Nation-States and Common Markets: The Institutional Conditions for Acceptance
In: Review of international political economy: RIPE, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 494-530
ISSN: 0969-2290
The polarized debate on the future of the nation-state in common markets singularly focuses on who controls supranational decision making. Scholars of the European Union (EU) have long disagreed over the extent to which nation-states control the European Commission. It is contended that common markets can erode the authority of the nation-state through a second venue: with the promulgation of rules that, on proper implementation, reach deep into national legislative & administrative authority & strip the nation-state of its ability to regulate important aspects of social life. When viewed from this perspective, the nation-state appears strangely positioned. The EU & Mercosur states at times yield to, & at times refuse, transnational rules. An explanation for these implementation patterns is proposed that should contribute more to a genuine understanding of current state-market conditions than any additional claim for or against the hegemony of common markets. The hypothesis is institutional, centering on the challenges that transnational rules pose regarding policy legacies & interest group organization of nation-states. To test the hypothesis, it is applied to the EU & the fate of a major environmental directive in Italy, GB, & Spain. 3 Tables, 103 References. Adapted from the source document.