AbstractThis paper uses a dynamic game to investigate the strategic interactions between carbon taxation by a coalition of resource consumers and (wellhead) energy pricing by a producers' cartel under the possibility of innovation in a cheap carbon-free technology. The timing of innovation is uncertain, but can be affected by the amount spent on R &D. The results show that the expectation of possible innovation decreases both the initial carbon tax and producer price, resulting in higher initial resource extraction and carbon emissions. Though this 'green paradox' effect triggered by possible innovation also will appear in the cooperative case (without strategic interactions), the presence of strategic interactions between resource producers and consumers can somewhat restrain such an effect. For both the resource consumers and a global planner, the optimal R &D to stimulate innovation is an increasing function of the initial CO2 concentration. However, the resource consumers can over-invest in R &D relative to the investment level that a global planner would choose.
This article presents the history of the formation and development of Russian oriental and sinology studies, as well as a detailed analysis of the scientific works of Russian and Chinese scientists, in particular, much attention is paid to the works of B.L. Riftin.
AbstractAlthough environmental taxes have become a popular policy tool, their effectiveness for pollution control and impact on the compliance strategies of agents remains questionable. This research uses a quasi‐experimental design to examine the effectiveness of the Pay for Permit policy, an environmental tax that has been imposed on water pollution emissions in Lake Tai Basin, Jiangsu, China, since 2009. A plant‐level panel dataset from 2007 to 2010 is used for both difference‐in‐differences and difference‐in‐difference‐in‐differences analyses to compare the pollution discharge, pollution abatement, and pollution generation of policy participants and control groups. The results indicate that treated plants reduce their emissions by about 40 percent after two years of the policy implementation. Thus, the policy generated approximately a 7 percent decrease in the industrial chemical oxygen demand emission in the entire Lake Tai Basin based on the emission level of 2007. Pollution is primarily reduced via end‐of‐pipe abatement instead of cleaner production. Our results show the effectiveness of environmental taxes in controlling industrial pollution, and indicate that the tax may not motivate the adoption of innovative techniques in the short term.