The dynamics of treaty change - measuring the distribution of power in the European Union
In: European integration online papers: EIoP ; an interdisciplinary working papers series, Band 15, S. 24
ISSN: 1027-5193
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In: European integration online papers: EIoP ; an interdisciplinary working papers series, Band 15, S. 24
ISSN: 1027-5193
In: European integration online papers: EIoP ; an interdisciplinary working papers series, Band 15, Heft 4
ISSN: 1027-5193
In: Journal of contemporary European research: JCER, Band 8, Heft 4
ISSN: 1815-347X
It is a commonplace that the mechanisms established in the stability and growth pact are blunt instruments. They are highly politicised as both the establishment of infringements and possible sanctions are subject to votes in the EU Council. The financial crisis of 2009/10 has dramatically altered the financial situation of many EU member states and has also shown the need for new regulatory instruments to enforce budgetary discipline in the Euro zone. Figures on the EU member states' budget debts from 1999 to 2010 support this argument empirically. We discuss the current reform proposals and show that the introduction of a reversed qualified majority is likely to strengthen substantially the position of the European Commission to sanction non-complying member states. This becomes possible because decisive players in the EU Council will be closer to the position of the Commission.
In: International journal of public administration, Band 40, Heft 14, S. 1237-1249
ISSN: 1532-4265
In: European political science review: EPSR, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 283-307
ISSN: 1755-7747
It is widely debated in studies of international negotiations why certain negotiators are more successful than others. Institutionalist and rationalist approaches claim that institutions and negotiators' resources largely explain the outcome of negotiations, whereas constructivist approaches stress the importance of shared norms and values. The article asks to what extent the use of normative arguments explains negotiation success in EU treaty negotiations. We apply our approach to the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam. We first define normative arguments as justifications for positions that refer to common norms and develop a concept of common values for EU constitutional negotiations. Second, we assess to what degree governments justify their positions by normative arguments using an automated analysis of position papers. Finally, we ask if such justifications increase success in negotiations. The results of our statistical models show that arguing affects negotiation success significantly and positively.