The budgetary consequences of the reform proposals in Agenda 2000 have stimulated the debate on the financial costs and benefits of EU-membership. This article analyses the implications of the proposed agricultural reform for the net contributions by simulating three scenarios. The inclusion of implicit trade subsidies is vital in the discussion on net positions. Agenda 2000 is projected to affect substantially the net positions of member states.
Over the period 2005-2009 the Dutch government increased childcare subsidies substantially, reducing the average effective parental fee by 50%, and extended subsidies to so-called guestparent care. We estimate the labour supply effect of this reform with a difference-in-differences strategy, using parents with older children as a control group. We find that the reform had a moderately sized impact on labour supply. Furthermore, the effects are an upper bound since there was also an increase in an earned income tax credit for the same treatment group over the same period. The joint reform increased the maternal employment rate by 2.3%-points (3.0%). Average hours worked by mothers increased by 1.1 hours per week (6.2%). Decomposing the hours effect we find that most of the increase in hours is due to the intensive margin response. A number of robustness checks confirm our results.
The European Commission favours the introduction of a consolidated corporate tax base to overcome the distortions arising from the existing system of separate accounting. The blueprints for consolidation are simulated with the applied general equilibrium model CORTAX. We show that the benefits of a common consolidated tax base are limited due to two weaknesses. Formula apportionment, which is needed to allocate the consolidated taxable profits across jurisdictions, creates for MNEs new tax planning possibilities to exploit tax rate differentials in the European Union. In addition, it triggers tax competition as the incentives for member states to attract foreign investment by reducing their tax rates are enforced. The second weakness arises from the unlevel playing field, which is introduced if only part of the firms chooses to participate in the consolidation. The gains from consolidation can be fully grasped if it is obliged for all firms and accompanied by harmonisation of the tax rate.
This memo documents version 7 of the model, which is used in in Bettendorf et al. (2006). The first chapter documents the derivation of the equations. The calibration of the model is described in chapter 2. Section 1.1 derives the first-order conditions for consumption and labour supply from utility-maximising households. Section 1.2 derives from profit maximisation, the demand for labour, capital, location specific capital, intermediate inputs and financial assets for domestic and multinational firms. Taxes on corporate income, labour income, consumption and wealth are introduced when appropriate. The tax revenues have to meet the government expenditures on consumption, transfers and debt, see section 1.3. The market equilibria and the linkages with the Rest of the World are presented in section 1.4. Section 1.5 presents the solution procedure. Notation follows some simple rules. Upper case symbols are used for aggregated values whereas lower case characters are reserved for per capita variables (in terms of the young generation in the country of origin). In the case of variables with two dimensions, the first index refers to the country which owns the resource (residence), whereas the second index denotes the using country (destination). Time subscripts and country indices are dropped in the exposition whenever this is possible. The rates of return on bonds ( ˆ rwb) and equities ( ˆ rwe) are assumed fixed. The considered countries are small in the sense that they can import (or export) capital from the Rest of the World (ROW) without affecting the world interest rates. In other words, the net supply of capital by the ROW is perfectly elastic. Multinationals are assumed to operate only in the other 'small' countries, but not in the ROW (and vice versa). The ROW block does not need to be fully modelled. International capital and good flows are restricted by the current account for each country.
This paper analyzes the impact of corporate taxes on structural unemployment, using an applied general equilibrium model for the European Union. We find that the unemployment and welfare effects of corporate taxes differ considerably among European countries. The magnitude of these effects rise in particular in the broadness of the corporate tax base of a country, and the strength of international spillover effects through foreign direct investment. The effect on unemployment is smaller if the substitution elasticity between labour and capital is large, if international spillover effects operate primarily via multinational profit shifting, and if equilibrium forces on the labour market are strong. Although the effect of corporate taxes on unemployment may be smaller than the effect of labour and value-added taxes (e.g. under relatively strong real wage resistance), the welfare costs of corporate taxation are typically larger for most European countries under plausible parameters, especially under strong international spillovers.