Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Contents -- Part I: A Phenomenological Conception of Experiential Justification -- Chapter 1: Motivating PCEJ -- 1.1 What Is PCEJ? -- 1.2 Initial Motivation for PCEJ -- 1.3 Motivating PCEJ via a Recent Controversy -- 1.4 Defending PCEJ Against a Recent Objection -- Chapter 2: Perceptual Justification -- 2.1 Different Versions of PCEJ in Current Analytic Epistemology -- 2.2 Epistemic Desiderata: Problems for Current Versions of PCEJ -- 2.2.1 Degrees of Justification -- 2.2.2 Empty Seemings -- 2.2.2.1 Cognitive Malfunction -- 2.2.3 Phenomenological Adequacy -- 2.2.3.1 Wishful Thinking -- 2.3 Phenomenology of Self-Givenness -- 2.3.1 The Basic Idea -- 2.3.2 Clarifications -- 2.4 Fulfilling the Epistemic Desiderata -- Chapter 3: Intuitional Justification -- 3.1 Perceptual Learning -- 3.2 What Are Intuitions? -- 3.3 Mathematical Intuitions: Towards a Phenomenological Clarification -- 3.4 Intuitional Learning -- 3.5 Cases of Intuitional Learning -- 3.5.1 Prime Number -- 3.5.2 Pythagoras -- 3.6 Intuition vs. Strong Conviction: Negative Multiplication -- 3.7 Epistemological Lessons from Intuitional Learning -- Chapter 4: How to Supplement Mentalist Evidentialism: Phenomenological Principles Are the Fundamental Epistemological Principl... -- 4.1 Introducing and Motivating Mentalist Evidentialism -- 4.2 Best Explanationism -- 4.3 Problems for Explanationism -- 4.3.1 Is EME Internalist? -- 4.3.2 EME Is Neither Foundationalist Nor Coherentist -- 4.3.3 The Charge of Overintellectualization -- 4.3.4 Degrees of Justification Made Difficult -- 4.3.5 Is Epistemic Justification Grounded in Non-normative Terms? -- 4.4 Phenomenological Mentalist Evidentialism -- 4.5 Virtues of PME -- 4.5.1 PME Is Internalist -- 4.5.2 PME Is Foundationalist -- 4.5.3 No Overintellectualization -- 4.5.4 Degrees of Justification Made Easy.

AbstractRecently, a number of phenomenological approaches to experiential justification emerged according to which an experience's justificatory force is grounded in the experience's distinctive phenomenology. The basic idea is that certain experiences exhibit a presentive phenomenology and that they are a source of immediate justification precisely by virtue of their presentive phenomenology. Such phenomenological approaches usually focus on perceptual experiences and mathematical intuitions. In this paper, I aim at a phenomenological approach to ethical experiences. I shall show that we need to make a distinction between evaluative experiences directed at concrete cases and ethical intuitions directed at general principles. The focus will be on evaluative experiences. I argue that evaluative experiences constitute a sui generis type of experience that gain their justificatory force by virtue of their presentive evaluative phenomenology. In Sect. 1, I introduce and motivate the phenomenological idea that certain experiences exhibit a justification-conferring phenomenology. In Sect. 4, I apply this idea to morally evaluative experiences. In Sect. 5, I suggest that certain epistemic intuitions should be considered epistemically evaluative experiences and I outline a strong parallelism between ethics and epistemology.

Abstract
Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i. e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl's a priori investigations on consciousness can be supplemented by research in experimental psychology in order to tackle fundamental questions in epistemology. Our result will be a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that is in accordance with and supported by empirical phenomena such as perceptual learning and the phenomenon of blindsight. Finally, I shall shed light on the systematic limits of empirical research.