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"This book develops an original interpretation of the relationship between F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel. It argues that the difference between these philosophers must be understood in light of their shared commitment to the philosophy of nature and the idea that spirit, or humanity, emerges from the natural world. The author makes a case for the contemporary relevance of German idealist philosophy of nature by walking the reader through its major themes, motivations, and arguments. Along the way, Schelling and Hegel are shown to develop key insights about the structure of reality and the dependence of living things and human beings upon inorganic natural processes. In elucidating the details of Schelling's and Hegel's respective philosophies of nature, the book challenges some of our most basic assumptions about the scope of philosophical inquiry and the relationship between matter, life, and human existence. Schelling, Hegel, and the Philosophy of Nature will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on German idealism, as well as those interested in contemporary philosophies of nature and the topic of emergence"--

The moral force and capacity for inspiration of both religion and politics alike arise in part from the sense that they authentically map the world as we nd it, yielding claims about how it should be. This paper asks what role we might imagine for law in this "hyperreal" world of religion and politics, arguing that law can display distinctive virtues linked to its capacity for strategic agnosticism about the real. Applying Sunstein's idea of "incompletely theorized agreements" to the politics of religious freedom, the paper examines the role of law as a tool of adhesion in two very different constitutional settings—Canada and Israel—and argues for modesty as a functional virtue in law and legal process. Viewed in this way, law draws its worth from its tolerance for ambiguity, its sub-theoretical nature, and its pragmatic proceduralism, seeking to sustain political community in the presence of normative diversity, rather than speaking truth to difference.

As a priori political judgments about what is a just punishment in all circumstances, minimum sentences pose particular and profound problems for the administration of criminal justice. Mandatory minimums are, however, politically seductive. Faced with their proliferation in Canadian penal law, Canadian courts have experimented with using the constitutional exemption as a means of addressing the excesses created by mandatory minimum sentences. This experiment was terminated in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Ferguson. Although this judgment has been met with dismay in some quarters, this article argues that the decision is best read as a welcome disruption of the troubling politics of minimum sentences and sends the right message about the substantive demands that we make of our penal laws and the responsibilities of politicians in their approach to criminal justice.

The author critically examines the claim that the Charter can be used to address social concerns about public health care through constitutional means. He concludes that a close examination of recent case law illuminated by the political assumptions underlying the Charter offers a far slimmer basis for hope than might initially appear.

RésuméLes tribunaux canadiens sont de plus en plus confrontés au défi de réconcilier une politique laïque libérale avec la protection de la liberté de religion de la Charte. Les approches traditionnelles envers le libéralisme et la laïcité ont rendu cette réconciliation particulièrement difficile, en promouvant une vision insatisfaisante, sur le plan conceptuel, d'un espace public areligieux, hyper-rationnel et dénué d'engagements moraux. En même temps, les théoriciens libéraux n'ont pas apprécié entièrement la nature et les demandes de la conscience religieuse. Cet article aborde les notions de libéralisme, de sécularisme et de conscience religieuse et suggère une compréhension de la relation entre les trois qui impliquerait un pluralisme arbitré sur la base des prémisses d'un langage de valeurs civiques. À l'aide d'une analyse de la jurisprudence canadienne, l'auteur montre que cette forme de réconciliation est déjà tacitement à l'œuvre. Cette approche est la manière la plus cohérente pour tracer les limites de la conscience religieuse au Canada et donne de la substance à la liberté religieuse tout en respectant le bien commun et les acquis du libéralisme séculier.