Suchergebnisse

While minimum wage is widely debated at both academic and political levels, little attention has been dedicated to documenting and assessing the implementation of and compliance with minimum wage policies. This paper begins to fill this research gap by identifying and qualitatively assessing a variety of minimum wage implementation mechanisms. The theoretical framework delineates various frameworks that explain what implementation strategies might be effective in achieving compliance with minimum wage. The empirical part offers examples of how these elements have been implemented in practice. First, it provides an overview of existing implementation mechanisms drawn from across the globe. Then, the British minimum wage implementation system is illustrated in detail. Finally, additional implementation strategies from the broader field of labour regulation are presented with a view to diversifying and strengthening minimum wage implementation. Based on the documentation of these strategies, five types of measures should be included in setting up an effective implementation system: First, persuasion strategies should be used to build public support for the minimum wage and encourage employers to comply voluntarily. Second, capacity building measures such as information sessions and training seminars should be undertaken so that employers and workers are informed about the minimum wage and so that employers know how to implement it in their firms. Third, the monitoring system should allow the detection of non-compliance. Labour inspections should be reinforced and carried out, especially in the sectors at risk; complaint procedures should be made more accessible and safer to workers and their representatives. Fourth, workers should be empowered to enforce their wage rights not just through individual complaints, but also through collective action, as workers fear retaliation when they are required to undertake individual action. For instance, unions should be given access to information on workers' wages, the opportunity to organize workers and the power to act on workers' behalf. Finally, sanctions should be structured such that they constitute an actual deterrent to non-compliance. This means that the cost of sanctions should be higher than the benefit of workers' underpayment. Moreover, the application of sanctions should be sure and incremental.

Abstract
This article contributes to the Comparative Political Economy discourse on countries' export specialization transitions. While current growth model literature often highlights producer coalitions' influence, we present a complementary perspective emphasizing industrial policies. These policies, we argue, are not solely shaped by politics but are also deeply influenced by sectoral technological capabilities. By strategically engaging in both demand and supply-side sectoral innovation processes, industrial policies deepen existing technological capabilities with spillover effects into new sectors or foster new sector-specific capabilities. Our empirical analysis comprises two main steps. First, we create export profiles for eight European nations, using OECD TiVA data from 1995 to 2018. These profiles are categorized based on their technological and innovation content. Second, we identify significant shifts in export structures within Ireland, Sweden and Spain. Through thorough case studies, we illustrate the role of industrial policies in cultivating sector-specific technological capabilities.

Popular accounts of labour market reforms in Western Europe have identified a process of dualisation over the last three decades, whereby service sector employ-ment has been deregulated while workers in the core manufacturing sector still en-joy high levels of employment protection and high wages. Two different labour market logics are thought to be in place between core and peripheral sectors and to co-exist in a stable equilibrium nurtured by the co-incidence of interests between capital and labour in core manufacturing sector, who jointly acted to safeguard workers in core sectors at the expense of peripheral service sectors. Building on the case studies of labour market and vocational training reform in Germany, this ar-ticle challenges this account. It is argued that processes of dualisation are best conceptualised as the contested outcome of a political conflict between capital and labour. Dualisation is not a stable equilibrium but rather the result of bargain-ing processes between employers who push for liberalization and unions who try to prevent it or - at least - mitigate it.

"This article proposes a new interpretation of the evolution of German industrial relations focusing on the interaction between macroeconomic dynamics and industrial relations developments and specifically on 'growth models'. It argues that there has been a shift in the German growth model from growth pulled by net exports and consumption simultaneously to almost exclusively export-led growth. In addition, exports of machinery and transportation equipment have become more price-sensitive, implying that wage and price increases now pose a greater threat to growth than in the past. These macroeconomic developments have spurred a set of adjustments in the industrial relations sphere with export-oriented firms seeking cost reductions and liberalizations. Industrial relations changes have in turn contributed to entrench export-led growth by augmenting the systemic importance of the foreign sector and reducing the relevance of domestic demand. The export sector has thrived at the expense of real wage stagnation, particularly (but not exclusively) in labour-intensive service sectors, and pattern bargaining has lost its ability to redistribute across sectors and boost domestic demand. The new German model is much leaner and meaner than in the past. Contrary to recent literature, its erosion and liberalization are not limited to the service periphery but affect the manufacturing core as well." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Why do skill formation systems put SMEs at greater disadvantage in some countries than others vis-à-vis large employers? By comparing vocational education and training (VET) institutions and their differential effect on firms of different sizes across three countries (UK, Italy, and Germany), we show that the design of VET has profound implications for shaping the ability of SMEs to use institutions as resources. In particular, quasi-market institutions in the UK amplify SMEs' disadvantage, while non-market coordinating institutions in Italy and Germany narrow the gap between SMEs and large employers. By unpacking the comparative disadvantage of SMEs, we offer important nuances to the argument that institutions help firms coordinate their business activities in different varieties of capitalism. ; Warum erfahren kleine und mittelständische Unternehmen (KMU) durch Berufsbildungssysteme mehr Nachteile als große Unternehmen und warum ist dieser Unterschied in manchen Ländern größer als in anderen? Wir vergleichen Ausbildungsinstitutionen und ihren unterschiedlichen Effekt auf Firmen verschiedener Größe in drei Ländern (Großbritannien, Italien und Deutschland). Dabei zeigen wir, dass die Art der Institutionen die Möglichkeit von Firmen, die vorhandenen Institutionen als Ressource zu nutzen, beeinflusst. Insbesondere verstärken die in Großbritannien vorherrschenden quasimarktlichen Institutionen den Nachteil von KMU, wohingegen nichtmarktliche Institutionen in Italien und Deutschland den Unterschied zu großen Unternehmen verringern. Durch das Aufzeigen des komparativen Nachteils von KMU leistet unser Papier einen Beitrag zu einer nuancierteren Sichtweise der Rolle von Institutionen in verschiedenen Spielarten des Kapitalismus.

This special issue wants to honour the memory of Giulio Regeni, a PhD student at the University of Cambridge who was assassinated while he was conducting field research on independent trade unions in Egypt. This introduction and the following articles focus on the theoretical, empirical and methodological questions at the core of Regeni's research. Unions have traditionally been regarded as crucial for representing the interests of the working class as a whole and for building and sustaining industrial and political democracy; however, there is a debate about the conditions under which unions can be effective, and the role of unions' internal democracy is particularly controversial. The article discusses the theoretical linkages between trade unions, democratization and union democracy and concludes with a reflection on the new concerns about the risk of conducting field research on these issues raised by Regeni's death.

Under what conditions can unions successfully regulate precarious employment? We compare the divergent trajectories of collective bargaining on agency work in the Italian and German metal sectors from the late 1990s. We explain the differences by the interaction between trade unions' institutional and associational power resources, mediated by employers' divide-and-rule strategies and by union strategies to (re)build a unitary front. In both countries, the liberalization of agency work allowed employers to exploit labour divides, undermining unions' associational power and preventing labour from negotiating effectively. However, while Italian unions remained 'trapped' in the vicious circle between weak legislation and fragmented labour, German unions were able to overcome their internal divides. The different degree of success depended on the nature of the divides within the labour movements.