Suchergebnisse

AbstractAfter decades of fertility postponement, we investigate recent changes in late parenthood across low‐fertility countries in the light of observations from the past. We use long series of age‐specific fertility rates from the Human Fertility Database (1950–2016) for women, and new data covering the period 1990–2016 for men. In 1950, the contribution of births at age 40 and over to female fertility rates ranged from 2.5 to 9 percent, but then fell sharply until the 1980s. From the 1990s, however, the prevalence of late first births increased rapidly, especially so in countries where it was initially lowest. This has produced a late fertility rebound in the last two decades, occurring much faster for women than for men. Comparisons between recent and past extremely late (age 48+) fertility levels confirm that people are now challenging the natural fertility barriers, particularly for a first child.

We study the aggregate gap between intended and actual fertility in 19 European countries and the US based on a cohort approach. This complements prior research that had mainly used a period approach. We compare the mean intended number of children among young women aged 20 to 24 (born in the early 1970s), measured during the 1990s in the Fertility and Family Surveys, with data on completed fertility in the same cohorts around age 40. In a similar manner, we compare the share who state that they do not want a child with actual cohort childlessness. Our exploration is informed by the cognitive - social model of fertility intentions developed by Bachrach and Morgan (Popul Dev Rev 39(3):459–485, 2013). In all countries, women eventually had, on average, fewer children than the earlier expectations in their birth cohort, and more often than intended, they remained childless. The results reveal distinct regional patterns, which are most apparent for childlessness. The gap between intended and actual childlessness is widest in the Southern European and the German-speaking countries and smallest in the Central and Eastern European countries. Additionally, we analyze the aggregate intentions-fertility gap among women with different levels of education. The gap is largest among highly educated women in most countries studied and the educational gradient varies by region, most distinctively for childlessness. Differences between countries suggest that contextual factors - norms about parenthood, work - family policies, unemployment - shape women's fertility goals, total family size, and the gap between them.

Abstract
Fertility rates among individuals in their 20s have fallen sharply across Europe over the past 50 years. The implications of delayed first births for fertility levels in modern family regimes remain little understood. Using microsimulation models of childbearing and partnership for the 1970–1979 birth cohorts in Italy, Great Britain, Sweden, and Norway, we implement fictive scenarios that reduce the risk of having a first child before age 30 and examine fertility recovery mechanisms for aggregate fertility indicators (the proportion of women with at least one, two, three, or four children; cohort completed fertility rate). Exposure to a first birth increases systematically in the ages following the simulated reduction in first-birth risks, leading to a structural recovery in childbearing that varies across countries according to their fertility and partnership regimes. Full recovery requires an increase in late first-birth risks, with greater increases in countries where late family formation is uncommon and average family sizes are larger: in scenarios where early fertility declines substantially (a linear decline from 50% at age 15 to 0% at age 30), first-birth risks above age 30 would have to increase by 54% in Great Britain, 40% in Norway and Sweden, and 20% in Italy to keep completed fertility constant.

As first births are increasingly postponed across Europe, a strong two-child family norm persists. Past research has examined educational differentials in progressions to second birth, testing various hypotheses but overlooking normative aspects. Comparing fertility surveys from France and Spain, we explore whether late first-time mothers, who have fewer reproductive biological years left to conceive, accelerate the transition to a subsequent child (time squeeze effect). We also consider a normative dimension, i.e., whether women have their first child earlier or later than others in their educational and cohort groups. In both countries, among first-time mothers between 25 and 34 years of age, highly-educated women transitioned to second birth more frequently than less-educated women did. Within the same age group, highly-educated women in Spain had a second child more quickly after the firstborn than their less educated counterparts did, while there is no such difference in France. These results hold after controlling for cohort effects, but are only partly explained by a time squeeze effect. Different normative ages at first birth by education and birth cohort explain the educational gap in the likelihood of transitioning to second birth, but not the birth intervals in Spain. In sum, our analysis demonstrates a persistent educational gap in second births in this country that cannot be reduced to biological or normative effects. This suggests that a broad range of economic constraints play a role, such as unfavourable individual economic conditions and lower levels of institutional support for parenthood.