Suchergebnisse

Canada is sorely in need of electoral reform. Its present system of giving legislative representation only to candidates who win the most votes in geographically defined constituencies is grossly unfair. Yet it appears that neither the legislative nor the executive branches of government is likely to initiate any meaningful reform. For proportional representation (PR) to be adopted, the courts will have to insist on the change. This is not a new idea. The Japanese Supreme Court had to declare three national elections unconstitutional before the government adopted a modified PR system. Those who continue to defend the present first-past-the-post (FPTP) system claim that FPTP is conducive to stronger, more stable, & therefore more effective governments. This claim is unlikely to stand up in court. Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, & Sweden all include proportionality in their electoral systems & all have had stable & effective governments for decades. The constitutional deficiencies of Canada's FPTP system will assuredly be recognized by the courts & reform effected soon after. J. Stanton

Examines Canadian Supreme Court method of judicial review under 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms and implications for protection of human rights.

Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- 1. Human Rights and the Rules of Law -- 2. Federal Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights in the United States of America -- 3. Judicial Review by the Supreme Court of Canada Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: The First Ten Years -- 4. Human Rights and Constitutional Review in Japan -- 5. The Jurisprudence of Human Rights -- 6. Methods and Criteria of Judgement on the Question of Rights to Freedom in Italy -- 7. Human Rights and Judicial Review in Germany -- 8. Human Rights and Judicial Review: The European Court of Human Rights -- 9. The Last Generation: When Rights Lose their Meaning -- International Studies in Human Rights.

In this essay, Professor Beatty reviews the leading Charter cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada which consider the constitutionality of a variety of different labour laws. In reasoning and result, he finds that by and large these cases provide strong support for those legal scholars who are generally sceptical of the law and critical of the courts and who predicted that, even with the Charter, it was unlikely the Court would change the antipathy judges have historically displayed to the interests of workers and their associations. However, while these legal theorists may draw some comfort from these decisions in confirming their powers of prognostication, Professor Beatty concludes that the workers who were adversely affected by them can take little solace in being left out in the cold.

In this essay Professor Beatty joins the debate as to how, if at all, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the process of judicial review can be integrated with our tradition of democratic rule and the sovereignty of the popular will. Rather than deal directly with the arguments of those who are critical of the entrenchment of a written bill of rights, Professor Beatty endeavors to cast the Charter and the new role of the judges in the best possible light. Analogizing the process of constitutional review to "conversations of justification" (using examples drawn from the labour law field), Professor Beatty describes how the Charter offers those who are generally financially weak, numerically small and otherwise politically disadvantaged an opportunity to participate in the formulation of social policies which profoundly affect their lives in a way majoritarian politics have never allowed.