Suchergebnisse

We study the relative efficiency of two mechanisms actually employed in large-scale public procurements, often for transportation projects such as roads, bridges and rapid transit systems. In the more common "bidding the project" mechanism, the government specifies the size of the project (a quantity) and firms bid prices (the lowest bid winning). In the "bidding the envelope" mechanism the government specifies what it is willing to spend and firms bid quantities (the highest winning). With uncertainty about project costs and benefits, the much less frequently applied "bidding the envelope" mechanism can lead to higher value for money. Its advantage lies in its ability to allow quantity to adjust to high or low costs. ; Conicyt FB0816 and Milenio P-05-004-F

This paper analyzes the incentives for and welfare implications of collaboration among local governments in landside port accessibility investment. In particular, we consider two seaports with their respective captive markets and a common inland market for which the ports compete. The ports and the inland belong to three independent regional governments, each making investment decisions on accessibility for its own region. We find that there is a conflict of interest between the port governments and inland government in terms of their jointly making accessibility investment decisions, and that each region's preference over various coalitions is highly affected by ownership type of the competing ports. For public ports, the inland may compensate the port regions to achieve the grand coalition that maximizes total welfare but requires a sizable investment in the port regions. For private ports, however, the port regions benefit from coordinating with the inland and hence may be able to compensate the inland to form the grand coalition. ; Research Grants Council of Hong Kong RGC/PolyU 252015/14E Institute for Complex Engineering systemas (ISCI) grants Conicyt FB0-16 Milenio P-05-004-F Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)