Suchergebnisse

THE MODEL OF "CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY" IS NO LONGER REGARDED IN ANGLO-SAXON COUNTRIES AS A CURIOSITY BUT MAY BE IN DANGER OF BEING ACCEPTED TOO UNCRITICALLY AS A MODEL FOR RESOLUTION OF DIVISIONS WITHIN A SOCIETY. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE AFFECT OF ATTEMPTING TO INTRODUCE CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CANADA AND NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD BE TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE.

What is social justice? In Theories of Justice Brian Barry provides a systematic and detailed analysis of two kinds of answers. One is that justice arises from a sense of the advantage to everyone of having constraints on the pursuit of self-interest. The other answer connects the idea of justice with that of impartiality. Though the first book of a trilogy, Theories of Justice stands alone and constitutes a major contribution to the debate about social justice that began in 1971 with Rawls's A Theory of Justice.

This Research Project critically appraises the current dispute resolution mechanisms for employment law in Ireland. This exploration provides the basis for submissions to improve the overall service for workers, employers and Government. The researcher undertook the following strands of analysis: A comprehensive study and critical analysis of existing employment dispute resolution fora in Ireland both on a systematic level, and on a forum-specific level. ; TARA (Trinity?s Access to Research Archive) has a robust takedown policy. Please contact us if you have any concerns: rssadmin@tcd.ie

An interview with Brian Berry in which the interviewee discusses his career as a political scientist.

In response to criticisms made by Keith Dowding (hereafter KD) of `Capitalists Rule OK', this article argues (1) that there is a genuine structural conflict of interest between consumers and producers, voters and politicians, and capitalists and governments, and (2) that only by ad hoc and arbitrary limitations on the scope of the concept of power can it be denied that consumers collectively have power over producers and capitalists (collectively) have power over government. KD accepts that voters (collectively) have power over governments. Ironically, however, this is by far the most tenuous and generally problematic of the three putative power relations. Furthermore, there is no plausible way of conceding that voters (collectively) have power over politicians without also having to accept the validity of a power relation in the other two cases. The implication is that the thesis that is supposed to justify the standard North American or western European politico-economic system, according to which consumers and voters have power but capitalists do not, is nothing more than ideology, in Marx's sense of a fantastical picture of the world designed by the beneficiaries of the status quo to protect their privileged positions against legitimate demands for revolutionary change. The article concludes by taking up KD's primary objection to `Capitalists Rule', which is its rejection of the proposal to equate power with resources. According to KD's official definition, `resources' are the means of raising and lowering others' utilities. I pointed out in `Capitalists Rule' that KD himself acknowledges the inadequacy of this definition, since he almost immediately goes on to say that people do not necessarily have the power that is attributed to them. Obviously, `power' in this new sense must be something different, and is, in fact, the ability to get people to do what you want them to do or to refrain from doing things you do not want them to do. This is precisely my own proposed definition in `Capitalists Rule'. The only remaining disagreement arises from KD's wish to turn everything that lies between power in his first sense and power in his second (and my) sense into a further `resource'. I argue that this is obfuscatory and, in any case, infeasible.

In response to criticisms made by Keith Dowding (hereafter KD) of 'Capitalists Rule OK', this article argues (1) that there is a genuine structural conflict of interest between consumers & producers, voters & politicians, & capitalists & governments, & (2) that only by ad hoc & arbitrary limitations on the scope of the concept of power can it be denied that consumers collectively have power over producers & capitalists (collectively) have power over government. KD accepts that voters (collectively) have power over governments. Ironically, however, this is by far the most tenuous & generally problematic of the three putative power relations. Furthermore, there is no plausible way of conceding that voters (collectively) have power over politicians without also having to accept the validity of a power relation in the other two cases. The implication is that the thesis that is supposed to justify the standard North American or western European politico-economic system, according to which consumers & voters have power but capitalists do not, is nothing more than ideology, in Marx's sense of a fantastical picture of the world designed by the beneficiaries of the status quo to protect their privileged positions against legitimate demands for revolutionary change. The article concludes by taking up KD's primary objection to 'Capitalists Rule', which is its rejection of the proposal to equate power with resources. According to KD's official definition, 'resources' are the means of raising & lowering others' utilities. I pointed out in 'Capitalists Rule' that KD himself acknowledges the inadequacy of this definition, since he almost immediately goes on to say that people do not necessarily have the power that is attributed to them. Obviously, 'power' in this new sense must be something different, & is, in fact, the ability to get people to do what you want them to do or to refrain from doing things you do not want them to do. This is precisely my own proposed definition in 'Capitalists Rule'. The only remaining disagreement arises from KD's wish to turn everything that lies between power in his first sense & power in his second (& my) sense into a further 'resource'. I argue that this is obfuscatory &, in any case, infeasible. [Copyright 2003 Sage Publications, Ltd.]

Normative political theory and empirical social science have a reciprocal relationship. This thesis is illustrated by taking up two topics: one is social exclusion; the other is ethnicity and discrimination.

Even if we do not observe those who own or manage capital doing anything, are there nevertheless good reasons for saying that they have power over government? My thesis is that, on any analysis of `power over others' that enables us to say that voters have power over those elected and that consumers have power over producers, we also have to say that those who own or control capital have power over government. Conversely, the reasons that can be given (and have been given) for denying that owners of capital have power over governments would be equally good reasons for denying that voters have power over governments and that consumers have power over producers.

Even if we do not observe those who own or manage capital doing anything, are there nevertheless good reasons for saying that they have power over government? My thesis is that, on any analysis of "power over others" that enables us to say that voters have power over those elected & that consumers have power over producers, we also have to say that those who own or control capital have power over government. Conversely, the reasons that can be given (& have been given) for denying that owners of capital have power over governments would be equally good reasons for denying that voters have power over governments & that consumers have power over producers. Adapted from the source document.