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In 2021, the UK system for regulating the conduct of parliamentarians was briefly plunged into crisis. The government responded to a proposal to sanction one of its MPs – who had been found to have egregiously breached the Code of Conduct and accompanying rules - by threatening to change the whole system. This highly unusual interference by the executive branch, though withdrawn within 24 hours, violated the axiom that the executive should not have a say in disciplining members of the legislature because this might compromise parliament's ability to hold the government to account. Yet the ensuing debate has prompted calls to move the UK system yet further away from self-regulation and grant more powers of oversight to 'external' roles and bodies. This article draws on interviews with MPs to analyse whether this longstanding trajectory of reform is in line with how these "rule makers" perceive the system's flaws. It concludes that, over the years, MPs have to a large extent forfeited the right to regulate their own conduct by repeatedly shirking their responsibilities to regulate themselves effectively. Moreover, the constant focus on 'fixing' the procedures for investigating and sanctioning misconduct has crowded out a more constructive discussion about how to promote ethical behaviour.

Collective action initiatives in which governments and companies make anti-corruption commitments have proliferated in recent years. This apparently prosocial behavior defies the logic of collective action and, given that bribery often goes undetected and unpunished, is not easily explained by principal-agent theory. Club theory suggests that the answer lies in the institutional design of anti-corruption clubs: collective action can work as long as membership has high entry costs, members receive selective benefits, and compliance is adequately policed. This article contributes to the debate by examining how these conditions manifest in the case of anti-corruption clubs in the realm of international business, with particular focus on the international dimension of many initiatives. This vertical aspect of institutional design creates a richer, more complex set of reputational and material benefits for members, as well as allowing for more credible and consistent monitoring and enforcement.

Aspiration of oropharyngeal flora is the most common route of acquiring Gram‐negative pneumonia, a major nosocomial infection. Epidemiologic studies indicate that the elderly are at increased risk for developing these life‐threatening pneumonias. The primary objective of this study was to determine the effects of salivary oral defenses against Gram‐negative colonization. The study population consisted of 41 male outpatients, age 70 and older, seen at the Denver VAMC. The group included subjects with both diminished and normal salivary flow. Each subject answered a questionnaire regarding overall health, medication use, and symptoms of salivary dysfunction. We then collected whole saliva, unstimulated and stimulated parotid saliva, and performed a throat swab on each patient. For each throat culture, analysis was done to identify Gram‐negative bacteria. Flow rates between colonized (n = 6) and noncolonized subjects (n = 34) were compared. While there were no significant differences in the flow rates between the two groups, a trend was noticed in that flow rates were lower for all three flow measures in the colonized group (whole, 22% decrease; unstimulated, 22% decrease; and stimulated, 28% decrease). These preliminary findings suggest that subjects with diminished salivary flow may possibly be at Increased risk for oropharyngeal Gram‐negative colonization. Research on the role that saliva plays in oropharyngeal bacterial colonization is continuing

Incoming governments sometimes abuse their power to manipulate the allocation of government contracts so as to buy loyalty from cronies. While scandals suggest such practices are relatively widespread, the extent of such partisan favoritism is difficult to measure and the conditions under which it flourishes under-theorized. Drawing on theory regarding the role of institutions as constraints on corruption, we identify three spheres of political influence over government contracting and show how elites can manipulate two of those spheres to increase their opportunities to influence the procurement process and minimize external accountability, facilitating the corrupt allocation of contracts to partisan allies. Using an innovative big data methodology, we then identify the effects of a change in government on procurement markets in two countries, Hungary and the United Kingdom, which differ in terms of political influence over these institutions. We find that politically-favored companies secure 50–60% of the central government contracting market in Hungary but only 10% in the UK.

Transparency in the extractives sector is widely seen as an important tool for improving accountability and deterring corruption. Yet for those very reasons, it is a puzzle that so many governments in corruption‐prone countries have voluntarily signed up to greater scrutiny in this area by joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). We argue that EITI serves as a reputational intermediary, whereby reformers can signal good intentions and international actors can reward achievement. International and domestic actors thus utilize EITI to diffuse the norm of resource transparency and to advance reformist aims in a highly problematic policy area.

This article explores how realism in political theory can inform our understanding of political corruption. Whereas political moralists see corruption as a problem of implementation, which does not undermine their values, realists see corruption as posing a more fundamental problem, challenging the very nature of politics and undermining the attempt to establish and exercise authority in the ordering of conflict and the allocation of resources. Recent realist work has sought to characterize a discrete type of "institutional" corruption, and to construct political corruption as the antithesis of good governance or impartiality. Other work has focused on the micro level, drawing on new insights from psychology and experimental economics to analyze individual decisions and motivations to behave corruptly. This article challenges scholars to build future research upon a richer understanding of the realities of political life that are intrinsic to both individual and institutional patterns of corruption.

This article explores how realism in political theory can inform our understanding of political corruption. Whereas political moralists see corruption as a problem of implementation, which does not undermine their values, realists see corruption as posing a more fundamental problem, challenging the very nature of politics and undermining the attempt to establish and exercise authority in the ordering of conflict and the allocation of resources. Recent realist work has sought to characterize a discrete type of 'institutional' corruption, and to construct political corruption as the antithesis of good governance or impartiality. Other work has focused on the micro level, drawing on new insights from psychology and experimental economics to analyze individual decisions and motivations to behave corruptly. This article challenges scholars to build future research upon a richer understanding of the realities of political life that are intrinsic to both individual and institutional patterns of corruption. Adapted from the source document.