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Discusses possible causal linkages.

THE LINKAGE OF REGIME CHANGE AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN SOME OF THE MORE INDUSTRIALIZED LATIN AMERICAN STATES MAY BE SUMMARIZED IN THE FORM OF A MODEL WITH SIX ELEMENTS: A SHIFT IN THE PATTERN OF INDUSTRIALIZATION; DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN INVESTORS AND FOREIGN SOURCES OF CREDIT; TECHNOCRATS; THE POTENTIAL FOR CRISIS; A DELICATELY-BALANCED POLITICAL SITUATION; AND THE MILITARY. THE RECENT WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION CHALLENGES THIS MODEL. IN AT LEAST SOME COUNTRIES, MILITARY WITHDRAWAL HAS OCCURRED IN A CLIMATE REMINISCENT OF THOSE THIS MODEL SUGGESTS ARE DEMOCRACY-DESTROYING. IN THIS ESSAY, THE AUTHOR USES A CASE STUDY OF BRAZIL TO TEST THE MODEL.

In the wake of the Latin American military coups of the 1960s and 1970s, an extensive and impressive body of literature explored the origins and development of these new military regimes. This paper examines some of the high points of this literature: Huntington's and Nun's proposals of the military as the agent of the modernizing middle classes, Skidmore's focus on the inadequacy of one precoup party system, and O'Donnell's version of the thesis of a crisis in peripheral capitalist industrialization. While each proposal has shed light on some aspects of these regimes, all of them raise questions about the thinking of the central actors in military politics that currently dominant lines of empirical research are unlikely to resolve.

Some emphasis on the Brazilian political system. Based on studies that address the issues of democratic institutions in Brazil, political consequences of the military's relationship to the middle class, and the interactions of industrial development and political life.

Kritische Erörterung der These von A. Stepan hinsichtlich der Übernahme der Führungsrolle durch das brasilianische Militär 1964 aufgrund ideologischer Veränderungen vor allem an der Escola Superior de Guerra. Hinweis auf die Bedeutung des Machtzuwachses der Streitkräfte gegenüber den bundesstaatlichen Milizen und Hervorhebung der zunehmenden Dysfunktionalität einer Mittlerrolle angesichts der sich häufenden Interventionen vor 1964

INTRODUCTIONIn looking at yesterday's frontiers (or at today's industrialized world), social analysts tend to see violence as a straightforward and uncomplicated phenomenon: when openly used, it is a direct way of settling disputes; when it is not used but available, it is a necessary—and, at least in the short run, sufficient—condition of domination. As a background condition violence is readily forgotten. Such is the case even in the study of the various affronts to authority that are lumped under the rubric of'collective behavior.' One speaks of violent 'episodes' arising from the 'breakdown' of various routine social mechanisms. By the same token, all the interesting problems in political theory seem to lie in the area of how to control people in every other conceivable manner: through the establishment of a normative consensus, through ideologies, through the creation of common interests, or through bargains and deals. Sufficient consideration is not usually given to the varied and subtle effects of these ways in which the capacity for violence is structured in social life. But consequences follow for any society from the presence or absence of full-time military specialists, from the forms of their organization, from the regional distribution of control of organized violence, from the advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of force, and from the norms associated with such use.