Suchergebnisse

"We estimate channels of international risk sharing between European Monetary Union (EMU), European Union, and other OECD countries 1992-2007. We focus on risk sharing through savings, factor income flows, and capital gains. Risk sharing through factor income and capital gains was close to zero before 1999 but has increased since then. Risk sharing from capital gains, at about 6 percent, is higher than risk sharing from factor income flows for European Union countries and OECD countries. Risk sharing from factor income flows is higher for Euro zone countries, at 14 percent, reflecting increased international asset and liability holdings in the Euro area"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

AbstractIn this paper, we investigate the impact of institutional quality on risk sharing across Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) and emerging economies (EMEs). It has been found that the quality of institutions and risk sharing are significantly interrelated among OECD members (mostly through credit market channel), but not for the EMEs. Our results are consistent when we control for pre‐ and post‐GFC periods. The reason why the impact of institutional quality on risk sharing is limited among EMEs might be due to the significant monetary injections from advanced economies in the form of remittances and financial aid which might understate other factors that influence risk sharing.

In this article, we first measure the potential welfare gains from perfect risk sharing among Australian states and New Zealand regions under possible unification. We show that New Zealand regions reap moderate gains from perfect risk sharing when they form a union with Australia, whereas for Australian states, the gains are somewhat similar to what they have attained at the intranational level. Second, we measure the extent of interstate risk sharing and intertemporal smoothing between the two countries. We are able to observe a substantial degree of intertemporal smoothing among Australian states and New Zealand regions, either alone or jointly, thus confirming the permanent income hypothesis. Further, unique to the risk‐sharing literature, we decompose the aggregate (nondiversifiable) output shocks into positive and negative components, in order to assess the strength of risk‐sharing mechanisms across business cycles. The study finds a virtual absence of risk sharing when Australia and New Zealand face negative aggregate fluctuations, raising doubts about the feasibility of the union, particularly during economic downturns. (JEL F41, F36)

PurposeThe conventional and new inflation bias theories present two distinct facets to explain the outcome of excess inflation without output gains by a discretionary central banker. First is the temptation to achieve a higher than potential output, and, second is not to let it falter. The authors explicitly account for these two distinct dimensions in empirical formulations both exogenously and endogenously. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to investigate what monetary discretion can and cannot do in terms of dual objectives – inflation and growth – across boom and bust cycles, both directly and indirectly.Design/methodology/approach(i) Segregate the economic activity into boom and bust cycles; (ii) Explicitly account for the two dimensions of conventional and new inflation bias theories; and (iii) model and estimate the direct and indirect effects of monetary discretion across business cycles.FindingsThe results indicate considerable asymmetries in the effects of monetary discretion and distribution thereof across objectives and cycles. The direct impact of monetary discretion tends to induce significantly higher inflation in boom and bust cycles, while it exerts a positive but insignificant effect on output. The inflation effects are more pronounced in boom than bust cycles and vice versa are the output effects. The indirect effects on output via inflation are significantly pernicious, which are more pronounced in expansions than recessions.Originality/valueIn a nutshell, instead of benefiting, monetary discretion tends to harm in terms of both the dual policy objectives, which cautions about its well calculated and constrained use only.

AbstractWe calculated the real effective exchange rate indexes and measured their volatilities based on four currency baskets to find which currency basket is optimal for achieving China's policy target of keeping exchange rates stable. The volatility of the bilateral exchange rate between the RMB and the US dollar is also calculated to make a comparative analysis. Results showed that the bilateral exchange rate of the RMB and the US dollar is only stable in special time periods. In most time periods, pegging to the G3 currency basket is optimal to achieve the goal of stabilizing exchange rates while pegging to the AMU currency basket will result in the most volatile exchange rates.