Suchergebnisse

A nation of nonbelievers -- Classifying secularities -- A cultural view of secularities -- Historical foundations -- The great abdicating -- Nonreligious belief systems -- Ethnicity, assimilation, and secularity -- Gender and secularity -- Marriage, family, and social networks -- The (explicit) politics of secularity -- A secular, cosmical movement?

Theorized links between science and secularism are prevalent in classic sociological thought. More recently, scholars have critiqued these frameworks as oversimplified and empirically untenable. In response to such criticisms, contemporary researchers typically overlook or actively argue against links between science and secularism. This study analyzes data from a random, national survey of adults to examine the empirical connections between perceptions of science and secular identities in the United States. Analyses demonstrate that perceptions of science correlate strongly with American secularism, particularly among atheists and agnostics. Additionally, politicized views of science help account for the previously documented relationship between political and secular identities in the United States. A perspective drawing on the sociology of culture and perceived knowledge provides a more useful framework for understanding these patterns than theories of secularization.

Abstract
Journalistic sources seem to suggest that there has been a resurgence of the American Religious Left (i.e., politically liberal Christians who support progressive agendas) in the wake of the strong support from the conservative Christian right in the 2016 presidential election of Donald J. Trump. Using quantitative analysis, we draw on survey data from the General Social Survey, the Public Religion Research Institute, and the National Congregations Study to assess the possibility of a resurgence among the Religious Left. In comparison with a speculated rise, our analysis indicates a notable decline in both the prevalence and engagement of Americans who self-identify as both religious and politically liberal. Not only is the constituency of the Religious Left shrinking, they have also been steadily disengaging from political activity in the last decade. Especially when looking at more recent elections, it has been those among the Secular Left who have been the most politically engaged. We summarize these empirical patterns in relation to the Religious Right and consider the potential for influence among the Religious Left aside from electoral politics. We also briefly consider other possibilities for their political impact and reflect on the inadequacy of the label "Religious Left" for capturing important dynamics. In the end, we urge greater attention to politics among sociologists of religion, providing a set of research questions to consider in light of the upcoming American 2020 national election.

Deviance Management examines how individuals and subcultures manage the stigma of being labeled socially deviant. Exploring high-tension religious groups, white power movements, paranormal subcultures, LGBTQ groups, drifters, recreational drug and alcohol users, and more, the authors identify how and when people combat, defy, hide from, or run from being stigmatized as "deviant." While most texts emphasize the criminological features of deviance, the authors' coverage here showcases the diversity of social and noncriminal deviance. Deviance Management allows for a more thorough understanding of strategies typically used by normalization movements to destigmatize behaviors and identities while contributing to the study of social movements and intra-movement conflict

AbstractRecent research demonstrates strong connections between Americans' embrace of Christian nationalism and their beliefs and attitudes towards a host of salient social and cultural issues. Implicit in these explanations is that a stronger embrace of Christian nationalism signals an underlying fear of changes to the broader culture, which are perceived as leading the nation further away from a preferred, mythic past. To date, however, empirical studies have not focused explicitly on the relationship between social fears and Christian nationalism. Using a nationally representative sample of American adults, we examine the relationship between Christian nationalism and Americans' fears about immigrants, Muslims, communism, white racial replacement and gun control. We find that Christian nationalism is strongly associated with fears about ethnoracial 'others', as well as fears about losing economic autonomy and access to guns. Overall, our study shows that contemporary Christian nationalism in the United States is situated in a constellation of social fears about ethnoracial purity, as well as about the perceived loss of individual autonomy.

Prior research demonstrates that multiple dimensions of religiosity significantly predict punitive attitudes and militarism. This study highlights the importance of believing in a masculine God, an aspect of religiosity with a robust and consistent relationship to punitiveness and militarism, but which has previously been unexamined. After accounting for multiple aspects of religiosity highlighted by previous research—such as frequency of religious practice, religious tradition, fundamentalist identity and beliefs, and other dimensions of God image including love, anger, judgment, and engagement—believing that God is a "He" consistently and strongly increases support for harsh social policies targeting intra-societal enemies (criminals), as well as general militarism and campaigns targeting extra-societal enemies (e.g. "terrorists"). These results highlight the importance of theorizing and measuring gendered dimensions of belief in God, as well as the importance of fine-grained considerations of religion in studies of penal populism and militarism.

Historically, religious frameworks—particularly conceptions of evil—have been tied to attitudes about criminal behavior and its corresponding punishment, yet views of transcendent evil have not been explored in the empirical literature on religion and punitive ideology. We examine whether and how different aspects of religiosity shape punitive attitudes, using a national sample of Americans. For both general punitiveness and views of capital punishment, belief in the existence and power of transcendent religious evil (e.g. Satan and hell) is strongly associated with greater punitiveness, while higher levels of religious practice (service attendance, prayer, and reading sacred scriptures) reduces punitiveness. The effects of other aspects of religiosity on punitiveness such as self-identified fundamentalism, scriptural literalism, and images of God are rendered spurious by accounting for perceptions of evil. We discuss these findings in light of cultural and comparative approaches to penology, arguing for the inclusion of conceptions of the "transgressive" sacred in studies of, and theories about, penal populism.

Although belief in ghosts or analogous concepts is prevalent cross-culturally, including in contemporary Western cultures, social scientific treatments of spirit belief and experience often dismiss such views as superstitious, or overlook this dimension of culture completely. Using mixed methods, we examine ghost belief, experience, and media consumption, as well as the practice of 'ghost hunting' in the United States. Results from a national survey demonstrate that these beliefs and practices are common and concentrated strongly among younger generations of Americans, especially moderately religious 'dabblers.' Fieldwork with multiple groups centered on 'hunting' ghosts reveals several notable themes, including rhetorical appeals to both science and religion, magical rites, the extensive use of technology to mediate evidence and experiences of ghosts, and the narrative construction of hauntings. We argue that the inherent liminality of spirits as cultural constructs accounts for their persistence, power, and continual recurrence.

The liberalization of attitudes toward homosexuality in the United States over the past 30 years is well documented. Despite these changes, substantial resistance to equality for gay men and lesbians remains. Previous studies indicate that beliefs about the etiology of homosexuality are central to this discussion. Those who believe homosexuality is innate are more favorable, while those who believe it is the result of a choice are more negative. Moreover, experimental research indicates that those with negative views actually become more opposed when a natural explanation is proposed. This study highlights the importance of perceived sources of epistemic and moral authority for understanding views of homosexuality. Using stances on culturally controversial issues involving "science and religion" as indicators of where individuals place authority, we outline the connection between perceptions of moral authority and attributions about homosexuality. Analyses of a national survey of American adults show that, net of controls, one's stance on moral authority is the strongest predictor of attributions about whether homosexuality is chosen or innate.