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AbstractThis paper contributes to the debate on domestic revenue mobilization and state-building in the Global South by exploring the concept of fiscal states and the common assumption that such states are present in sub-Saharan Africa. We systematically review the diverse understandings of the fiscal state across relevant literatures to revisit its conceptualization. On that basis, we define the fiscal state as a state whose public revenue base is dominated by tax revenue and loans, and where the relationship between taxation and external and domestic borrowing is balanced and thereby sustainable and characterized by interdependence. We distinguish the fiscal state conceptually from the tax, debt, and rentier states and present a typology of these ideal state types, discussing illustrative empirical examples of different states in sub-Saharan Africa. These illustrate that not all sub-Saharan states can be categorized as fiscal states. This is important because when African states are regarded as fiscal states, assumptions are made about their economic structures; yet, to the extent that these are absent, fiscal policy reforms are unlikely to carry long-term positive effects.

This book examines the politics of revenue bargaining in Africa in a time when attention to domestic revenue mobilisation has expanded immensely. Measures to increase taxes and other revenues can -but do not always- lead to a process of bargaining, where revenue providers negotiate for some kind of a return. This book offers in-depth analyses of micro-instances of revenue bargaining across five African countries: Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda. All case studies draw on a common theoretical framework combining the fiscal contract theory with the political settlement approach, which enables a systematic exploration into what triggers revenue bargaining; how these processes unfold; and finally, if and when they reach an agreement (whether a fiscal contract or not). From the empirically rich case narratives emerges a story of how power and initial bargaining position influence not only whether bargaining emerges in the first place, but also the processes and their outcomes. Less resourceful taxpayers are in a more difficult position to raise their voice, but in some cases even these groups manage to ally with other civil society groups to protest against tax reforms they perceive as unfair. Indirect taxes such as VAT often trigger protests, and so do sudden changes in tax practices. Revenue providers rarely call for improved services in return for paying tax, which would be expected to nurture the foundation for a fiscal social contract. Instead, revenue providers are more likely to negotiate for tax reductions, implying that governments' effort to increase revenue is impeded. We do find many instances of state-society reciprocity when ruling elites try to be responsive to revenue providers' demands. Hence, this book gives insight into the nature and dynamics not only of revenue bargaining but of policy-making in general as well as the implications hereof for state-society reciprocity in Africa.

This volume offers in-depth analyses of micro-instances of revenue bargaining across five African countries. The case studies all draw on a common theoretical framework combining the fiscal contract theory with the political settlement approach, which enables a systematic exploration into what triggers revenue bargaining.