The EU in the global investment regime: commission entrepreneurship, incremental institutional change and business lethargy
In: Routledge/UACES contemporary European studies, Volume 37
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In: Routledge/UACES contemporary European studies, Volume 37
In: Routledge/UACES contemporary European studies, 37
In: Regulation & governance, Band 16, Heft 4, S. 1362-1381
ISSN: 1748-5991
AbstractJudicialization scholarship suggests that states must seek the de‐judicialization of international dispute settlement mechanisms to regain regulatory space. Why then do some states seek a de‐judicialization yet others increased judicialization of dispute settlement mechanisms in their pursuit of regulatory space? This article advances a twofold argument. First, the concept of judicialization has been erroneously conflated with state perceptions of regulatory space under dispute settlement mechanisms. States aspiring to consolidate regulatory space may pursue de‐judicialization and increased judicialization alike. Second, states' preferences for de‐judicialization or increased judicialization to regain regulatory space should largely depend on conceptions of legitimate international law as either intergovernmental contracts or cosmopolitan quasi‐constitutional order. The article illustrates these arguments at the example of US and EU efforts to reform the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization and investor‐to‐state dispute settlement. Both seek to increase regulatory space. Yet, the USA pursues de‐judicialization while the EU promotes judicialization.
Does European business lobby for international investment agreements? In the public debate, international investment policymaking has become almost synonymous with a policy domain subject to an undue influence of business on policy outcomes. This paper argues that business preferences and lobbying have little effect on outcomes in international investment policy. The perceived beneficial effects of international investment agreements are small, distant and uncertain, which results in limited business lobbying. Instead, bureaucratic politics seems to decisively shape international investment policymaking in Europe. The paper confirms these hypotheses by means of a detailed assessment of German and EU international investment policymaking before and after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, in-depth case studies of major international investment negotiations and an evaluation of the changing design of European international investment agreements. It concludes with a discussion of the TTIP negotiations as an important outlier to the generally observed passivity of European business in this domain.
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