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In three-person envy games, an allocator, a responder, and a dummy player interact. Since agreement payoffs of responder and dummy are exogenously given, there is no tradeoff between allocator payoff and the payoffs of responder and dummy. Rather, the allocator chooses the size of the pie and thus - being the residual claimant - defines his own payoff. While in the dictator variant of the envy game, responder and dummy can only refuse their own shares, in the ultimatum variant, the responder can accept or reject the allocator's choice with rejection leading to zero payoffs for all three players. Comparing symmetric and asymmetric agreement payoffs for responder and dummy shows that equality concerns are significantly context-dependent: allocators are willing to leave more money on the table when universal equality can be achieved than when only partial equality is at stake. Similarly, equality seeking of responders is most prominent when universal equality is possible.

Leadership has been deemed, by some earlier scholars, to be less necessary in organizations that are knowledge-intensive. It has been assumed that because experts and professionals are driven largely by intrinsic motivation, extrinsic management and leadership factors are less important. We believe this assumption is wrong. Leaders have been shown in recent studies to have a considerable influence on organizational performance in universities, research institutes, hospitals and in high-skill sports settings. What matters, we argue, is the kind of leader. Experts and professionals need to be led by other experts and professionals, those who have a deep understanding of and high ability in the core-business of their organization. Our contribution will summarize the literature on the relationship between expert leaders and organizational performance, and then we will present a theory of expert leadership in a new model that outlines the possible transfer processes through which expert leaders generate better organizational performance. (HRK / Abstract übernommen).