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AbstractThis paper considers an alternate dimension of government institutions associated with the separation of powers between government and its central bank. A more independent central bank is consistent with greater institutional quality and constraints on government. We propose that central bank independence influences the prevalence of the shadow, or underground, economy. Using cross‐country panel data for over 100 nations over the period 1991 to 2012, the results from instrumental variables techniques show that central bank independence curbs underground economic activity. Furthermore, considering different dimensions of independence, we find that independence related to central bank CEO, policy formation, and central bank lending are effective at checking the shadow sector. Overall, these findings are robust to a different measure of the underground economy, correcting for the potential influence of outliers, controlling for the impact of additional factors, accounting for heterogeneity related to the level of development, and considering the heterogeneity related to the prevalence of the shadow sector. The main implication of the results is that nations seeking to reduce the prevalence of the underground economy would benefit from policies that promote central bank independence.

Using cross‐country data this paper examines the spillovers of corruption to formal and informal entrepreneurship in neighboring countries. Whereas research has shown that entrepreneurs move underground to escape corruption, we argue that entrepreneurs may also seek refuge in neighboring countries. Indeed, the empirical results show that in response to a ceteris paribus increase in corruption in neighboring countries formal entrepreneurship increases in the home country with no effect on informal entrepreneurship. This is consistent with entrepreneurs circumventing corrupt public officials by immigrating to countries with presumably less corruption. These results withstand a battery of robustness checks. (JEL D73, L26)

This paper examines the influence of government ideology, political institutions and globalization on the choice of exchange rate regime via panel multinomial logit approach using annual data over the period of 1974-2004 in a panel of 180 countries: 26 developed and 154 developing. We provide evidence that government ideology, political institutions and globalization are important determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime. In particular, we find that left-wing governments, democratic institutions, central bank independence and financial development increase the likelihood of choosing a flexible regime, whereas more globalized countries have a higher probability of implementing a fixed regime. More importantly, we find that political economy factors have different effects on the choice of exchange rate regime in developed and developing countries. All our results are robust to panel ordered probit model. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

AbstractThe recent prevalence of digital currencies has challenged policymakers as they try to control the supply of money and rein in clandestine activities. Corruption and shadow economy are widely prevalent illegal/unobserved activities that have been hard to eliminate worldwide. These longstanding and entrenched activities have possibly found a new avenue to thrive and evade detection/punishment. So disentangling the nexus between corruption, shadow economy, and digital currencies is important. Using recent cross‐country data, this paper analyzes the interrelationships between corruption, shadow economy, and cryptocurrencies. We argue that a large underground sector in a nation provides a mechanism through which corrupt government officials use cryptocurrencies to conceal their unauthorized earnings. Employing formal mediation analysis, our results show that the positive nexus between corruption and cryptocurrency adoption is mediated by the shadow sector. Quantitatively speaking, three‐fourths of the correlation between corruption and cryptocurrency usage is mediated by the shadow economy. The primary implication of our findings is that effective monitoring of cryptocurrencies should pay attention to policies to control both corruption and the shadow economy.

AbstractThis article studies the impact of disease epidemics on the worldwide prevalence of the shadow or the underground economy. The informal sector has low entry barriers and provides an easy short‐term option for the supply of goods and services during epidemics when traditional supply lines are cut or strained. Furthermore, the enforcement resources might be directed elsewhere during epidemics, lowering the expected costs of shadow operations. Using data for over 125 nations, we find that the incidence of epidemics positively and significantly contributes to the spread of the underground sector. These findings withstand a series of robustness checks.