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AbstractCriticizing the insurance theory, this article asserts that to measure post-constitutional political uncertainty, one should consider not only the power distribution among the 'political' actors but the power distribution among all actors involved in the constitution-making process, including the public and civil society. Comparing the constitution-making processes of the constitutions of Egypt (2012) and Tunisia (2014), this study presents the duration of the constitution-making process as an alternative measure of power distribution among all actors. The theoretical framework asserts that the long constitution-making process increases the possibility of deliberation at the public level. That will help to develop trust among polarized political actors and improve political actors' perception of the public as a credible control and constraint mechanism. This will ensure that the incoming government will respect the newly established institutions and lead to the establishment of an independent and powerful judiciary. In the second part of the article, to test this argument, I use a large dataset that covers information on the content and design processes of 140 countries' most recent constitutions adopted between 1945 and 2018. The empirical results indicate that as the duration of the constitution-making increases, the number of constitutional guarantees for judicial independence also increases.

This study argues that the proximity to a general election would affect the frequency of the opposition parties' referrals to the constitutional court. This effect is hypothesized to be conditioned on the opposition parties' prediction of the upcoming election results. To test this theory, I constructed an original data set including all acts promulgated by Turkish Parliament and all cases that were brought to the constitutional court by the opposition parties during 1984-2011. The results show that once the opposition party believes that it will lose the election, it increases its referrals to the court as election approaches. Adapted from the source document.

Apart from the studies that focus on public attitudes toward higher courts in advanced democracies, we know little about the factors that can explain public confidence in the judiciary in a comparative setting. In this regard, the goal of this study is to explain whether, and to what extent, the country's level of democracy moderates the impact of political awareness on public confidence in the judiciary. This study uses hierarchical linear models to analyse the interaction between individual and country level factors by using the World Values Survey (2005–2009) data for 49 countries and various other data sources. Our empirical results show that in advanced democracies political awareness variables like education and political participation have a positive impact on public confidence in the judiciary, whereas in countries with weak levels of democracy higher political awareness leads to increased cynicism about the judiciary. These results suggest that a one-size-fits-all approach to explain confidence in the judiciary is not possible when we are dealing with a wide range of societies that vary in terms of many characteristics, both institutional and cultural

Governments‐ compliance with high court decisions is a critical factor affecting judicial independence, power, and legitimacy. Under what conditions do citizens tolerate incumbent non‐compliance with apex court decisions? Some theories yield predictions that government
supporters will be more tolerant towards non‐compliance, while others assert that citizens may value judicial review irrespective of their political preferences. Although the underlying logic of both arguments is plausible, the contexts that shape citizens‐ non‐compliance
preferences are not well identified. Focusing on the moderating effect of elite behavior and contextual factors, we demonstrate that supporters of incumbent governments are more tolerant of government non‐compliance in the years following high-profile shows of interbranch attacks or
government disregard of high court decisions, and in environments where the media is lacking independence.