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SUMMARYDecentralisation of powers and responsibilities from a higher to a lower level of government has been held out as an answer to a multitude of diverse political challenges. It is often assumed that as an organising principle, decentralisation reduces corruption by bringing government closer to the people. This article adds to the small literature dealing with the relationship between decentralisation and corruption by examining decentralisation of water supply from one level of sub‐national government to another. It extends this literature by considering a dynamic situation and examining whether the relationship changes over time. The area of study covers the rural and semi‐urban areas of two large Indian states. The study compares the level of corruption in piped water supply schemes run by centralised agencies and decentralised agencies. The study is based on experiential, not perception‐based corruption measures We find that decentralisation increases corruption significantly in the immediate aftermath of decentralisation. At the same time, we observe that with time, this increase in corruption is reduced substantially, although the increase persists in the medium term. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

AbstractThis article presents empirical findings regarding the relationship between decentralisation of provision of water supply and corruption in provision of services. The current policy advice from the international agencies of aiming for decentralisation as an end in itself is questioned. The conventional wisdom that decentralisation brings management closer to the service recipients and is therefore likely to reduce corruption is also disputed. Drawing on a large database from two large Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, the interaction between various actors is analysed. We find that the level of corruption in water supply agencies run by local governments is higher than that in the agencies run by the regional government. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This is a conference paper. ; This paper presents empirical findings regarding the relationship between decentralisation of provision of water supply and corruption in provision of services. The current policy advice from the international agencies of aiming for decentralisation as an end in itself is questioned. The conventional wisdom that decentralisation is likely to induce participation and reduce corruption is also disputed. Drawing on a large data base, interaction between various actors is analysed. In developing countries corruption takes many forms depending on the actors and the nature of transaction. Types and magnitude of corrupt behaviour are analysed and shortcomings of the current strategies to combat corruption are discussed. We find that corruption in water supply agencies run by local governments is significantly higher than in the agencies run by the state government. This applies to almost all types of corruption. The reasons for this situation are discussed. Measures to combat corruption in decentralised water supply agencies are suggested.

This is a conference paper. ; This paper looks at supply of safe drinking water in India. In India the state and the local governments are responsible for providing safe drinking water. International aid in the field of drinking water is a very small proportion of total investment and so policy in this sector has largely been autonomous.