Suchergebnisse

This paper analyzes a North-South trade model with costly offshoring and equilibrium unemployment due to union wage setting. Reductions in the amount of resources required in the offshoring process usually decrease employment, though the opposite can happen at a low initial level of offshoring activity. If additional offshoring leads to a fall in the scale of Northern firms, the increase in Southern workers' utility comes at the expense of a reduction in each Northern agent's welfare. The model can be used to make a case for a 'pragmatic union leader': unions have an incentive to take measures that reduce their bargaining power. With firm heterogeneity, there is scope for multiple equilibria.

Contrary to what is usually assumed, the expected revenue for lenders as a function of the loan rate cannot be globally hump-shaped in the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model with a continuum of types. This has important implications. First, if there is credit rationing, there must be at least two equilibrium loan rates. Second, while at the low rate loans are rationed, all those applicants willing to pay the high rate are then served. Numerical analysis shows that unless the joint distribution of risk class and output is rather special, the two loan rate outcome with rationing is unlikely. (JEL D82, G21)

In the Stiglitz–Weiss (1981) adverse selection model, pure credit rationing cannot arise in equilibrium. We show that this is due to the fact that single‐name risks are independent and a well‐diversified portfolio contains no risk. We introduce non‐diversifiable macroeconomic risk to the model and show that risk‐averse lenders possibly ration credit. Welfare analysis shows that an interest rate ceiling is potentially welfare enhancing and that equilibrium overinvestment can occur.