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Conventional wisdom portrays war zones as chaotic and anarchic. In reality, however, they are often orderly. This work introduces a new phenomenon in the study of civil war: wartime social order. It investigates theoretically and empirically the emergence and functioning of social order in conflict zones. By theorizing the interaction between combatants and civilians and how they impact wartime institutions, the study delves into rebel behavior, civilian agency and their impact on the conduct of war. Based on years of fieldwork in Colombia, the theory is tested with qualitative and quantitative evidence on communities, armed groups, and individuals in conflict zones. The study shows how armed groups strive to rule civilians, and how the latter influence the terms of that rule. The theory and empirical results illuminate our understanding of civil war, institutions, local governance, non-violent resistance, and the emergence of political order

AbstractWhy do armed groups fighting in civil wars establish different institutions in territories where they operate? This article tests the mechanisms of a theory that posits that different forms of wartime social order are the outcome of a process in which an aspiring ruler—an armed group—expands the scope of its rule as much as possible unless civilians push back. Instead of being always at the mercy of armed actors, civilians arguably have bargaining power if they can credibly threaten combatants with collective resistance. Such resistance, in turn, is a function of the quality of preexisting local institutions. Using a process-driven natural experiment in three villages in Central Colombia, this article traces the effects of institutional quality on wartime social order.The FARC were everything in this village. They had the last wordon every single dispute among neighbors. They decided whatcould be sold at the stores, the time when we should all go home, andwho should leave the area never to come back.... They alsomanaged divorces, inheritances, and conflicts over land borders.They were the ones who ruled here, not the state.— Local leader, village of Librea, municipality of ViotáWe [the peasant leaders] are the authority here.People recognize us as such. [The FARC] could not takethat away from us. They didn't rule us.— Local leader, village of Zama, municipality of Viotá

Theories of civil war usually theorize the choices of civilians and combatants without considering the institutional context in which they interact. Despite common depictions of war as chaotic and anarchic, order often emerges locally. Institutions vary greatly over time and space and, as in peacetime, shape behavior. In this article, I propose a research agenda on local wartime institutions. To this end, I present original evidence on conflict areas in Colombia to illustrate the scope of variation, propose the concept of wartime social order and a typology, and discuss several ways in which research on wartime institutions can contribute to our study of civil war both at the micro and macro levels.

Political scientists are tasked with a deeply meaningful and consequential responsibility: explaining the political world. This encompasses a wide array of phenomena, from the behavior of presidents, voters, rebels, and bureaucrats to the origins, transformation, and demise of institutions, regimes, and wars across history and the world. Moreover, our discipline delves into profound normative questions surrounding domination, freedom, equality, representation, and sovereignty, among others.

How do citizens change their voting decisions after their communities experience catastrophic violent events? The literature on the behavioral effects of violence, on the one hand, and on political behavior, on the other, suggest different answers to this question. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we investigate the influence of indiscriminate, rampage-style school shootings on both voter turnout levels and the relative electoral support for the Democratic and Republican Parties at the county level in US presidential elections (1980–2016). We find that although voter turnout does not change, the vote share of the Democratic Party increases by an average of nearly 5 percentage points in counties that experienced shootings—a remarkable shift in an age of partisan polarization and close presidential elections. These results show that school shootings do have important electoral consequences and bring to the fore the need to further examine the effects of different forms of violence on political behavior.