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The United States launched a new Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy in late 2017 after reluctantly concluding that its patient effort to engage and socialize China to the rules-based order since 1972 had failed. China's behaviour since 2009 convinced the United States that China is a revisionist power seeking to impose an authoritarian model of governance in Asia which, if successful, would end the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific as well as endanger US security and vital trade interests. The new US FOIP strategy initiative seeks to engage like-minded nations in economic, security (both traditional and non-traditional), and political governance partnerships to construct a collaborative and scalable network of relations that will be able to respond flexibly to meet a wide range of stakeholder needs and regional contingencies across the Indo-Pacific region. The United States occupies a peak organizing role in this network and works with a hierarchy of partners distributed throughout the vast Indo-Pacific to meet the economic, security, and governance capacity needs of network members at any level. The rules-based order is the "operating system" of this network approach, and so the network itself sustains the rules-based order for its members as a collective good. FOIP is more like a club that generates rules-based order benefits for its members and as such has little in common with Cold War bloc politics and containment strategy. Bearing in mind that FOIP is only in its start-up phase and is likely to gather momentum going forward; that the elements of this network strategy are already in place; and that the United States and its main FOIP partners together have considerable material, organizational, and soft power resources, one may say that its prospects for long-term sustainability and success are not bad.

The United States launched a new Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy in late 2017 after reluctantly concluding that its patient effort to engage and socialize China to the rules-based order since 1972 had failed. China's behaviour since 2009 convinced the United States that China is a revisionist power seeking to impose an authoritarian model of governance in Asia which, if successful, would end the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific as well as endanger US security and vital trade interests.The new US FOIP strategy initiative seeks to engage like-minded nations in economic, security (both traditional and non-traditional), and political governance partnerships to construct a collaborative and scalable network of relations that will be able to respond flexibly to meet a wide range of stakeholder needs and regional contingencies across the Indo-Pacific region.The United States occupies a peak organizing role in this network and works with a hierarchy of partners distributed throughout the vast Indo-Pacific to meet the economic, security, and governance capacity needs of network members at any level. The rules-based order is the "operating system" of this network approach, and so the network itself sustains the rules-based order for its members as a collective good. FOIP is more like a club that generates rules-based order benefits for its members and as such has little in common with Cold War bloc politics and containment strategy.Bearing in mind that FOIP is only in its start-up phase and is likely to gather momentum going forward; that the elements of this network strategy are already in place; and that the United States and its main FOIP partners together have considerable material, organizational, and soft power resources, one may say that its prospects for long-term sustainability and success are not bad.

Contents -- Note on Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Part I: Introduction -- Chapter 1: The Question of Regional Order in East Asia -- The New Regional Agenda: Adjusting to China as a Great Power -- Region, Regionalism, and Regional Order in East Asia -- East Asia's Soft Regionalism -- The Transformation of Regional Structure -- Hegemonic Order Versus Balance of Power Order -- How Will China's Rise Affect Regional Order? -- US Proposals for Strategic Partnership -- China Rejects US Overtures of Strategic Partnership -- US Strategic Rebalancing Toward Asia -- China Offers a "New Type of Great Power Relationship" -- Xi Jinping Articulates China's Great Power Agenda -- The Open Door Versus the Community of Common Destiny -- The Open Door -- China's Community of Common Destiny -- China-US Strategic Accommodation? -- Northeast Asia -- Southeast Asia -- Indian Ocean Region -- Conclusion -- Note -- Bibliography -- Part II: China Rising -- Chapter 2: China and East Asian Cooperation: Fundamental Bottlenecks, Recent Problems, and New Orientations -- Fundamental Bottlenecks of East Asian Cooperation -- The Paradox of Scale and Efficiency -- Imbalances Affect Regional Cooperation -- "Insider" versus "Outsider" and the Strategies of Great Powers -- Multiple "Prohibited Security Zones" and "Quasi-restricted Areas" -- "Renaissance" of Nationalism in East Asian Countries -- China's Recent Problems in East Asian Cooperation -- Fierce and Continuing Confrontation Between China and Japan -- Apparent Stalemate of South China Sea Disputes -- US Initiative in East Asian Multilateralism -- The Swift and High-Profile Launch of TPP -- The Course China Should Take -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: Remapping Asia's Geopolitical Landscape: China's Rise, US Pivot, and Security Challenges for a Region in Power Transition

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