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How Informative Are Central Bank Minutes?
In: Review of economics: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Band 65, Heft 1, S. 53-76
ISSN: 2366-035X
Abstract
One characteristic feature of central banks today is that policy decisions are almost exclusively made by a committee rather than by a single policy maker. Another is that central banks endeavour to be transparent. Together, this has brought to the fore an important but so far unresolved issue: how much information about the committee's deliberations should the central bank reveal? Does this kind of information make monetary policy easier to understand and predict, or does it make it harder? We address this issue by employing a novel method. We measure the sentiment and tone of the minutes of the Swedish central bank using an automated content analysis that converts the qualitative information in the minutes to a quantitative measure. We find that this measure is helpful in predicting future policy rate decisions.
The information content of central bank minutes
One characteristic feature of central banks today is that policy decisions are almost exclusively made by a committee rather than by a single policy maker. Another is that central banks are considerably more transparent than they used to be. Together, this has brought to the fore an important but so far unresolved issue: to what extent should a central bank's communication reflect the full spectrum of opinions among its committee members? Does information on all members views make monetary policy easier to understand and predict, or does it make it harder? We address this issue by employing a novel method. We measure the sentiment and tone of the minutes of the Swedish central bank using an automated content analysis that converts the qualitative information in the minutes to a quantitative measure. We find that this measure is useful in predicting future policy rate decisions.
BASE
How Much Information Do Monetary Policy Committees Disclose? Evidence from the FOMC's Minutes and Transcripts
In: Sveriges Riksbank Working paper Series No. 381, November 2019
SSRN
Working paper
Picking the brains of MPC members
This paper reports and analyzes the results from a questionnaire sent to all present and former members of the Riksbank's Executive Board, the monetary policy committee (MPC) of the Swedish central bank. The questions cover a number of issues discussed in the growing literature on monetary policy making by committees. The paper thus relates research to the views of practitioners in a way that has not been done before. We find, among other things, that many members consider the six-person strong Riksbank MPC to be slightly too large, that it is very common that members have decided before the policy meeting how they will vote, and that members, when forming their opinions, consider input from the staff more important than input from their colleagues.
BASE
Monetary Policy Decisions - Comparing Theory and 'Inside' Information from MPC Members
In: Norges Bank Working Paper 2013/03
SSRN
Working paper