Suchergebnisse

Customer Profitability Analysis (CPA) is a technique for assessing the real profitability of customers and markets and is currently the subject of growing interest. The Marketing Accounting Research Centre at the Cranfield School of Management recently conducted a study involving four diverse companies, the purpose of which was to review the concepts and approaches that could be used to implement a system of customer profitability accounting.

In the last decade there has been a significant increase in the use of derivatives as a vehicle to manage financial risk. The sudden spurt of derivatives has resulted in the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) being forced to develop new standards for quantification and disclosure. The financial standard of interest to this study is Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS 133). SFAS 133 requires all derivatives, without exception and regardless of the accounting treatment for the underlying asset, liability, or transaction, to be recognized in the balance sheet as either liabilities or assets. SFAS 133 entitled Accounting for derivative activities and hedging (and SFAS 137, which postponed the implementation of SFAS 133 until June 2000) is different from prior standards in that it requires recognition as opposed to mere disclosure in the notes. The justification given for implementing SFAS 133 was to increase transparency to investors. In this study we empirically investigate this issue with particular focus on whether SFAS 133 provides incremental information above that provided by reported earnings, book value, and proxies for omitted variables. We study commercial banks since they are among the most frequent users of large-scale derivative contracts and their use has increased significantly over the last two decades, and in particular over the last five years. Our findings indicate that information regarding total derivative contracts, when disclosed in the financial statements as required by SFAS 133/137, is value relevant to investors. However, investors view this information negatively, perhaps attributing this to higher risk. Losses on holding derivatives are viewed positively and gains are viewed negatively.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate whether bank managers of countries within the European Union (EU) engage in signalling, especially after implementation of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) commencing 2005.Design/methodology/approach"Signaling" is the use of loan loss provisions (LLPs) to convey signals of fiscal prudence and future profitability to investors. The authors use data from 18 countries across the EU covering the pre and post IFRS regimes and apply univariate and multivariate tests in order to test signaling behavior under both accounting regimes.FindingsThe findings indicate insufficient evidence that financially healthy banks engage in signaling behavior. However, banks facing financial distress appear to engage in aggressive signaling relative to healthy banks. Finally, the propensity to engage in signaling behavior is more pronounced for financially distressed banks in the post IFRS regime. While IFRS, under IAS 39 sort to mitigate the discretionary component of LLPs, our finding may be attributable to lax enforcement of IFRS.Practical implicationsThe findings have implications for both investors and regulators. Investors should be aware that troubled banks engage in signaling to convey positive information about their future prospects. Regulators should be aware that financially stressed banks have a greater propensity to engage in signaling and need to ensure that the provisions of IFRS (which attempts to limit discretion in estimating LLPs) are enforced more stringently.Originality/valueThe paper contributes to the growing literature on bank signaling in a number of ways. First, the authors use a sample from 18 countries within the EU which has not been done before. Second, unlike prior studies which only examined healthy banks, the authors also include financially distressed banks in the sample. Third, the authors examine signaling behavior in the pre and post IFRS regimes to understand the influence of IFRS on the propensity to engage in signaling by bank managers.