Suchergebnisse

Why do national governments implement devolution given the high risk that it will encourage peripheral parties to demand ever more devolved powers? The aim of 'Challenging the State' is to answer this question through a comparative analysis of devolution in four European countries: Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.

Why do national governments implement devolution given the high risk that it will encourage peripheral parties to demand ever more devolved powers? The aim of 'Challenging the State' is to answer this question through a comparative analysis of devolution in four European countries: Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom

The objective of this paper is to analyze the alleged unfolding of 'democracy without choices' in Europe and its consequences for the quality of national democracies, particularly those of the Eurozone periphery (GIIPS – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The argument is, in a nutshell, that the lack of responsiveness of GIIPS national Governments to their respective national constituencies is the reverse of the medal of an excess of responsiveness in core Euro countries, particularly Germany. Governments are trapped between the pressure to be responsive at home and the need to be responsible to their European partners and the European project. If the trade-off of all democratic politics is between responsiveness and responsibility, Euro core countries have clearly opted for responsiveness (to domestic constituencies) and Eurozone peripheral countries have been forced to be responsible (towards their EU partners and the EU as a whole). As a result, the 2008 financial crisis has led to a three-fold breach inside the EU between core and periphery concerning the pace of economic recovery, the degrees of governmental autonomy and, most important of all, democratic legitimacy. Eurozone peripheral countries are at the losing side of this three-fold breach.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the alleged unfolding of 'democracy without choices' in Europe and its consequences for the quality of national democracies, particularly those of the Eurozone periphery (GIIPS – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The argument is, in a nutshell, that the lack of responsiveness of GIIPS national Governments to their respective national constituencies is the reverse of the medal of an excess of responsiveness in core Euro countries, particularly Germany. Governments are trapped between the pressure to be responsive at home and the need to be responsible to their European partners and the European project. If the trade-off of all democratic politics is between responsiveness and responsibility, Euro core countries have clearly opted for responsiveness (to domestic constituencies) and Eurozone peripheral countries have been forced to be responsible (towards their EU partners and the EU as a whole). As a result, the 2008 financial crisis has led to a three-fold breach inside the EU between core and periphery concerning the pace of economic recovery, the degrees of governmental autonomy and, most important of all, democratic legitimacy. Eurozone peripheral countries are at the losing side of this three-fold breach.

El objetivo de este capítulo es analizar el presunto despliegue de la «democracia sin alternativas» en Europa y sus consecuencias para la calidad de las democracias nacionales, especialmente las de la periferia de la zona euro –giips: Grecia, Irlanda, Italia, Portugal y España. El argumento principal es que la falta de receptividad de los gobiernos nacionales de los países giips hacia los deseos de sus ciudadanos constituye el reverso de la moneda de un exceso de atención de los gobiernos de los países núcleo del euro, en especial de Alemania, a las preferencias de su ciudadanía. En todas las democracias representativas los políticos se enfrentan a un dilema fundamental entre receptividad a las demandas ciudadanas y responsabilidad ante terceros. Enfrentados a este dilema, los países núcleo del euro han optado claramente por lo primero –la receptividad ante las demandas de los electorados nacionales–, mientras que los países de la periferia de la zona euro se han visto forzados a ser responsables –ante sus socios de la ue y ante la ue en su totalidad. Como resultado, la crisis financiera de 2008 ha conducido a una ruptura en tres frentes dentro de la Unión Europea entre el núcleo y la periferia: con relación al ritmo de la recuperación económica, a los grados de autonomía gubernamental y, lo más importante, a la legitimidad democrática. Los países de la periferia de la eurozona se encuentran en el bando perdedor en los tres frentes.The objective of this article is to analyze the alleged unfolding of 'democracy without choices' in Europe and its consequences for the quality of national democracies, particularly those of the Eurozone periphery –giips: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The argument is, in a nutshell, that the lack of responsiveness of giips national Governments to their respective national constituencies is the reverse of the medal of an excess of responsiveness in core Euro countries, particularly Germany. Governments are trapped between the pressure to be responsive at home and the need ...

El objetivo de este capítulo es analizar el presunto despliegue de la «democracia sin alternativas» en Europa y sus consecuencias para la calidad de las democracias nacionales, especialmente las de la periferia de la zona euro – GIIPS: Grecia, Irlanda, Italia, Portugal y España. El argumento principal es que la falta de receptividad de los gobiernos nacionales de los países GIIPS hacia los deseos de sus ciudadanos constituye el reverso de la moneda de un exceso de atención de los gobiernos de los países núcleo del euro, en especial de Alemania, a las preferencias de su ciudadanía. En todas las democracias representativas los políticos se enfrentan a un dilema fundamental entre receptividad a las demandas ciudadanas y responsabilidad ante terceros. Enfrentados a este dilema, los países núcleo del euro han optado claramente por lo primero –la receptividad ante las demandas de los electorados nacionales–, mientras que los países de la periferia de la zona euro se han visto forzados a ser responsables –ante sus socios de la UE y ante la UE en su totalidad. Como resultado, la crisis financiera de 2008 ha conducido a una ruptura en tres frentes dentro de la Unión Europea entre el núcleo y la periferia: con relación al ritmo de la recuperación económica, a los grados de autonomía gubernamental y, lo más importante, a la legitimidad democrática. Los países de la periferia de la eurozona se encuentran en el bando perdedor en los tres frentes. ; The objective of this article is to analyze the alleged unfolding of 'democracy without choices' in Europe and its consequences for the quality of national democracies, particularly those of the Eurozone periphery – GIIPS: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The argument is, in a nutshell, that the lack of responsiveness of GIIPS national Governments to their respective national constituencies is the reverse of the medal of an excess of responsiveness in core Euro countries, particularly Germany. Governments are trapped between the pressure to be responsive at home and the need to be responsible to their European partners and the European project. If the trade-off of all democratic politics is between responsiveness and responsibility, Euro core countries have clearly opted for responsiveness –to domestic constituencies– and Eurozone peripheral countries have been forced to be responsible –towards their EU partners and the EU as a whole. As a result, the 2008 financial crisis has led to a three-fold breach inside the EU between core and periphery concerning the pace of economic recovery, the degrees of governmental autonomy and, most important of all, democratic legitimacy. Eurozone peripheral countries are at the losing side of this three-fold breach.

El objetivo de este capítulo es analizar el presunto despliegue de la «democracia sin alternativas» en Europa y sus consecuencias para la calidad de las democracias nacionales, especialmente las de la periferia de la zona euro –giips: Grecia, Irlanda, Italia, Portugal y España. El argumento principal es que la falta de receptividad de los gobiernos nacionales de los países giips hacia los deseos de sus ciudadanos constituye el reverso de la moneda de un exceso de atención de los gobiernos de los países núcleo del euro, en especial de Alemania, a las preferencias de su ciudadanía. En todas las democracias representativas los políticos se enfrentan a un dilema fundamental entre receptividad a las demandas ciudadanas y responsabilidad ante terceros. Enfrentados a este dilema, los países núcleo del euro han optado claramente por lo primero –la receptividad ante las demandas de los electorados nacionales–, mientras que los países de la periferia de la zona euro se han visto forzados a ser responsables –ante sus socios de la ue y ante la ue en su totalidad. Como resultado, la crisis financiera de 2008 ha conducido a una ruptura en tres frentes dentro de la Unión Europea entre el núcleo y la periferia: con relación al ritmo de la recuperación económica, a los grados de autonomía gubernamental y, lo más importante, a la legitimidad democrática. Los países de la periferia de la eurozona se encuentran en el bando perdedor en los tres frentes.The objective of this article is to analyze the alleged unfolding of 'democracy without choices' in Europe and its consequences for the quality of national democracies, particularly those of the Eurozone periphery –giips: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The argument is, in a nutshell, that the lack of responsiveness of giips national Governments to their respective national constituencies is the reverse of the medal of an excess of responsiveness in core Euro countries, particularly Germany. Governments are trapped between the pressure to be responsive at home and the need to be responsible to their European partners and the European project. If the trade-off of all democratic politics is between responsiveness and responsibility, Euro core countries have clearly opted for responsiveness –to domestic constituencies– and Eurozone peripheral countries have been forced to be responsible –towards their eu partners and the eu as a whole. As a result, the 2008 financial crisis has led to a three-fold breach inside the eu between core and periphery concerning the pace of economic recovery, the degrees of governmental autonomy and, most important of all, democratic legitimacy. Eurozone peripheral countries are at the losing side of this three-fold breach.