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We simulate the effect of the introduction of premium differentiation (experience rating) in the Dutch Unemployment Insurance system on the demand for labor for a variety of sectors in the Dutch economy. For the simulations we use the Bentolila and Bertola (1990) framework as a point of departure. In the simulations, the introduction of experience rating is modeled as expenditure neutral: in the absence of premium differentiation the cost of financing UI is modeled as a wage tax (independent of the number of workers fired by the firm), whereas in the presence of experience rating this cost is attributed to firing cost (affected by the firing action). Thus, the introduction of experience rating results in a shift from wage cost to firing cost. Following the political debate on the issue in the Netherlands, we assume that the introduction of experience rating does neither lead to a change in tax rates paid by workers nor to a change in eligibility rules or replacement rates of benefit claimants. Specific attention is paid to the distinction between 'young' and 'old' workers . In the model, labor adjustment costs (hiring and firing costs) are linear. The model allows for uncertainty in the business cycle.

In this paper we estimate the effect of early life health on home care use later in life, and we analyse whether this effect is mediated through household composition. We use Dutch administrative data on men born in 1944-1947 who were examined for military service between 1961-1965 and we link them to national data on non-residential care in the period 2004-2013 and data on house- hold status information for the years 1999-2014. We account for confounding factors that influence both early life health and later life home care use. We also account for selective attrition. Our empirical findings show that general health problems in youth is an important health predictor for later life home care use. A large portion of this effect is an indirect effect running through changes in partnership status.

This paper investigates the timing of wealth transfers between generations. We develop an overlapping generations model in which each generation can borrow against its future income but not against expected bequest. As a result, generations relatively poorer than their parents may end up not smoothing consumption. We prove that if wealth transfers can take place earlier in life, then each generation smooths consumption despite the constraint on borrowing and the first best solution is restored. The model implies that parents transfer resources when the children are credit constrained. This implication is tested using Dutch survey data on households' intentions to make intervivos transfers matched with administrative data that allow to construct a measure of the probability of being in need of a transfer. All in all, the paper highlights the importance of intervivos transfers as a device that households can resort to in order to mitigate inter--generational wealth inequalities.