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AbstractThis article examines the politics of the Federal Reserve System of regional banks. While regional banks have long lacked meaningful influence over monetary policy, their leadership stands to provide a base of elite support for the Federal Reserve. To serve this role effectively, however, regional bank leadership must reflect the ideological diversity of political elites. This article provides the first quantitative empirical analysis of the ideological composition of the regional banking system, introducing a novel data set of all regional bank directors serving from 1980 to 2015 and linking each individual to a measure of political ideology derived from campaign finance contributions. With these data, I examine the degree to which regional banks are ideologically aligned with the districts and industries they are assigned to represent. The results highlight a new function for the decentralized central banking system and opportunity to address declining levels of public confidence in the Fed.

Courts often interpret and attempt to enforce rules designed to economically integrate federal and international organizations. In this article, we investigate to what degree court rulings can liberalize trade by examining data from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Studying the ECJ allows us to compare the Court's effectiveness through two different mechanisms: infringement proceedings, which are purely a form of international adjudication, and preliminary references, which are applied through national courts. We find infringement rulings have no effect on a nation's intra-EU imports, while preliminary rulings have a positive, though temporary, effect on a nation's intra-EU imports. Adapted from the source document.

Roll-call votes provide scholars with the opportunity to measure many quantities of interest. However, the usefulness of the roll-call sample depends on the population it is intended to represent. After laying out why understanding the sample properties of the roll-call record is important, we catalogue voting procedures for 145 legislative chambers, finding that roll calls are typically discretionary. We then consider two arguments for discounting the potential problem: (a) roll calls are ubiquitous, especially where the threshold for invoking them is low or (b) the strategic incentives behind requests are sufficiently benign so as to generate representative samples. We address the first defense with novel empirical evidence regarding roll-call prevalence and the second with an original formal model of the position-taking argument for roll-call vote requests. Both our empirical and theoretical results confirm that inattention to vote method selection should broadly be considered an issue for the study of legislative behavior.