Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe size and especially the growth of the Latino population in the United States are associated with anti-Latino and anti-immigrant attitudes. Findings from a recent line of experimental work suggest that Latino growth may also be associated with Whites' anti-Black attitudes. Racial status threat could account for this association if Whites view Latino growth as a potential challenge to their status within a multi-group system that includes Blacks. Alternatively, or in addition, by engendering instability and uncertainty, Latino growth may promote ideological conservatism, which itself predicts racial attitudes. Building on prior work, this study examines the association between real, local Latino population growth––as opposed to manipulated or perceived growth––and Whites' anti-Black resentment for a nationally representative sample of White Americans. Using data from the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, the study finds that Whites in counties where the Latino population grew more report stronger anti-Black resentment. They are also more likely to perceive a threat to Whites' racial status and to endorse ideological conservatism. Perceived threat and conservatism each partially account for the association between Latino growth and anti-Black resentment, suggesting the effect of Latino growth on anti-Black resentment is mediated through both channels.

Previous studies reach contradictory conclusions regarding the relationship between residential concentration and naturalization. This paper tackles the impasse by exploring the pathways through which immigrant communities influence individual naturalization. Specifically, this study examines naturalization among Latino immigrants using the 2006 Latino National Survey linked to county data. Multilevel model results indicate that the county concentration of naturalized co-ethnics positively predicts individual naturalization, and this relationship operates through two channels: information dissemination and perceived belonging. Regarding the latter, Latino immigrants who live among naturalized co-ethnics identify more strongly as "American," and strength of American identification mediates nearly one-half of the relationship between concentration and naturalization.

We explore what people mean by "diversity" when they use the term to describe real communities. "Diversity" can refer to multiple differences—ethnoracial, economic, and so on. It may also refer to multiple dimensions of the same difference, that is, heterogeneity or group representation. Analyzing a survey of Chicago-area residents, we ask: (1) When people describe a community as diverse, on which kinds of differences are they drawing? (2) Within each relevant difference, are evaluations of diversity predicted by heterogeneity, the share of specific groups, or both? Findings suggest that respondents associate diversity primarily with a community's ethnoracial attributes and secondarily with its economic attributes. Within ethnoracial attributes, both heterogeneity and the share of disadvantaged ethnoracial groups, especially Blacks, predict assessed diversity. Within economic attributes, income inequality predicts assessed diversity, albeit negatively; the representation of poor people does not. Qualitative responses reveal varied understandings of diversity while confirming the dominance of ethnoracial attributes.

Using field experiments, scholars can identify causal effects via randomization while studying people and groups in their naturally occurring contexts. In light of renewed interest in field experimental methods, this review covers a wide range of field experiments from across the social sciences, with an eye to those that adopt virtuous practices, including unobtrusive measurement, naturalistic interventions, attention to realistic outcomes and consequential behaviors, and application to diverse samples and settings. The review covers four broad research areas of substantive and policy interest: first, randomized controlled trials, with a focus on policy interventions in economic development, poverty reduction, and education; second, experiments on the role that norms, motivations, and incentives play in shaping behavior; third, experiments on political mobilization, social influence, and institutional effects; and fourth, experiments on prejudice and discrimination. We discuss methodological issues concerning generalizability and scalability as well as ethical issues related to field experimental methods. We conclude by arguing that field experiments are well equipped to advance the kind of middle-range theorizing that sociologists value.

Scholars are increasingly employing skin color measures to investigate racial stratification beyond the dimensions of self- or other-classification. Current understandings of the relationship between phenotypic traits, like skin color, and racial classification are incomplete. Scholars agree that perceptions of phenotypic traits shape how people classify others; it remains to be seen, however, whether racial classification in turn shapes people's perceptions of phenotypic traits. The present study is based on an original survey experiment that tests whether assessments of others' skin color are affected by a subtle racial cue, a name. Results indicate that skin color ratings are affected by the presence of a racially distinctive name: A significant share of people will rate the same face darker when that face is assigned a distinctively Hispanic name as opposed to a non-Hispanic name. In addition, ratings of male faces are more sensitive to racially distinctive names. The findings bear important lessons for our understanding of the social construction of race and its role in producing inequalities.

Although service to the nation–state features in academic and lay understandings of patriotism, claims of patriotism are rarely examined alongside contributions to the nation–state. The present study examines four behaviors—military enlistment, voting, monetary contributions, and census response—to evaluate the claim that certain parts of the United States, and specifically the communities of "real America," contribute more than others to the country overall. Consistent with the words of several electoral candidates, ruralness, religiosity, political conservatism, and gun culture collectively identify a distinctive set of communities where residents are both more likely to report "American" as their ancestry and to vote for Republican presidential candidates, including Donald Trump. However, visual and statistical evidence undermine the claim that these communities contribute more than other parts of the country. Instead, and in several respects, these communities make smaller contributions to the nation–state than one would expect based on other characteristics. The findings undermine divisive claims about a "real" America that gives more than its "fair share."

AbstractAsian Americans became targets of increasingly hostile behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic. What motivated this? Fears of contagion arising from a behavioral immune system may have motivated hostility toward Asian Americans, especially among those Americans vulnerable to COVID-19. Additionally, stigmatizing rhetoric from right-wing figures may have legitimated anti-Asian behavior among those Americans who held stronger anti-Asian sentiments to begin with or who were more receptive to right-wing rhetoric. We explore these possibilities using a behavioral game with a representative sample of Americans at two points: in May and October 2020. Participants were partnered with a U.S.- or Chinese-born American in a give-or-take dictator game. The average American discriminated against Chinese-born Americans in May but not October 2020, when China was no longer a COVID-19 hotspot. But among Republicans, who may have held stronger anti-Asian sentiments to begin with and who were likely more receptive to right-wing rhetoric, discrimination—that is, differential treatment—was both stronger in May compared to non-Republicans and persisted into October 2020. Notably, Americans who were more vulnerable to COVID-19 were not especially likely to discriminate.

If preferences on immigration policy respond to facts, widespread misinformation poses an obstacle to consensus. Does factual information about immigration indeed affect policy preferences? Are beliefs about immigration's societal impact the mechanism through which factual information affects support for increased immigration? To address these questions, we conducted an original survey experiment, in which we presented a nationally representative sample of 2,049 Americans living in the United States with facts about immigrants' English acquisition and immigrants' impact on crime, jobs, and taxes—four domains with common misperceptions. Three of these factual domains (immigration's impact on crime, jobs, and taxes) raise overall support for increased immigration. These facts also affect beliefs that are directly relevant to that information. Moreover, those beliefs mediate the effect of factual information on support for increased immigration. By contrast, information about English acquisition affects neither policy preferences nor beliefs about immigration's impact. Facts can leverage social cognitions to change policy preferences.