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This paper contrasts four distinct versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma (the commons, public goods, biological altruism, and biological selfishness) in terms of their ethical content for economic decision making. An argument is made for the restoration of Tucker's third player — as given in the original specification of the game — in order to judge whether a resolution is desirable in economic and business situations that reduce to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Finally, the use of tit-for-tat as a 'solution' to the Prisoner's Dilemma is compared with the practice of business ethics.

An evolutionary game-theoretic model is employed to address three essential aspects of whistle blowing: ethical decision making, the duality of mutual accountability among cohorts in large organizations, and role conflict between individual and organizational values. I derive an equilibrium condition relating the treatment of whistle blowers to the punishment of violators. The model facilitates an evaluation of the whistle blowing provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Act. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

We investigate the problem of motivating terrorist operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks when operatives have either self-interested or social preferences that are not observable by the terrorist organization. We characterize the screening mechanism for selecting operatives according to their social preferences and determine under what conditions a terrorist group will prefer to utilize suicide versus conventional tactics. For example, when operatives are intrinsically motivated and likely to be represented in the pool of potential recruits, a terrorist organization will be more likely to employ suicide attacks as its sole tactic of choice. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

We investigate the problem of motivating terrorist operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks when operatives have either self-interested or social preferences that are not observable by the terrorist organization. We characterize the screening mechanism for selecting operatives according to their social preferences and determine under what conditions a terrorist group will prefer to utilize suicide versus conventional tactics. For example, when operatives are intrinsically motivated and likely to be represented in the pool of potential recruits, a terrorist organization will be more likely to employ suicide attacks as its sole tactic of choice.

This article presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks, where the target government faces a trade-off from its counterterrorism responses and the backlash (counterreaction) that such responses incite. An endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars is specified, given a government's counterterrorism stance and the potential for backlash attacks. In particular, spectacular attacks are pooling, rather than separating, phenomena, whereby the government cannot discern, based on past attacks, the militancy of the terrorist group. The definition for "spectacular" terrorist attacks is inversely related to the governments toughness and its belief that it confronts a militant group. Policy recommendations are specified for non-event-specific intelligence in relation to the avoidance of spectacular attacks or unnecessary concessions. Intelligence must be focused on the propensity for counterterrorism to give rise to a backlash attack. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

This article presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks, where the target government faces a trade-off from its counterterrorism responses and the backlash (counterreaction) that such responses incite. An endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars is specified, given a government's counterterrorism stance and the potential for backlash attacks. In particular, spectacular attacks are pooling, rather than separating, phenomena, whereby the government cannot discern, based on past attacks, the militancy of the terrorist group. The definition for ''spectacular'' terrorist attacks is inversely related to the government's toughness and its belief that it confronts a militant group. Policy recommendations are specified for non-event-specific intelligence in relation to the avoidance of spectacular attacks or unnecessary concessions. Intelligence must be focused on the propensity for counterterrorism to give rise to a backlash attack.