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Many resources have been invested in reforming the public sectors of most countries in the world during the last 20 years. Greater focus on evaluation and performance is one of the most central aspects of these reforms, but despite much academic research virtually no systematic evaluations of the outcome of the reforms themselves are found. This paper presents a study of the effect of performance management reforms of Danish public schools on the achievements of more than 80,000 lower secondary students. The study finds no or very small effects on performance measured as average exam scores, but highly significant effects on inequity in the sense that students with low socioeconomic status perform worse at reforming schools than at similar non‐reforming schools. These results, as well as the methodological challenges involved in estimating reform impact, emphasize the need for more empirical scrutiny of what effects the reforms have.

Research on the effect of school choice on student performance has generally been based on small‐scale experiments or comparisons of Catholic and public schools in the United States. Recent studies indicate, however, that the market competition stemming from school vouchers does not affect all private schools equally. This study makes use of individual‐level register data on the performance of more than 30,000 students in Denmark, where private schools have been voucher‐financed for more than 100 years, while public schools are governed and financed by the politico‐administrative system. Using an instrumental variable model to exclude selection effects, the results show no significant average effect of private schooling on final examination scores. However, a multilevel model shows that private schools of high socio‐economic status perform better than similar public schools, while private schools of low socio‐economic status under‐perform – even for individual students with high socio‐economic status. This indicates that the institutional setting of a voucher system is not enough to raise educational performance in general, arguably because some parents choose schools on the basis of non‐academic criteria.

AbstractUnderstanding which political candidates are elected for office is fundamental to democracy and political science. Whereas there is much agreement that party affiliation is one of the most important candidate characteristics to voters, evidence regarding the gender and race of the candidate is mixed. We suggest voters have lexicographic preferences, meaning they rank their preferences and focus primarily on the candidate's party affiliation. Second-order preferences such as gender and race are mostly necessary when there is a tie in first-order preferences when voters choose between two same-party candidates or have no party information. We show how conjoint experiments can be used to test for lexicographic preferences and use data from a US-representative sample and a pre-registered replication to confirm that in the United States, gender and race are second-order preferences. Lexicographic preferences provide a theoretical lens explaining some of the mixed results of gender and race in the candidate literature.

Abstract
Existing research demonstrates how governments can use insights from behavioral science to design policy and alter residents' behavior. This article proposes that the effect of behavioral interventions may be different in hierarchical organizations where the decision to change behavior and the execution of that decision are split between different individuals. We examine the effect of two small-scale interventions—personal reminders and financial incentives—in a large-scale field experiment with public schools in Denmark. The Ministry of Education invited a representative sample of public schools to adopt a program that provides information on students' socio-emotional competencies. Results show that small financial incentives increased managers' adoption of the program by 7 percentage points. Frontline workers' subsequent data generation and performance information acquisition were also increased in the incentive treatment groups, even though the latter was not incentivized. Reminders paired with incentives had an impact on the managers' adoption, but the reminder effect disappeared during the implementation phase. These findings demonstrate both the potentials and limitations of applying behavioral research on individual residents to hierarchical organizations.

AbstractSome of the most important decisions young people make are choices about education. Yet recent research shows that educational decisions are poorly explained by classical models of human capital investments: adolescents do not always choose what would best optimize their long-term net outcomes. Instead, students have been shown to be influenced by their current group of peers at the time when they make educational decisions. We expand on existing models by showing that students' stated educational preferences can be influenced by simply priming them with their peers' preferences. Further, we show that students are unaware of this peer influence in the sense that: (1) they claim that peers have no influence; (2) in a conjoint experiment, they do not select educations based on peers' assessments; and (3) in a list experiment absent of any social desirability bias, they do not ascribe any influence to their peers either. All in all, the results show that young people are unwittingly influenced by their peers. These results have important implications for public policies aimed at encouraging young people to make more deliberate and informed educational choices.

Abstract
It is well established that bureaucrats' implementation of policies is influenced by their own policy positions, that is, their attitudes toward the given policies. However, what affects the policy positions of bureaucrats? This article focuses on whether the policy positions of bureaucrats at the front lines of government are susceptible to frames and cues embedded in communication. Based on the notion that bureaucrats often adhere to certain professional norms when developing their attitudes toward policies, the authors hypothesize that communication frames and cues that align policies with such norms move bureaucrats' policy positions in favor of the policy. Results of four studies in European and American settings among mid‐ and street‐level bureaucrats show support for the hypothesized effect. They also show that aligning policies with dimensions outside professional norms is ineffective, possibly even producing opposite effects.