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"Over the course of four decades, the Egyptian economy underwent consistent and comprehensive economic liberalization, privatization of state-owned enterprises, deregulation. Yet the Egyptian economy today still experiences low-growth, declining total investment rates, and high un- and under-employment. The private sector has never become globally competitive. There are few beneficiaries to the economic transformations begun under Sadat and continued by Mubarak, and most Egyptians, notably public-sector workers and the urban and rural middle classes, claim losses through these efforts. The 2011 uprising highlighted that these efforts at transformation failed not only economically, but politically as well. This book explores how and why 40 years of economic reform efforts largely failed. Amr Adly argues the fault lies in cleft capitalism: the perpetuation of initial size differences in enterprises, through limits on available land and capital (finance), that constrain any opportunities for growth and expansion"--

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Acronyms -- Chapter One. SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO FAILED CAPITALISM -- Chapter Two. BEYOND CRONYISM -- Chapter Three. EGYPT'S CLEFT CAPITALISM -- Chapter Four. THE ORIGINS OF CLEFT CAPITALISM -- Chapter Five. HOW CLEFT CAPITALISM CAME ABOUT -- Chapter Six. EGYPT'S BANKING SYSTEM -- Chapter Seven. EGYPT'S DESERT LAND -- Chapter Eight. BALADI CAPITALISM -- Chapter Nine. DANDY CAPITALISM -- EPILOGUE -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

"The economies of Turkey and Egypt, remarkably similar until the early 1980s, have since taken divergent paths. Turkey has successfully implemented a policy of export led industrialisation whilst Egypt's manufacturing industry and exports have stagnated. In this book, Amr Adly uses extensive primary research to present detailed comparisons of Turkey's and Egypt's state administrative and private sector capacities and links between the two. The conclusion the author draws is that the external contexts for both were so alike that this cannot account for their diverging paths. Instead, the author suggests a counterintuitive yet compelling explanation; that a democratic polity is far more likely than an authoritarian one to engender a successful developmental state. Emerging in the wake of the January revolution in Egypt, when hopes for democratisation were raised, this book provides a fresh perspective on the topical subject of state reform and development in the Middle East and will be of interest to students and scholar alike"--

"The economies of Turkey and Egypt, remarkably similar until the early 1980s, have since taken divergent paths. Turkey has successfully implemented a policy of export led industrialisation whilst Egypt's manufacturing industry and exports have stagnated. In this book, Amr Adly uses extensive primary research to present detailed comparisons of Turkey's and Egypt's state administrative and private sector capacities and links between the two. The conclusion the author draws is that the external contexts for both were so alike that this cannot account for their diverging paths. Instead, the author suggests a counterintuitive yet compelling explanation; that a democratic polity is far more likely than an authoritarian one to engender a successful developmental state. Emerging in the wake of the January revolution in Egypt, when hopes for democratisation were raised, this book provides a fresh perspective on the topical subject of state reform and development in the Middle East and will be of interest to students and scholar alike"--

AbstractThe post-2013 crackdown on Islamist-affiliated businesses in Egypt offers a unique glimpse at the Islamists' economic assets and activities. How could affiliates of the Islamist movement in Egypt accumulate so many assets and become significant market actors since the 1970s despite periodic state hostility and weak property rights protection? I argue that belonging to the Islamist movement endowed affiliated entrepreneurs with an economic habitus. This mode of embeddedness allowed the conversion of organisational, symbolic and social capital from the socio-religious and cultural fields into the market field. However, the Islamist habitus was tension-ridden, hence conflicted, in two principal aspects. It was marked by embeddedness as much as boundedness for the affiliated entrepreneurs. One source of tension was introspective about the actual and perceived (in)compatibility between business activities and the ideological mission of the movement. The other was extrospective related to the power relations with periodically hostile state authorities.

Since the outbreak of the Arab revolutions in 2011, geopolitical developments have reinforced the already deep security and economic interdependencies between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Will this partnership push for deeper forms of economic integration? This report argues that even though the current geopolitical context has created long-term prospects for a deepened geostrategic partnership, it will unlikely lead to further economic integration between the two nations. Instead, it has intensified earlier forms of rent recycling in the form of workers' remittances, inter-governmental aid or loans and investments by often politically-connected businessmen.

"Ägyptens Wirtschaft leidet an einem gigantischen Haushaltsdefizit, einem Leistungsbilanzdefizit und einem massiven Rückgang der Währungsreserven. IWF-Kredite allein böten keine Lösung. Und was war die Strategie der Muslimbrüder? Die Macht sichern, jegliche harten Einschnitte vermeiden und ansonsten: weiter wie schon unter Hosni Mubarak." (Autorenreferat)

Ägyptens Wirtschaft leidet an einem gigantischen Haushaltsdefizit, einem Leistungsbilanzdefizit und einem massiven Rückgang der Währungsreserven. IWF-Kredite allein böten keine Lösung. Und was wäre die Strategie der Muslimbrüder? Die Macht sichern, jegliche harten Einschnitte vermeiden und ansonsten: weiter wie schon unter Hosni Mubarak. (IP)

Why do many States in transitional economies lack the regulative capacities to evenly distribute property rights among emerging private firms resulting in having public good devoured by particularistic interests? I argue that uneven distribution of property rights is deeply embedded within broader power relations permeating political regimes. This study attempts to develop the concept of politically-embedded cronyism where State incumbents generate and protract uneven distribution of property rights in favor of a few private actors as tactics of regime survival that go beyond the mere interest of self-enrichment as the capture thesis would argue. Politically-embedded cronyism is likely to emerge the more State incumbents retain their relative autonomy from their cronies through higher concentration of power in the executive, less role of societal groups in general and business in particular in the reproduction of the power of top incumbents and higher public asset retention in the post-liberalization period in addition to possessing channels of political incorporation to fledging business.

Cet article tente de montrer que la révolution qui s'est produite en Égypte était porteuse d'un projet politique libéral-démocrate. Les groupes révolutionnaires et les opposants au régime de Moubarak ont réussi à mobiliser des couches sociales substantielles en 2011 en demandant le respect des droits humains de base et la représentation de la volonté du peuple. La forte présence d'ouvriers mécontents, de classes moyennes appauvries et de populations urbaines défavorisées dans le mouvement de protestation n'a jamais débouché sur un projet politique visant un changement économique et social. Leurs revendications sont restées figées dans une économie morale nassériste où les revendications économiques et sociales sont en grande partie apolitiques et totalement dissociées de la démocratisation des relations entre la société et l'État. L'absence de projet de changement socio-politique a privé le processus révolutionnaire d'une large et solide coalition sociale.

It has been held that external rents significantly affect the formation of state institutional capacities as constant flows of rents tend to weaken the state regulative, monitoring and extractive capacities vis-a-vis the economy. However, if more rents were associated with weaker state capacities, would a steady and consistent decline in rents reverse the trend towards state capacity building? Egypt provides a puzzling case of how rents have been associated with state capacity building. Adapted from the source document.