Suchergebnisse

Общий тренд в сторону актуализации консервативных ценностей начал отмечаться со второй половины 1990-х годов, однако вплоть до 2012 г. эта тенденция во многом смягчалась сохраняющимся сильным влиянием либеральных ценностей как в обществе, так и в большей степени в политических элитах. Большинство, на которое опиралась власть, было скорее центристским, государственническим, тогда как более радикальные группы и либералов, и консерваторов были вытеснены на политические фланги, и их влияние представлялось минимальным. В последние два года началась стремительная поляризация общества, во многом спровоцированная сверху под влиянием протестной активности зимы 2011-2012 гг. Оформилось новое консервативное большинство с ярко выраженными консервативно-державническими ценностями, ставшее новой опорой власти. События вокруг Украины и Крыма продемонстрировали готовность этого большинства поддержать радикальные действия по расширению «русского мира» и не менее решительную антизападническую риторику. В статье на материалах опросов, проведенных ИС РАН и ВЦИОМ, исследуются идейный и социальный генезис консервативного большинства, его внутренняя неоднородность, место в нем националистов, электоральные симпатии и политические установки. В частности, делается вывод о двойственном характере ценностей нового консерватизма, когда за его фасадом скрывается вполне адаптивное к современности общество массового потребления, не являющееся консервативным по своему образу жизни. Исследуется динамика ценностных трендов за последние 2-3 года, показывающая высокую устойчивость основных ценностных расколов, характеризующих современную Россию. ; Many Russian sociologists acknowledge the rise of conservative values ever since the late 1990s the turning point most frequently identified as the year of economic default in 1998. However, until 2012 this trend was largely compensated by a strong influence of liberal values both in society as a whole and, to a greater extent, among the political elites. The 'majority', on which the authorities relied, could be most likely characterized as centrist, while the more radical groups of liberals and conservatives enjoyed only marginal support. A notable polarization began only a couple of years ago with increased protest activities in the winter of 2011-2012. Having begun more as a political technology aiming to polarize the disgruntled on ideological grounds, this trend soon had a life of its own. A 'new conservative majority' suddenly formed, becoming the new more radical support for those currently in power. The events around Crimea and Ukraine have shown that this conservative majority can easily support the radical actions of the state and its anti-West rhetoric. This article draws on sociological data from surveys by IS RAN and VTsIOM, and attempts to investigate the social roots of this 'conservative majority', its inner heterogeneity, its representation of nationalists and liberals, as well as electoral preferences. It shows that the new conservatism is quite ambiguous in the sense that behind this conservative façade hides a consumerist society far from being conservative in terms of its lifestyles and consumption patterns. This means that modern Russia's conservatism is less a retreat to traditions (often proclaimed by the ideologists of this new course), rather it is an organic feature of a modern mass society, enjoying limited access to information and weak political competition. The article studies the dynamics of these values in the last 2-3 years and shows that this major ideological divide has been quite persistent. It is concluded that the ideology of aggressive conservatism could lead to even further ideological divide in society and pose a serious threat to social stability. "New Conservative Majority" as a Socio-Political Phenomenon

За политической и социальной стабилизацией, характерной для последнего десятилетия, стоит в первую очередь существенный ценностный сдвиг общества. Социокультурная природа этого сдвига двойственна: с одной стороны, он носит консервативный характер возврата к вековым традициям и архетипам, с другой отражает процесс быстрой социальной модернизации образа жизни, ценностей и запросов россиян, свойственных современному городскому обществу массового потребления. Современный российский неоконсерватизм это альтернатива не только либеральным, но и консервативным ценностям, это процесс формирования устойчивого порядка в обществе, где традиционные ценности и институты уже не могут быть жизнеспособными. Социальным ядром неоконсервативного синтеза выступают адаптивные слои россиян, по многим параметрам соответствующие новому среднему классу. За последние 7-8 лет из относительно малочисленной группа неоконсерваторов превратилась в доминирующую, определяющую и вектор развития страны, и особенности трансформации российской политической системы. В России сформировалась и неоконсервативная идеология, в той или иной степени разделяемая всеми ведущими социальными группами. Она представляет собой синтез левых (левогосударственнических) и правых (правогосударственнических) идеологем, в центре которого находятся идеи сильного государства, порядка, социальной справедливости. Вокруг неоконсервативных идеологем образовался своего рода идейный консенсус, прочность которого не смог поколебать даже экономический кризис. В то же время национальное самосознание неоконсерваторов, их идентичность остаются противоречивыми, процесс формирования современной «политической нации» еще далек от своего завершения. Несмотря на идейную консолидацию, не сформированы адекватные институты, способные связать разорванный и атомизированный российский социумBehind the political and social stability of the last decade there lies a substantial shift in the values of the society. The sociocultural nature of this shift is dualistic: on the one hand, it bears the conservative character of the return to century-old traditions and archetypes; on the other, it reflects the process of a swift social modernization of the lifestyles, values and demands of Russians typical for contemporary urban society of mass consumption. The contemporary Russian neo-conservatism is an alternative not only to the liberal and conservative values, but also a process, which shapes the stable order in the society, where the traditional values and institutions can no longer exist. The social nucleus of the neo-conservative synthesis is produced by the most flexible strata of Russians, who in many parameters correspond to the so called 'new middle' class. In the past 7-8 years this group of neo-conservatives has attracted a lot of supporters and became the dominating force, which determines the vector of country's development and the particularities of Russia's political transformation. In Russia there has also formed a neo-conservative ideology, which is more or less accepted by the rest of the leading social strata. It represents a synthesis of the leftist and rightist ideologies, to which the ideas of a strong state, a statist order and social justice have become the central ones. And this general consensus ever the neo-conservative ideologies has persisted even throughout the difficulties of the world economic crisis. At the same time, the national self-conscience of the neo-conservatives and their identity are still quite contradictory, and the process of shaping one 'political nation' is far from being over. Despite the ideological consolidation the adequate institutions, which could bind together the atomized Russian society, have not yet been formed

The author discusses reasons, why political opposition in the country is yielding its positions, and has little support from the public.

Leontiy G. Byzov in his article tries to assess the results of the regional elections that took place in December 2005 and their impact on the change of the political spectrum and the prospects for political parties in this respect. ; Leontiy G. Byzov in his article tries to assess the results of the regional elections that took place in December 2005 and their impact on the change of the political spectrum and the prospects for political parties in this respect.

Leontiy Byzov in "On Crossroads of the Second Term" speculates on the Putin's stability concept and its perception by the population, as well as on the attitude of the Russians towards various administrative and political innovations of the President.

Leontiy Byzov in "Proportional Electoral System and the Future of Political Parties in Russia" speculates about the presidential initiatives aimed at strengthening the party system and establishment of the new procedures for the parliamentary elections. He makes an attempt to understand whether these projects comply with the public expectations and the real functioning of the multi-party system in Russia.

Leontiy G. Byzov in his article "Prospects of Changes in the Russian Political Spectrum", with regard to the latest VCIOM opinion polls, observes in his study a considerable unification of a large part of the political landscape in Russia characterizing it as "Putin's consensus". Demand for order and justice is highest while stability, nation and freedom are seen as values of second rank. The author points out to the formation of the following electoral niches: 1) the center, consisting of a synthesis of liberal ideas and ideas of national order; 2) the camp of national order bringing together left economic conceptions and right ideas of the nation; 3) the left-liberal camp interested in the development of democracy and rule of law and fighting against a strong state and excessive demands for order. ; Leontiy G. Byzov in his article "Prospects of Changes in the Russian Political Spectrum", with regard to the latest VCIOM opinion polls, observes in his study a considerable unification of a large part of the political landscape in Russia characterizing it as "Putin's consensus". Demand for order and justice is highest while stability, nation and freedom are seen as values of second rank. The author points out to the formation of the following electoral niches: 1) the center, consisting of a synthesis of liberal ideas and ideas of national order; 2) the camp of national order bringing together left economic conceptions and right ideas of the nation; 3) the left-liberal camp interested in the development of democracy and rule of law and fighting against a strong state and excessive demands for order.

Leontiy G. Byzov in his "In the Course of New Social Demand" analyzes the outcome of the Duma elections and maintains that the parliamentary elections indicated new social demand for building strong and socially oriented national state. This demand was picked up by the "Rodina" (Motherland) bloc, which became the highlight of the political season. "Rodina" collected protests of the voters, but most of these protests were not of social, but of existential character. Therefore, there is a need for a new social model capable of giving the public the new "reason to live", the new order based on the principles and values of the new "middle class". ; Leontiy G. Byzov in his "In the Course of New Social Demand" analyzes the outcome of the Duma elections and maintains that the parliamentary elections indicated new social demand for building strong and socially oriented national state. This demand was picked up by the "Rodina" (Motherland) bloc, which became the highlight of the political season. "Rodina" collected protests of the voters, but most of these protests were not of social, but of existential character. Therefore, there is a need for a new social model capable of giving the public the new "reason to live", the new order based on the principles and values of the new "middle class".

Статья подготовлена на основе результатов массового опроса, проведенного Институтом социологии РАН в 2017 г. ежегодного мониторинга. Автор обращает внимание на существенный рост сторонников перемен за последний год, что формирует новый общественный запрос на перемены. Однако вектор этих перемен различные социальные группы видят по-своему. Анализируются ­сознание и ценности таких ключевых групп, как средний класс, молодежь, консервативное большинство, либеральное меньшинство, а внутри двух последних групп выделяются более и менее радикальные фракции. Через призму особенностей массового сознания этих групп исследуется оценка исторического прошлого. Показывается, как современные общественные противоречия способствуют формированию групповой исторической идентичности, различного отношения к важнейшим вехам исторического прошлого.

Leontiy G. Byzov, Yekaterina A. Kulagina in their report "Dagestan — a Potential Hotbed of Instability on the Map of Russia" presents the data of the survey conducted by VCIOM in Dagestan in order to find out the major problems of the regions, the attitude to the political institutions and law enforcement agencies, etc. The article is followed by the commentary of Yury T. Solovyev, who headed the team of interviewers and gives some interesting observations about the way the study was held. ; Leontiy G. Byzov, Yekaterina A. Kulagina in their report "Dagestan — a Potential Hotbed of Instability on the Map of Russia" presents the data of the survey conducted by VCIOM in Dagestan in order to find out the major problems of the regions, the attitude to the political institutions and law enforcement agencies, etc. The article is followed by the commentary of Yury T. Solovyev, who headed the team of interviewers and gives some interesting observations about the way the study was held.