Suchergebnisse

AbstractAround the world, movements for justice or social change struggle with the question of whether to use nonviolent or violent protest strategies. While research suggests that nonviolent strategies may be more successful than violent ones, people's preferences and support for different strategies may depend on their specific role in the conflict. We tested this in Study 1 in the context of the Kurdish question in Turkey (N = 320), and we found that Turks and Americans supported nonviolent movements more than violent movements, while Kurds were equally supportive of both. Study 2 (N = 192) replicated Study 1 and investigated whether the preference for nonviolent strategies among the third‐party group was dependent on the perceivers' specific preferred outcomes in the conflict. We found that, in the context of the Kurdish question in Syria, third‐party Americans still supported nonviolent movements more than violent movements regardless of their preferred outcomes, although the more that they preferred that Kurds would win the conflict, the more supportive they were of both nonviolent and violent protest movements. These studies suggest that the preference for nonviolent strategies may depend on people's role in the conflict, with important implications for addressing conflict needs and conflict resolution.

The current study highlights the multiplicity of Kurdish diasporic identity construction in relation to distant conflict, the Afrin conflict in particular. It first distinguishes between different reference points for identity construction: national Kurdish identity, ethnic Kurdish identity, and politicized Kurdish identity. Second, it explains diasporic identity construction by means of collective action variables: perceived injustice, perceived efficacy, and past online/offline participation. By means of a quantitative survey of members of the Kurdish diaspora in Germany (N = 94) and subsequent regression analyses, the findings show that past online/offline political participation represents a vital factor in the construction of a politicized Kurdish identity, while perceived injustice and perceived collective efficacy represent key predictors of identifying with a Kurdish national identity. Identifying with an ethnic Kurdish identity is not meaningfully explained by the chosen collective action predictors in this study. The study aims to connect diaspora communication and social psychology literatures by using the above-mentioned identity and collective action variables.

The current study highlights the multiplicity of Kurdish diasporic identity construction in relation to distant conflict, the Afrin conflict in particular. It first distinguishes between different reference points for identity construction: national Kurdish identity, ethnic Kurdish identity, and politicized Kurdish identity. Second, it explains diasporic identity construction by means of collective action variables: perceived injustice, perceived efficacy, and past online/offline participation. By means of a quantitative survey of members of the Kurdish diaspora in Germany (N = 94) and subsequent regression analyses, the findings show that past online/offline political participation represents a vital factor in the construction of a politicized Kurdish identity, while perceived injustice and perceived collective efficacy represent key predictors of identifying with a Kurdish national identity. Identifying with an ethnic Kurdish identity is not meaningfully explained by the chosen collective action predictors in this study. The study aims to connect diaspora communication and social psychology literatures by using the above-mentioned identity and collective action variables.