Suchergebnisse

Editada en la Fundación Empresa Pública ; En este artículo se estudia la figura del Factor General del rey dentro de la organización y funcionamiento de la Real Hacienda castellana entre 1627 y 1644, coincidiendo con el gobierno reformista del Conde-duque de Olivares. Durante esos años, el desempeño de este cargo recayó en Bartolomé Spinola, uno de los más importantes hombres de negocios genoveses del reinado de Felipe IV. El estudio aborda cómo se organizó la gestión de los recursos y la toma de decisiones económicas por parte de la Real Hacienda en el siglo XVII y el papel que jugaron en este aspecto algunos hombres de negocios privados. Primero estudiamos qué sentido tuvo la presencia de un Factor General en las finanzas de la Corona. En segundo lugar, explicamos quién era Bartolomé Spinola y cómo se convirtió en un importante hombre de negocios gracias a su actividad como banquero privado. Y por último, analizamos brevemente algunas de las funciones desempeñadas por el Factor General tanto en la financiación de los gastos de la Corona como en los problemas generados por la moneda de cobre. ; This paper studies the figure of «Factor General del rey» in the organization and work of the Royal Finances of Castilla between 1627 and 1644, under the reformist government of the Count-Duke of Olivares. During these years, the Factor General was Bartolomé Spinola, one of the most importants Genoese bankers of Phillip IV. This article analyses the strategy of Royal Finances in the fínancial market during the early seventeenth century, and the role played by the most important bankers. To begin with, I examine why the Royal Finances needed a Factor General. At this moment, the Crown was establishing a system where the policy was established by experts. The presence oí fínanciers in the court of Madrid grew as much as to influence economic policy. Later afterwards, I explain who Bartolomé Spinola was and how he got to become the main important banker, and then the Factor General. Drawing upon the experience and understanding he gained from his activities in the fínancial markets as a prívate banker, he could influence the direction of the political economy of the Spanish Empire. Finally, I analyse briefly some of the functions of the Factor General in the financing of the Crown's expenses, and his intervention in the problems relative to the vellon coinage. ; Publicado

AbstractIn the fragmented geographical, fiscal, and financial state inherited by Philip II of Spain, while the public debt reached an unprecedented level (50–60 per cent of GDP), the critical refinancing of unfunded asientos into funded juros was operated by merchant‐bankers who signed the asientos. This process is illustrated, using abundant archival documentation, by an asiento with the Maluenda brothers in 1595, which provided the Crown with steady monthly cash payments for a year with options to sell juros for two‐thirds of the credit, and a monthly rate of 1 per cent on the interim balance. Other examples are provided.

Under Philip II, Castile was the first country with a large nation‐wide domestic public debt. A new view of that fiscal system is presented that is potentially relevant for other fiscal systems in Europe before 1800. The credibility of the debt, mostly in perpetual redeemable annuities, was enhanced by decentralized funding through taxes administered by cities making up the Realm in the Cortes. The accumulation of short‐term debt depended on refinancing through long‐term debt. Financial crises in the short‐term debt occurred when the service of the long‐term debt reached the revenues of its servicing taxes. They were not caused by liquidity crises and were resolved after protracted negotiations in the Cortes by tax increases and interest rate reductions.

In this response, we demonstrate that Mauricio Drelichman and Hans‐Joachim Voth, in their 2015 Economic History Review note 'Duplication without constraints: Álvarez‐Nogal and Chamley's analysis of debt policy under Philip II', provide a misconceived and inaccurate account of our argument about the finances of Philip II in 'Debt policy under constraints: Philip II, the Cortes, and Genoese bankers' (Economic History Review, 2014). Here, we summarize our position in the context of the current literature and provide a few comments on data gathering.

AbstractThe economic decline of Early Modern Spain offers an opportunity to explore how it affected perceptions of welfare and inequality. We provide an answer based on the Bull of the Crusade, an inexpensive alms collected by the Hispanic Monarchy and massively purchased by a highly religious population that believed in its spiritual benefits. The purchase of the bull represented a public practice of religion that captured people's religiosity and belief in the afterlife and had a positive impact on their spiritual well-being. We find that our measure of spiritual well-being—the ratio of (normalized) bulls sold to their recipients (the population aged 12 and above)—deteriorated in the late 1570s and 1580s and the 1640s but improved during the 1670s, while subjective inequality—the ratio between the number of bulls sold to those who deemed themselves affluent and those sold to common individuals—increased from 1600–1640 and fell in the 1580s and early 1590s and the 1670s. Hence, improving (deteriorating) subjective well-being was accompanied by declining (improving) subjective inequality through the seventeenth century.

Two distinctive regimes are distinguished in Spain over half a millennium. The first one (1270s–1590s) corresponds to a high land–labour ratio frontier economy, which is pastoral, trade‐oriented, and led by towns. Wages and food consumption were relatively high. Sustained per capita growth occurred from the end of the Reconquest (1264) to the Black Death (1340s) and resumed from the 1390s only broken by late fifteenth‐century turmoil. A second regime (1600s–1810s) corresponds to a more agricultural and densely populated low‐wage economy which, although it grew at a pace similar to that of 1270–1600, remained at a lower level. Contrary to pre‐industrial western Europe, Spain achieved its highest living standards in the 1340s, not by mid‐fifteenth century. Although its death toll was lower, the plague had a more damaging impact on Spain and, far from releasing non‐existent demographic pressure, destroyed the equilibrium between scarce population and abundant resources. Pre‐1350 per capita income was reached by the late sixteenth century but only exceeded after 1820.