Suchergebnisse

AbstractEurope is besieged from within and without by anti‐liberal threats. The rise within Europe of populist‐nationalist parties and renewed jihadist attacks interact with pressure from Putin's Russia, Erdogan's Turkey, and actual and aspiring despotisms in Muslim‐majority countries. To varying degrees these threats are reactions to the effects of 21st‐century liberalism on societies. Liberalism always has been chiefly concerned to safeguard individual autonomy or self‐legislation, but the content of autonomy has shifted over two centuries. First‐stage liberalism saw the chief threat to autonomy as the state; second‐stage, as capital; the third‐stage version now ascendant sees traditional norms and institutions as the main menace. Third‐stage liberalism in Europe (and elsewhere) distributes power towards 'symbolic analysts' and away from those adept at services or manual labour. Thus the anti‐liberal backlash: within Europe large numbers of people find themselves less autonomous, in the older senses of the word, and ambivalent about the newer notion of autonomy; while on Europe's periphery many find certain features of liberal societies unappealing and threatening. Defending liberalism will require not only devoting more resources to national security and mitigating the disruptions of economic openness, but revisiting what individual autonomy ought to mean in the 21st‐century world.

Abstract
Anti-liberalism is often highlighted as central to interpretations of fascism. This article discusses the existence of a liberal-fascist current in Italian Fascism. Very active during the first years of the Fascist government, this current was expressed in the pages of the journals La Nuova Politica Liberale, which brought together disciples of the philosopher Giovanni Gentile, and Critica Fascista, an organ of the revisionists led by Giuseppe Bottai. Anti-individualist, anti-naturalist and anti-democratic, this current asserted that the rights of the nation preceded individual rights, that freedom would not exist in a supposed state of nature and would be the creation of a political society. It rejected the opposition between freedom and authority, stating that only a strong and orderly state would allow freedom to occur. Although the existence of a liberal-fascist current does not impugn the predominantly anti-liberal character of Italian Fascism, bringing it to light contributes to a more complex assessment of Italian Fascism, underlining the existence of different intellectual currents, ideological clashes, and political antagonism within the movement.

Thebaud reviews New Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe in Michael O'Meara.

Was liberalism really an outdated ideology in post-1945 European political systems, as claimed by some scholars? The great success of socialism on one side and various forms of Christian Democracy on the other could make that claim appear reasonable. In fact a closer view shows how postwar constitutions in some countries (Italy, France and Germany) presented once again fundamental liberal values, reformulated in different words. One of the roots of that difference is the gap between the Anglo-Saxon approach to liberalism, which takes into account history and communities, and the continental tradition of liberalism, linked to an abstract philosophical approach and highly dependent on long-standing struggles between Churches and the body politic.

The book rediscovers liberal modernity as the master process and destination of Western civilization, and its anti-liberal adversaries, notably conservatism, as the ghosts of a dead past. The anti-liberal rumors of the 'dead' of liberalism are 'greatly exaggerated'.

This is the final version. Available on open access from Routledge via the DOI in this record ; In this chapter I use the work of the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt to explain illiberal models of political governance across South Asia. First, I explore how Schmitt's advocacy of a sovereign leader is reflected in the rise of personalised, autocratic leadership in the region. Second, I unpack how his views pose a challenge to liberal views of the rule of law. Third, deep polarisation in South Asian societies reflects Schmitt's insistence on a politics defined by the distinction between friend and enemy. Finally, I discuss how Schmitt's advocacy of democracy without liberalism has echoes in the emergence of illiberal majoritarian politics across the region. Using political theory helps us to think comparatively about the ideational framework of autocratization, not only across South Asia, but on a global scale.