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Despite their presumed liabilities, institutions associated with democracy serve as a source of power in prolonged international competition by increasing the financial resources that states can bring to bear. The theory of sovereign debt suggests that a state's ability to raise money through public borrowing is enhanced when debtholders have mechanisms for sanctioning state leaders in the event of default. Institutions associated with liberal government provide such mechanisms. All other things being equal, states that possess these institutions enjoy superior access to credit and lower interest rates than do states in which the sovereign has more discretion to default unilaterally. Liberal states can not only raise more money from a given economic base but can also pursue tax-smoothing policies that minimize economic distortions. The ability to finance competition in a manner that is consistent with long-term economic growth generates a significant advantage in prolonged rivalries. These claims are explored by analyzing the Anglo-French rivalry (1688–1815) and the Cold War.

Demokratische Institutionen können im fortgesetzten internationalen Wettbewerb als Machtquelle dienen, indem sie die finanziellen Ressourcen, die ein Staat aufwenden kann, vergrössern. Die Theorie der Staatsverschuldung geht davon aus, dass öffentliche Schuldner eher Mittel aufnehmen können, wenn die Gläubiger über Mechanismen zur Sanktionierung der Regierungsvertreter verfügen. Unter sonst gleichen Umständen haben Staaten, die solche Institutionen besitzen, Zugang zu mehr Krediten und niedrigeren Zinsen, als wenn der Staat eher Entscheidungsmacht besitzt, die Zahlungen einzustellen. Liberale Staaten können nicht nur auf eine breitere ökonomische Basis zurückgreifen, sie können auch einkommensglättende Steuerinstrumente zur Verringerung ökonomischer Verzerrungen nutzen. Die Fähigkeit, Wettbewerb konsistent mit dem langfristigen Wachstum finanzieren zu können, schafft signifikante Vorteile in langen Rivalitäten. Diese Hypothesen werden mit einer Untersuchung der englisch-französischen Rivalitäten (1688-1815) sowie des Kalten Krieges analysiert. (SWP-Jns)

The importance of competition law as a policy lever to help the EU compete at the forefront of science and technology seems to have been overlooked by the Commission. As a consequence, the EU appears to be at a disadvantage to the USA in terms of the regulatory environment for intellectual property and licensing practices. This article examines these differences and explores the pros and cons of the European and American approaches to competition law, ultimately arguing in favour of regulatory harmonisation.

This article transfers the concept of competitive advantage from management theory to party competition. Competitive advantage as a party's ability to sustainably outrival any competitor in a given voter segment involves not only a superior appeal in that segment but also a resource or efficiency dimension. The effort involved in achieving distinctiveness and increasing one's attractiveness on an issue means that a party's competitive advantage is hard to challenge by its competitors. Investing in certain issues and attacking parties on "their" issues is therefore only promising under certain conditions. Whether a competitive advantage can be gained or sustained and whether a party can be challenged depends on the larger competitive situation, which is characterized by five kinds of influences: potential new competitors, existence of substitutes, voter influence, ideational suppliers, and intensity of rivalry. Together, these forces mark competitive pressures that are key to understanding parties' issue portfolio and policy changes.Related Articles

Bernick, Ethan M., and
Nathan Myers. 2012. "." Politics & Policy 40: 131‐159. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00340.x/abstract


Gant, Michael M. 1993. "." Southeastern Political Review 21: 683‐704. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.1993.tb00385.x/abstract


Carmines, Edward G.,
Jessica C. Gerrity, and
Michael W. Wagner. 2010. "." Politics & Policy 38: 1135‐1158. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00272.x/abstract
Related Media
. 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/2015/apr/02/political-brands-who-gets-your-vote

. 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21615610-large-centrist-parties-become-more-alike-radical-fringe-gets-stronger-alternatives

Competitive markets are now established in most successful economies but the question of what competition is and what it means for policy in developing countries is often overlooked. This book provides a refreshing and critical examination of the issues relating to market competition and competition policy. The book discusses competition from different theoretical perspectives and examines the implications these viewpoints have for policy. The contributors assess competitiveness in domestic markets and the impact of foreign competition. They also review the experiences of a range of countries