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This innovative study by one of the leading specialists in the field examines the social and economic role of the German army in the nation's internal affairs during the First World War. This was the area in which the influence of the army was most direct and profound. Germany's wartime economic mobilisation was both planned and directed by the army, and as a consequence of this largely unanticipated responsibility, the army was compelled to cope with the great social conflicts of Imperial Germany. In the process of confronting the groups representing army and labour, the army paved the way fo

Generally regarded as the most influential social science treatise of the 20th century, this work by legendary economist John Maynard Keynes is relevant reading even today for anyone who wants to understand international economics and foreign affairs. First published in 1919, The Economic Consequences of Peace created an intense and immediate controversy for its brazen criticism of world leaders and the Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I. Keynes argued that as a blueprint for peace, it was destined to create tension and conflict ahead...and history proved him right when world war broke out again within a generation. The popularity of this key work, and its place in history, helped cement Keynes's status as one of the 20th century's principal economists

This unique volume offers a definitive new history of European economies at war from 1914 to 1918. It studies how European economies mobilised for war, how existing economic institutions stood up under the strain, how economic development influenced outcomes and how wartime experience influenced post-war economic growth. Leading international experts provide the first systematic comparison of economies at war between 1914 and 1918 based on the best available data for Britain, Germany, France, Russia, the USA, Italy, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and the Netherlands. The editors' overview draws some stark lessons about the role of economic development, the importance of markets and the damage done by nationalism and protectionism. A companion volume to the acclaimed The Economics of World War II, this is a major contribution to our understanding of total war

Title page -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- PART I - THE ENEMIES OF DEMOCRACY -- CHAPTER I - MILITARISM AND THE WILL TO POWER -- CHAPTER II - MILITARISM AND CAPITALISM -- CHAPTER III - THE DEFENCE OF IMPROPERTY -- CHAPTER IV - PROTECTIONISM AND IMPERIALISM -- I -- II -- CHAPTER V - POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL REACTIONISTS -- CHAPTER VI - SPIRITUAL AND SOCIAL REACTIONISTS -- PART II - THE DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY -- CHAPTER I - HOW TO BREAK THE VICIOUS CIRCLE -- CHAPTER II - THE NEW ECONOMIC SITUATION -- CHAPTER III - TWO PROBLEMS FOR LABOUR -- CHAPTER IV - THE CONQUEST OF THE STATE -- CHAPTER V - THE CLOSE STATE VERSUS INTERNATIONALISM.

Abstract
The First World War was not only a military conflict but also an economic war. In all belligerent countries, labour and resources were shifted from civil production to military production. Factory workers, miners and farmers produced a steady flow of supplies for the frontlines. Financial mobilization provided the money for arms, ammunition, and other supplies. In contemporary understanding "financial mobilization" comprised all fiscal and monetary instruments that were necessary to finance the war. The aim of this paper is to discuss the interaction between the government and the central bank in Germany in financing the First World War. Aspects include the pre-war plans for financial mobilization, the fiscal and monetary policies of the war years and their inflationary consequences, the financing of foreign trade and financial demobilization during the transition from war to peace.

The First World War left a legacy of chaos that is still with us a century later. Why did European leaders resort to war and why did they not end it sooner? Roger L. Ransom sheds new light on this enduring puzzle by employing insights from prospect theory and notions of risk and uncertainty. He reveals how the interplay of confidence, fear, and a propensity to gamble encouraged aggressive behavior by leaders who pursued risky military strategies in hopes of winning the war. The result was a series of military disasters and a war of attrition which gradually exhausted the belligerents without producing any hope of ending the war. Ultimately, he shows that the outcome of the war rested as much on the ability of the Allied powers to muster their superior economic resources to continue the fight as it did on success on the battlefield

Intro -- Ludwig von Mises, Nation, State, and Economy -- Front Matter -- Title Page -- Copyright Details -- Table of Contents, p. vii -- Preface, p. ix -- Translator's Introduction, p. xi -- Nation, State, and Economy -- Introduction, p. 1 -- Nation and State -- 1. Nation and Nationality, p. 7 -- 1. The Nation as a Speech Community, p. 7 -- 2. Dialect and Statard Language, p. 17 -- 3. National Changes, p. 22 -- 2. The nationality Principle in Politics, p. 25 -- 1. Liberal or Pacifistic Nationalism, p. 25 -- 2. Militant or Imperialistic Nationalism, p. 32 -- A. The nationality Question in Territories with Mixed Populations, p. 32 -- B. The Migration Problem and Nationalism, p. 46 -- C. The Roots of Imperialism, p. 64 -- D. Pacifism, p. 70 -- 3. On the History of German Democracy, p. 80 -- A. Prussia, p. 80 -- B. Austria, p. 88 -- War and the Economy -- 1. The Economic Position of the Central Powers in the War, p. 110 -- 2. War Socialism, p. 117 -- 3. Autarky and Stockpiling, p. 121 -- 4. The Economy's War Costs and the Inflation, p. 125 -- 5. Covering the State's War Costs, p. 136 -- 6. War Socialism and True Socialism, p. 142 -- Socialism and Imperialism -- 1. Socialism and Opponents, p. 147 -- 2. Socialism and Utopia, p. 152 -- 3. Centralist and Syndicalist Socialism, p. 162 -- 4. Socialist Imperialism, p. 169 -- Concluding Observations, p. 176 -- Index, p. 185.