Suchergebnisse

The general trend in 2001 was a focus by the international community on regional & domestic sources of conflict & relevant arms control measures, particularly operational measures. In Europe the focus was on the implementation of agreed measures, &, after the 11 September (2001) terrorist attacks on the US, the search for new approaches to the politico-military dialogue. Russia's continued noncompliance with its agreed flank levels hindered the entry into force of the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). However, Russia has met its commitments regarding troop withdrawals from Moldova. In Georgia the future of one Russian military base & the continued presence of Russian forces remain to be resolved. Regional & bilateral confidence- & security-building measures (CSBMs) continued to work smoothly, & new bilateral CSBMs were introduced in Europe. On 1 Jan 2002 the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies entered into force. The Second Review Conference of the CCW ('Inhumane Weapons') Convention extended the application of the convention to domestic armed conflicts. 3 Tables, 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.

COMMENTS ON SEVERAL ASPECTS OF MBFR, BOTH IN TERMS OF THE OPTIONS OPEN TO THE SUPER-POWERS AND INT TERMS OF THE POTENTIAL EVENTUAL SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING MBFR'S GOALS. CONCLUDES THAT IT MAY BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SUPERPOWERS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL TROOP WITHDRAWALS WITHOUT GETTING BOGGED DOWN OVER TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS. BUT IT WILL NOT HELP CURB THEIR USE OF MILITARY WEAPONS.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- 1. The Resurgence of Conventional Arms Control -- 2. The Purpose and Scope of Conventional Arms Control in Europe -- Deterrence and Crisis Stability -- Arms Race Stability -- The Stability of the International Political Order -- Conclusions -- 3. The Methodology of Negotiations on Conventional Arms Control -- 1. Force Reductions and Withdrawals -- 2. Confidence-Building Measures -- 3. Realignment of Doctrines, Strategies and Force Structures -- 4. Reciprocal Unilateral Measures -- 4. Looking Ahead -- Appendix -- 1. The "Budapest Appeal," June 12,1986 -- 2 The "Brussels Declaration," December 1986 -- 3. The "Berlin Communiqué," May 29,1987 -- 4. The "Jaruzelski Plan," July 17, 1987 -- 5. The Brussels Summit Statement, March 2-3,1988 -- 6. The "Sofia Appeal," April 6, 1988 -- About the Author.

The role of legally binding agreements in achieving arms control objectives has been the subject of discussion in recent years. One specific aspect, the circumstances in which a state may unilaterally withdraw from its legal obligations, has become especially controversial. A legally binding agreement under international law -- a treaty -- is generally seen as a robust tool for the recording of agreements between states. The conclusion, maintenance and termination of such agreements are governed by a branch of international law known as 'the law of treaties'. The performance of obligations owed under a treaty is safeguarded by the principle expressed in the Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda-agreements are to be honored in good faith. A central element in the notion of a legally binding agreement is that its termination is subject to the application of legal rules, rather than the discretionary interests of single parties. Subjecting the termination of a treaty to legal rules and principles serves to maintain stability and predictability in international relations. On 10 January 2003, North Korea revoked a 10-year 'moratorium' on its 1993 unilateral withdrawal from the multilateral 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). In 1993 it had invoked a special clause in the NPT that allows a party, in exercising its national sovereignty, to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that 'extraordinary events' have jeopardized its supreme interests. The North Korean withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 was the first instance of such a clause being invoked in relation to a modern multilateral arms control agreement. However, it was not the first instance of a state using a similar clause to renounce obligations owed under an arms control treaty. In 2002, the United States withdrew from the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), a bilateral agreement between it and the Soviet Union/Russia, by invoking a similar clause on unilateral withdrawal. The actions taken by the North Korean and US governments are unprecedented in the modern history of international arms control and raise several fundamental and important questions in relation to the role usually attributed to legally binding agreements as a robust tool for arms control. Prima facie, a unilateral withdrawal would seem to run counter to the notion that the termination of a legally binding international agreement should not be at the discretionary interest of a single party. On the other hand, because both the USA and North Korea invoked provisions that were part of the pactum in question, their actions are not contrary to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. However, it should also be emphasized that the context is markedly different in each case. The USA withdrew from the ABM Treaty because its plans for the development of a ballistic missile defense system would have violated the treaty. North Korea, however, invoked the withdrawal clause after having violated its obligations under the NPT. What effect, if any, these two events might have on future invocations of the extraordinary events clause remains to be seen. In any event, it cannot be said that the requirement to provide an explanation served as a moderating factor in either case. None of the arguments presented by the states concerned in support of the use of the clause is persuasive. Neither case resulted in any negative consequences for the withdrawing party. This could set a future standard and may in a sense 'lower the threshold' for the invocation of this type of withdrawal clause in order to terminate legally binding relationships. This would, in turn, run counter to efforts to obtain stability and predictability in international relations. Adapted from the source document.

The US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in June 2002 ended the era when the effort to control nuclear weapons was a central preoccupation of US foreign policy. Arms control did little to control weapons during the Cold War, but it was a political imperative which assuaged the anxiety of the nuclear competition. At the end of the Cold War, arms-control treaties initially provided an essential mechanism for managing the decline of Soviet power. Then the paraphernalia of arms control quickly came to be seen as cumbersome, slow and ill-adapted to new security threats. The second Bush administration delivered the coup de grace. Strategic arms control has had its day, but it would be a mistake to throw the baby out with the bathwater. (Survival / SWP)

Why do some democracies break their security commitments whereas others do not? This study proposes a research strategy to answer the question by analyzing the timing of unilateral exits from a coalition military operation. Coalition participants typically do not exit until a military mission has been accomplished. However, in the case of the US-led coalition occupying Iraq since May 2003, 16 states have unilaterally withdrawn their armed forces. Despite the danger such defections may cause to the relationship of these states with the USA, why and when do they exit? The author creates a dataset with a state-month unit of analysis that contains information on 37 partner states and applies a Cox proportional hazard model. The study finds that the occurrence of a national election serves as a strong driving force to accelerate an exit from the coalition. An incumbent leader who faces a challenger who opposes military contributions in Iraq would reverse the policy to support the USA and exit the coalition to win an election, even at the risk of damaging a bilateral relationship with the USA. A change in leadership after an election, on the other hand, failed to be a predictor of the timing of defection. Furthermore, results reveal that the division of power within the government and the constitutional rules that enable significant parliamentary control over executive decisions to use force neither delay nor accelerate the timing of withdrawal. To understand the conditions under which democracies break their security commitments, more attention should be paid to election cycles than to a change in leadership and to types of democratic institutional and constitutional arrangements.