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The work of Christoph Breidert is positioned in a methodologically challenging area of marketing research that is highly relevant to both theoretical investigations and practical apphcations. Determination of willingness-to-pay for products and/or services from a customers per­ spective is crucial for modern approaches to pricing decision-making. Based on the in­ creasing availability of individual transaction data (e. g. , scanner data, consumer panel data, and data from Smart Cards) remarkable improvements have been achieved in es­ timating advanced price response models based on observed pu

This paper uses a referendum‐style survey approach known as dichotomous‐choice contingent valuation to estimate the benefits of restricting the uses of 6.9 million acres of desert land. Statistical techniques estimate the value to California residents of creating three new national parks and 76 new wilderness areas in the high and low deserts of eastern California. The total amount that California residents would be willing to pay to enact desert protection legislation ranges from $177 million to $448 million per year. This estimate hinges on the assumptions that (i) the residents who did not complete and return the survey questionnaire ("nonrespondents") would receive no benefits from desert protection and (ii) the estimate of willingness to pay for the "respondents" is unbiased.

In many areas such as consumer law or competition law, legislators can opt between two alternative forms of sanctions to remedy wrongdoing: they can impose an infringer to pay either a fine or a compensation. There is a major research gap regarding the infringers' reactions to the different forms of sanctions. This paper reports an experiment that investigated infringers' willingness to pay compensation versus fines. Results show that regardless of victim characteristics (whether the victim is a company or an NGO), infringers are willing to pay higher amounts in compensation than in fines, view compensation as more fair and believe compensation is better able to restore their reputation. Compensation and fines did not differ in the extent to which they stimulated infringers' willingness to take precautionary measures. Participants who inflicted harm to a company rather than an NGO, surprisingly viewed their sanction as more fair, irrespective of the type of sanction in place. Our findings highlight some important strengths of compensation from a infringer's point of view that are to be weighed in the policy debate.