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THIS PAPER PRESENTS A MODEL OF CENTRALIZED VOTE-TRADING IN A LEGISLATURE. IN THIS MODEL, LEGISLATORS TRADE ONLY WITH PARTY LEADERS, WHO SET PRICES AT WHICH THEY WILL BUY NEEDED VOTE-CHANGES AND SELL PROMISES TO PASS OR DEFEAT PARTICULAR BILLS. EACH LEGISLATOR TRADES AWAY VOTES ON BILLS OF LITTLE CONCERN TO HIM AND OF HIGH CONCERN TO LEADERS, AND PURCHASES PROMISES FROM THE LEADERS TO PASS (OR DEFEAT) PARTICULAR BILLS OF HIGH CONCERN TO THE LEGISLATOR RELATIVE TO THE PRICE THE LEGUSLATOR MUST PAY. THIS MODEL IS INTENDED AS A FORMAL REPRESENTATION OF AN "EFFICIENT" AND POSSIBLY DESIRABLE LEGISLATURE; MODIFICATIONS ARE NEEDED TO MAKE IT USEFUL IN DESCRIBING ACTUAL LEGISLATURES. HOWEVER, SOME EVIDENCE IS CITED TO SHOW THAT THIS MODEL BETTER ACCORDS WITH REALITY THAN PREVIOUS VOTETRADING MODELS.

The point has been made that vote trading may result in Pareto inefficient legislative outcome; yet vote trading can also result in beneficial consequences for legislators. In every legislative meeting, the outcome that would prevail in the absence of vote trading must be Pareto inefficient; there must be at least one potential vote trade that would make every legislator better off than he would be without vote trading. An example of legislative decision-making processes illustrates this case. Special reference is made to "The Paradox of Vote Trading," by W. H. Riker & S. J. Brams (American Political Science Review, 1973, 66) & "Problems of Majority Voting" by G. Tullock (Journal of Political Economy, 1959, 67) with respect to clarification of certain assumptions concerning the effects of vote trading. C. Grindle.

International audience ; Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others' votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling - the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions - to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.

International audience ; Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others' votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling - the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions - to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.

International audience ; Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others' votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling - the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions - to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.

International audience ; Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others' votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling - the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions - to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.

International audience ; Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others' votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling - the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions - to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.

The aim of this paper is to clarify the continuing debate about the theoretical characteristics of vote trading. It sets about this by first emphasizing existing distinctions among types of vote trading systems, most importantly, the distinction between trades on entire platforms characterizing social states (implicit vote trading) and trades on the individual issues making up the platforms (explicit vote trading). The subdivisions of the latter type are more carefully explored, with the key results being that: while all vote trading systems may lead to circularity in the attempt to choose; and while implicit vote trading inevitably involves such circularity; vote trading over individual, independent issues may be stable. The challenge to the social choice field is therefore to be more careful in specifying the conditions of foresight, renegotiability and the like, and to compare theoretical systems for explicit vote trading with actual legislative rules.