The U. S. Supreme Court and Civil Liberties
In: American studies newsletter, Heft 9, S. 44-50
ISSN: 0941-6978
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In: American studies newsletter, Heft 9, S. 44-50
ISSN: 0941-6978
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 498-499
ISSN: 1537-5927
[p. 1] ; column 6 ; 4 col. in. ; The Mormons attempted to prove the Edmunds Act unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court ruled against them.
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In: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee: VRÜ = World comparative law : WCL, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 431-435
ISSN: 0506-7286
In: NACLA newsletter, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 6-7
In: Sociological inquiry: the quarterly journal of the International Sociology Honor Society, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 75-86
ISSN: 1475-682X
This study was designed to test the designed to test the legitimacy‐conferring hypotheses as it relates to the United States Supreme Court. Conventional wisdom has long asscrted that the Court, in its role as interpreter of the Constitution, is a major force influencing the values and attitudes of Americans. However, little empirical research has been conducted on the issue, and that which has been conducted has been ambiguous. Using a split‐ballot experimental technique, we found support for the legitimacy‐conferring hypothesis among a sample of older Americans from twenty‐two different states across the U. S. We found five of nine proposals to be more strongly endorsed when their attributed source was the Supreme Court rather than the U. S. Congress or when the source was unattributed. A factor analysis of the items was used to discover underlying value‐orientations described by the nine items. An analysis to three derived factors added to our confidence in the legitimacy‐conferring hypothesis.
In: American political science review, Band 35, Heft 5, S. 890-898
ISSN: 1537-5943
"We are under a Constitution," said Charles Evans Hughes when he was governor of New York, "but the Constitution is what the judges say it is …" Several theories of jurisprudence have arisen which attempt to take into account this personal element in the judicial interpretation and making of law. The so-called "realistic" school has argued that law is simply the behavior of the judge, that law is secreted by judges as pearls are secreted by oysters. A less extreme position was taken by the late Justice Holmes, who said: "What I mean by law is nothing more or less than the prediction of what a court will do." While these views go rather far in eliminating any idea of law as a "normative, conceptual system of rules," no one doubts that many judicial determinations are made on some basis other than the application of settled rules to the facts, or that justices of the United States Supreme Court, in deciding controversial cases involving important issues of public policy, are influenced by biases and philosophies of government, by "inarticulate major premises," which to a large degree predetermine the position they will take on a given question. Private attitudes, in other words, become public law.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 1217-1225
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The Western political quarterly, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 204-211
ISSN: 1938-274X
In: Midwest journal of political science: publication of the Midwest Political Science Association, Band 16, Heft 4, S. 652
Constitutional scholars Christopher P. Banks and John C. Blakeman offer the most current and the first book-length study of the U.S. Supreme Court's "new federalism" begun by the Rehnquist Court and now flourishing under Chief Justice John Roberts. While the Rehnquist Court reinvorgorated new federalism by protecting state sovereignty and set new constitutional limits on federal power, Banks and Blakeman show that in the Roberts Court new federalism continues to evolve in a docket increasingly attentive to statutory construction, preemption, and business litigation.
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 914-915
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 18, Heft 4, S. 713-724
ISSN: 0092-5853
THE PRIMARY HYPOTHESIS OF DAVID W. ROHDE ("POLICY GOALS, STRATEGIC CHOICE AND MAJORITY OPINION ASSIGNMENTS IN THE US SUPREME COURT," MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1972, 16, NOV, 652-682) THAT IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF MAJORITY OPINIONS THE OPINION ASSIGNER WILL ASSIGN THE MAJORITY OPINION TO HIMSELF OR TO THE JUSTICE WHOSE POSITION IS CLOSEST TO HIS OWN ON THE ISSUE IN QUESTION, WAS TESTED & SUPPORTED BY DATA FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES CASES DECIDED IN THE WARREN COURT. DATA EMPLOYED FOR REPLICATION CONSISTED OF 405 ECONOMICS CASES DECIDED BY THE WARREN COURT FROM 1958 TO 1969. BOTH DAVID W. ROHDE'S & HAROLD J. SPAETH'S ("A THEORY AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS," UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT) METHOD OF CLOSENESS SCALING WERE USED, WITH NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN THE RESULT: THE HYPOTHESIS IS NOT SUPPORTED IN THE AGGREGATE OF CASES. WHEN CASES ARE CONTROLLED FOR ISSUE AREA & CLOSENESS OF OPINION, THE RESULTS ARE TOO INCONCLUSIVE TO SUPPORT THE PRIMARY HYPOTHESES. ROHDE'S THEORY IS BASICALLY SOUND, BUT DOES NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF OTHER FACTORS SUCH AS THE SALIENCE OF THE ISSUE FOR THE ASSIGNER & THE CONSTRAINT ON THE ASSIGNER TO EQUALIZE THE MAJORITY OPINION-WRITING WORKLOAD. 4 TABLES. MODIFIED HA.
This book provides any teacher with viable, useable case law to fit any historical timeframe or unit of study. Aligned with the NCSS' Ten Themes, this teacher's guide provides thirty-two high-interest U.S. Supreme Court cases edited to a more reader-friendly format while retaining the original verbiage.