Suchergebnisse

County jails have faced a high turnover problem among jail officers for some time. This study analyzed five jails with a survey to determine the predominant predictors of turnover. Some predictors are under the control of the sheriff, some of the government and others of the economy. Of those elements that the sheriff can control, communication of realistic promotion support, genuine interest and full use of employee skills, are the most important.

List of Contents -- Section I Turnover of Central Neurotransmitters -- 1 The Turnover of Neurotransmitters in the Brain: An Introduction -- 2 The Turnover of Catecholamines -- 3 The Turnover of 5-Hydroxytryptamine -- 4 The Turnover of Acetylcholine -- 5 The Turnover of Transmitter Amino Acids,With Special Reference to GABA -- 6 The Turnover of Peptides -- Section II Application of Turnover Studies to Specific Problems -- Differences in Dopamine Metabolism in Rat Striatum andOlfactory Tubercle -- Changes in Central 5-Hydroxytryptamine Turnover inducedby Acute and Chronic Inhibition of the Re-uptake Process -- Tail Pinch Induced Gnawing: Voltammetric and BehaviouralEffects of Fenfluramine -- Analysis of CSF Amine Metabolites and Precursorsincluding Tryptophan, 5HIAA and HVA by HPLC using Fluorescence and Electrochemical Detection in Primates: Effects of Probenecid -- Species Differences in the Acetylation of [3H]Cholinein Cortical Slices -- The Effects of GABA Uptake Inhibitors including 2,4-Diaminobutyric Acid on GABA Metabolism in vivo -- Concomitant Determination of Endogenous Release of Dopamine, Noradrenaline, 5-Hydroxytryptamine and Thyrotrophin Releasing Hormone (TRH) from Rat Brain Slices and Synaptosomes.

We consider a repeated duopoly game where each firm privately chooses its investment in quality, and realized quality is a noisy indicator of the firm's investment. We focus on turnover equilibria in which a low‐quality realization is penalized by lowering future demand of the firm that delivered this quality. We determine when a turnover equilibrium that gives higher welfare than the static equilibrium exists and how this relates to market fundamentals. We also derive comparative statics properties, and we characterize a set of investment levels and, hence, payoffs that turnover equilibria sustain.

As the retirement wave of Baby Boomers approaches, retaining newly hired, mid-career, and retirement-eligible employees will be nearly as crucial as hiring top-quality new people. Using two large data sets on federal employees, we focus on whether human resource management (HRM) practices can affect turnover intention and whether they matter equally at all stages of the federal career. First, however, we test how well turnover intention predicts behavior using a 1% sample of the Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) and the 2005 Merit Principles Survey (MPS). Although turnover intention and behavior are correlated, they respond differently enough to demographic factors to suggest the need for caution in extrapolating the apparent impact of HRM practices from turnover intention to behavior.

We study how political turnover in mayoral elections in Brazil affects public service provision by local governments. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design for close elections, we find that municipalities with a new party in office experience upheavals in the municipal bureaucracy: new personnel are appointed across multiple service sectors, and at both managerial and non-managerial levels. In education, the increase in the replacement rate of personnel in schools controlled by the municipal government is accompanied by test scores that are 0.05–0.08 standard deviations lower. In contrast, turnover of the mayor's party does not impact local (non-municipal) schools. These findings suggest that political turnover can adversely affect the quality of public services when the bureaucracy is not shielded from the political process. (JEL D72, D73, H75, H76, J45, O17)

While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national income available, I show that development is associated with more democratic government— but mostly in the medium run (10 to 20 years). This is because higher income tends to induce breakthroughs to more democratic politics only after an incumbent dictator leaves office. And in the short run, faster economic growth increases the ruler's survival odds. Leader turnover appears to matter because of selection: in authoritarian states reformist leaders tend to either democratize or lose power relatively quickly, so long-serving leaders are rarely reformers. Autocrats also become less activist after their first year in office. This logic helps explain why dictators, concerned only to prolong their rule, often inadvertently prepare their countries for jumps to democracy after they leave the scene.