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AbstractWe examine the recent evolution of salient trade costs in agricultural and food markets, and changes in their composition. We review ways to measure costs and provide guidance with policy prescriptions to reduce them. We pay attention to transportation costs, border measures, and standard‐like nontariff measures. By pointing out limitations in current approaches and recent developments, we aim to improve our understanding of their effects and derive clearer prescriptions. We suggest promising directions for further research and investigation of agricultural trade costs, including on the emerging debate on gene editing and trade, transportation costs, and mainstreaming recent advances in analyzing nontariff measures.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, this article argues that trade liberalization may facilitate collusion and reduce welfare. With the help of a duopoly model in which firms interact repeatedly in multiple markets, we first show that, if trade costs (i.e., tariffs/transport costs) and discount factors are not too high, efficient cartel agreements necessitate the cross‐hauling of goods, as that entails lower deviation incentives. In this setting, we then demonstrate that reciprocal trade liberalization always raises total output when trade costs are within a range whose lower bound exceeds a threshold level, but may reduce total output (and thus be pro‐collusive) when trade costs are below that threshold level.

We agree, this isn't what we normally hear but according to the Financial Times it is true. Brexit has reduced trade costs by reducing the problems of inspections, paperwork and bureaucracy at the border:Goods entering the UK from outside the EU, which previously underwent rigorous physical or documentary inspections, are now entering with weaker checks or none at all, three agents told the Financial Times.Of course, it's possible to have different views about this. But that idea that Brexit would cripple trade by increasing border inspections and thus the costs of trade. This appears to be not wholly so.A rough guide - rough, you understand - is that 50% of our trade is with the EU, 50% isn't (that's of the small minority of all trade that actually crosses the borders of the Kingdom of course). So, if non-EU imports are now being more lightly inspected then that makes - from the effects of trade barriers and costs - non-EU goods cheaper to us. Which is good. Yes, yes, it's possible to think that increasing the barriers on the other 50% of our trade is a bad idea. But then we've always backed unilateral free trade. Let's lower the barriers on all.But, Brexit means higher barriers on 50% of our trade, lower barriers on the other 50%. Are we thus evens? It's possible to veer to the idea that we're hugely better off. For the lower costs, the freer trade, is now with 7.5 billion of our fellow humans, the increased costs are with the 430 million left in that rump-European Union. We are, thus, about 15 times better off in our ability to trade with more people. Which is good, you know? Tim Worstall