Almost 30 per cent of the adult population of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) smokes. All but one of the ASEAN members are currently parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC). The outlier is Indonesia, the most populous of the ten ASEAN countries. Multilaterally, all ten ASEAN members are World Trade Organization (WTO) members and subject to its trade rules. Regionally, ASEAN is in the process of accelerated economic integration, with the aim of establishing the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. A Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) system, set up under the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) arrangement, has existed since 1992, propelling members towards trade liberalisation and elimination of tariffs. At the same time, ASEAN has been negotiating trade and investment treaties with external partners, which have separate liberalisation targets and implications. In tandem, the overarching ASEAN Strategic Framework on Health and Development (2010–15) was established under the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint, to introduce and implement healthrelated initiatives in ASEAN. One area of focus of this framework is healthy lifestyles. In 2010, under these auspices, ASEAN health ministers committed to addressing tobacco control as a priority to promote healthy living. As a result, legislative and non-legislative initiatives have been introduced. In July 2012, ASEAN health ministers announced that tobacco would not be included in tariff liberalisation of the AFTA.
Intro -- Foreword -- Foreword -- Tobacco Control Is Good for Building a Healthy and Prosperous China -- Foreword -- Foreword -- Foreword -- A Few Words on Tobacco Control -- Preface -- Summary of the Book -- Contents -- About the Authors -- Abbreviations -- Chapter 1: Introduction: China and the Negotiation of WHO FCTC -- 1.1 Tobacco Use: A Serious Public Health Problem at a Global Level -- 1.2 Response to the Challenge of the Global Tobacco Pandemic: WHO FCTC -- 1.3 China and the Negotiation of WHO FCTC -- 1.4 Implementation of the WHO FCTC -- 1.4.1 General Obligations (Article 5) -- 1.4.2 Protect Tobacco Control Policies from the Tobacco Industry -- 1.4.3 The Reduction in Demand for Tobacco -- 1.4.3.1 Price and Tax Measures to Reduce the Demand for Tobacco -- 1.4.3.2 Protection from Exposure to Tobacco Smoke -- 1.4.3.3 Tobacco Product Regulation -- 1.4.3.4 Packaging and Labeling of Tobacco Products -- 1.4.3.5 Comprehensive Banning Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sponsorship -- 1.4.3.6 Treatment of Tobacco Dependence -- 1.5 Closing Remark -- Chapter 2: Tobacco Epidemic and Health Risk in the Chinese Population -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Pattern of Tobacco Epidemic in the Chinese Population -- 2.2.1 Model on Stages of the Cigarette Epidemic in the Developed and Developing Countries -- 2.2.2 Characteristics of Smoking Prevalence in China -- 2.2.3 Exposure to Secondhand Smoke in China -- 2.3 Epidemiological Study on Mortality Attributed Tobacco Use in China -- 2.3.1 Early Health Effects of the Emerging Tobacco Epidemic in China: A 16-Year Prospective Study -- 2.3.2 Morbidity and Mortality in Relation to Cigarette Smoking in Shanghai Community -- 2.3.3 Mortality Attributable to Cigarette Smoking in Xi'an Factory -- 2.3.4 Retrospective Proportional Mortality Study of One Million Deaths in the 1980s.
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Legislation to control tobacco use in developing countries has lagged behind the dramatic rise in tobacco consumption. India, the third largest grower of tobacco in the world, amassed 1.7 million disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) in 1990 due to disease and injury attributable to tobacco use in a population where 65% of the men and 38% of the women consume tobacco. India's anti-tobacco legislation, first passed at the national level in 1975, was largely limited to health warnings and proved to be insufficient. In the last decade state legislation has increasingly been used but has lacked uniformity and the multipronged strategies necessary to control demand. A new piece of national legislation, proposed in 2001, represents an advance. It includes the following key demand reduction measures: outlawing smoking in public places; forbidding sale of tobacco to minors; requiring more prominent health warning labels; and banning advertising at sports and cultural events. Despite these measures, the new legislation will not be enough to control the demand for tobacco products in India. The Indian Government must also introduce policies to raise taxes, control smuggling, close advertising loopholes, and create adequate provisions for the enforcement of tobacco control laws.
An short introduction or overview in Dutch Tobacco Control legislation, including a smoking ban in bars and restaurants and regulation of Tobacco Sale.
The last decade has seen unprecedented achievements in global tobacco control. These include the entry into force of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) and 179 states, as well as the European Union, becoming Parties to the Treaty,leading to an increased global cognizance of the negative health and economic impact of tobacco use. Governments around the world continue to adopt and implement effective tobacco control strategies and financial contributions from major philanthropies have increased the levels of financial support for tobacco control efforts in low- and middle-income countries. The UN high-level summit on Noncommunicable Diseases (NCDs) in 2011 and the 2015 adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in which NCDs and acceleration of implementation of WHO FCTC are included as specific targets, represent an increased global recognition of the need to address tobacco use prevalence as a key element of NCD interventions. ; The last decade has seen unprecedented achievements in global tobacco control. These include the entry into force of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) and 179 states, as well as the European Union, becoming Parties to the Treaty,leading to an increased global cognizance of the negative health and economic impact of tobacco use. Governments around the world continue to adopt and implement effective tobacco control strategies and financial contributions from major philanthropies have increased the levels of financial support for tobacco control efforts in low- and middle-income countries. The UN high-level summit on Noncommunicable Diseases (NCDs) in 2011 and the 2015 adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in which NCDs and acceleration of implementation of WHO FCTC are included as specific targets, represent an increased global recognition of theneed to address tobacco use prevalence as a key element of NCD interventions.
A large body of evidence demonstrates that tobacco companies use a wide range of tactics to interfere with tobacco control. Such strategies include direct and indirect political lobbying and campaign contributions, financing of research, attempting to affect the course of regulatory and policy machinery and engaging in social responsibility initiatives as part of public relations campaigns. Although more and more is known about tobacco industry tactics, a systematic, comprehensive guide is needed to assist regulators and policy-makers in combating those practices. Guidelines and recommendations exist for countering and monitoring industry marketing, and recommendations have been issued to refuse industry funding of certain activities, but no broad policy has been published to assist government officials, policy-makers and nongovernmental organizations in their interactions with the tobacco industry. The WHO Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI), the department in WHO with the mandate to control the global tobacco epidemic, monitors the activities of the tobacco industry in accordance with World Health Assembly resolution 54.18, which urges Member States to be aware of affiliations between the tobacco industry and members of their delegations, and urges WHO and Member States to be alert to any efforts by the tobacco industry to continue its subversive practice and to assure the integrity of health policy development in any WHO meeting and in national governments. As a continuing response to this mandate, TFI convened a group of experts to discuss tobacco industry interference in tobacco control and the public health policies and initiatives of WHO and its Member States. The meeting took place at the offices of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in Washington DC, United States of America, on 29–30 October 2007. Before the meeting, participants received a background paper commissioned by TFI, which served as the basis for discussions. The experts were asked to draw up a list of topics and concepts that should be included in policies to counter attempts by the tobacco industry to interfere with tobacco control. The list facilitated discussions on gaps in scientific evidence and the challenge of finding means for countering the wide range of types of interference (e.g. political, economic and scientific). This list also provided examples of proactive ways of eliminating tobacco companies' influence, including: policies refusing partnerships with tobacco companies; policies refusing tobacco company funding of research and programmes; rejecting self-regulatory or voluntary policies in tobacco control; encouraging divestment from tobacco investments; and promoting social indexing that excludes tobacco and businesses models that can be used to counter industry philanthropy. The meeting participants agreed that the results of the discussions should be incorporated into a document, to broaden understanding in the global public health community of the tobacco industry's influence on tobacco control. This document is therefore a synthesis of the evidencebased discussions, revisions and suggestions of the experts and is presented in a format that can readily be used by policy-makers and is based on the best available evidence on tobacco industry attempts to interfere with tobacco control and public health. The document begins by stating that effective tobacco control and the commercial success of the tobacco industry are fundamentally incompatible and that, accordingly, the tobacco industry can be expected to seek to avoid, prevent, weaken and delay effective policies and programmes, which are against its interests. Equally, tobacco control, in seeking to maximize the decline in tobacco related disease and in the tobacco use that causes such disease, must be vigilant in monitoring the wide range of tobacco industry actions to undermine effective tobacco control. Part I describes the means used by the tobacco industry and its allies to thwart effective tobacco control and summarizes the industry's history of undermining tobacco control, through direct lobbying and the use of third parties, academics and researchers. Part II describes the means used to monitor industry efforts to interfere with tobacco control. TFI aims for this document to provide the Contracting Parties to the WHO FCTC, and other WHO Member States, background and contextual information that may assist with the implementation of the WHO FCTC Article 5.3 Guidelines which were adopted at the third session of Conference of Parties (COP) in Durban, South Africa in November 2008 to counter tobacco industry interference with tobacco control.
Powerpoint presentation delivered at "Transforming Tobacco Control and Evaluation in Missouri,"St. Louis, Missouri July 18, 2006 concerning the economics of tobacco control. ; The Institute of Public Policy at the Harry s. Truman School of Public Affairs, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
OBJECTIVES: Because opinion leaders hold positions from which they may influence tobacco control efforts, this study examined their support for tobacco control policies and their involvement in tobacco control activities. METHODS: A telephone survey was administered to 712 California opinion leaders who were randomly selected from constructed lists representing 8 types of organizations: health, education, law enforcement, media, government, business, ethnic, and youth. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to identify predictors of support for and participation in tobacco control activities. RESULTS: Approximately one half to two thirds of opinion leaders supported the tobacco control policies queried; 60% reported involvement in tobacco control-related activities during the previous year. Organizational affiliation was a strong predictor of support and involvement, with leaders from health and educational organizations reporting the highest levels and business and media leaders reporting the lowest. Tobacco issue involvement variables (e.g., having a friend or family member with a smoking-related illness) were significantly associated with the outcomes, while sociodemographics, for the most part, were not. CONCLUSIONS: Study results can be used to mobilize opinion leaders' support for tobacco control more effectively.
Tobacco industry money has not been successful in recent years in buying support from lawmakers in Hawai'i. Since 2001, major legislation on clean indoor air, tobacco tax increases and a tobacco tax stamp measure have passed by comfortable margins. In 1994, the City Council of Honolulu passed smokefree workplaces ordinances that exempted bars and nightclubs. Mayor Jeremy Harris vetoed the bill because it covered restaurants. In 1997, Honolulu made all workplaces smokefree except restaurants and bars, which Mayor Harris signed because of the restaurant exemption. In December 2001, county government leaders of Honolulu, Kaua'i and Maui Counties announced they would be introducing legislation that would end restaurant smoking because of the state Legislature's inaction. Honolulu passed Hawai'i's first smokefree restaurant law in 2002. The State Department of Health media campaign that started June 1, 2001 focusing on the health impact of secondhand smoke on restaurant workers may have contributed to the polling data released in January, 2002 that showed strong support for a smokefree restaurant law. In the end, it was the persistence of the tobacco control advocates that carried the day. Honolulu's law set the stage for the Kaua'i and Maui ordinances that would follow shortly. During 2002 and 2003, each county in Hawai'i passed a smokefree restaurant or workplace law. By February 1, 2004, well over 80% of Hawai'i workplaces were smokefree and smoking was prohibited in virtually all restaurants. This status would set the tone for the passage of a sweeping statewide smokefree law. Polling data released in December, 2005 showed very strong public support for a statewide smokefree law. The statewide clean indoor air measure passed in 2006 with virtually no amendments from introduction to final passage, and with only three Nays in the Senate (out of 25) and three Nays in the House (out of 51). In 2007, a group of bar owners tried to undo the new statewide smokefree law in the Legislature and through a lawsuit claiming the law was unconstitutional. Tobacco control advocates prevailed in killing all of the bills that would have exempted some or all bars and restaurants with smoking rooms and the court dismissed the lawsuit. The Department of Health, however, as of July 1, 2008, had still failed to take any effective enforcement action against repeat violators of the smokefree law, to get local law enforcement agencies to act, or to issue the administrative rules required by the state law that went into effect November 16, 2006. There has been no sustained public education campaign about the public's power for enforcement. This failure made proactive implementation of the law all but impossible and created a situation that invites pro-tobacco forces to undermine the law's long-term effectiveness. Hawai'i has taken modest steps to control illegal sales of tobacco products to minors. Cigarette vending machines are restricted to venues in which minors under the age of 18 are not permitted, mobile food vendors (lunch wagons) are prohibited from selling or distributing cigarettes within 1,000 feet of any school, and the sale or distribution of single cigarettes or packs of cigarettes containing fewer than 20 cigarettes is prohibited. In 1998, the fines levied against individuals who sell or distribute tobacco products to minors were raised to $500 for the first offense and $2,000 for subsequent offenses. However, the law does not penalize the business owner for illegal sales to minors, which probably accounts for the large number of violations found in sting operations. In 1993, the tobacco industry was successful in replacing the Hawai'i ad valorem tax on cigarettes (40% of the wholesale price) with an excise tax, but this plan to reduce the size of the cigarette tax by switching to a per unit tax backfired. The per unit taxes established by state legislation between 1997 and 2007 exceeded the rates that cigarettes would have been taxed if the 40 percent ad valorem tax had remained in place. In 2006, the cigarette tax was increased by $.20 per pack per year over six years to $2.60. However, there were lost opportunities to add some of the new revenue from the increased cigarette taxes to tobacco control programs. In 2001, Hawai'i became one of the last states to require a tax stamp on cigarette packages to reduce smuggling and improve tax collections. The tax stamp was credited in a Department of Health report with reducing the number of smuggled cigarettes sold in Hawai'i and for increasing the tax revenues by $20 million annually. When the Legislature in 1999 split MSA funds into two accounts for tobacco control, one for the Department of Health and one in a Trust Fund, tobacco control advocates did achieve one goal of protecting funding from administrative diversion to programs other than tobacco control by putting the money in a nongovernmental organization. What they were not able to protect was the amount of funding that went into that Trust Fund, which was cut from 25% of MSA monies to 12.5% in 2002. Heavy lobbying by the University of Hawai'i to raid the MSA funds to build medical school facilities robbed tobacco control programs of vital resources. The 25% of the MSA funds that goes to the Department of Health is to be spent for a variety of health promotion and disease prevention programs, but the Department allocates relatively little to tobacco control. While Hawai'i has slowly improved its spending on tobacco control, it has never reached the 1999 CDC Best Practices recommendation of $10.8 to $23.4 million per year (reduced by CDC to $9.6 to $19.6 million per year in 2007. The closest it has come was 2006 when the Department of Health and the Trust Fund spent a total of $8.2 million on tobacco control. Despite these issues, there have been continuing declines in adult and youth smoking prevalence, though per capita cigarette consumption is not showing the steady decline we see nationally. When the Trust Fund was created from MSA monies, the legislation established an independent source of tobacco control funding, with its own Advisory Board, separate from the Department of Health which had its own MSA monies and its own tobacco control advisory group. Without any apparent statutory authority, the Department of Health has substantially interfered with that independence by effectively controlling how the Trust Fund spends its money on tobacco control by disapproving or requiring modifications of Trust Fund Advisory Board recommendations on funding, budgets and tobacco control programs.
The European Strategy for Tobacco Control (ESTC) reflects the increased political commitment to, and public health expectations of, tobacco control in WHO's European Region. It was adopted by the WHO Regional Committee for Europe at its fifty-second session in September 2002 and provides an evidence-based framework and guidance for effective national action and international cooperation. The ESTC builds on the lessons learnt from assessment of the three consecutive European Action Plans (1987–2001), the guiding principles set out in the Warsaw Declaration for a Tobacco-free Europe (February 2002), and the evidence underpinning tobacco control policy at national, regional and international level. The ESTC sets out strategic directions for action in the Region, to be carried out through national policies, legislation and action plans. It also makes recommendations regarding monitoring, evaluating and reporting on tobacco use and tobacco control policies. Finally, it specifies mechanisms, tools and a timeframe for international cooperation. The ESTC is an ongoing process, to be regularly reviewed and strategically adapted as appropriate.
Aims: Finland has implemented a gradually tightening tobacco control policy for decades. Recently the objective of a tobacco-free Finland was introduced. Still, the population's acceptance of tobacco control policy has not been measured. More knowledge is needed on differences in attitudes and factors associated with tobacco control opinions for future policy-making. Methods: A population-based study with quantitative analysis. Attitudes on smoking and tobacco control policy were assessed within the National FINRISK 2012 Study in Finland involving 25-74-year-old adults (N = 4905). In analyses, smoking status groups were compared. Results: In general, attitudes differed systematically by smoking status. Differences increased or decreased when moving from never smokers to other smoking groups. Similarities in attitudes were found particularly on youth smoking, while differences between smoking groups were notable on statements regarding smoking on balconies and availability of tobacco products. The adjusted analysis showed that smoking status was most strongly associated with attitudes on different tobacco control policy measures. Daily smokers viewed stricter tobacco control policy and workplace smoking bans more negatively than others, though they viewed societal support for quitters and sufficiency of tobacco control policy more positively compared with others. Differences were vast compared with non-smokers, but also occasional smokers differed from daily smokers. Conclusions: Tightening tobacco control and workplace smoking bans were supported by the Finnish adult population, but societal support for quitters to a lesser extent. Attitude change, where smokers are seen as deserving help to quit smoking, is important. ; Peer reviewed