Suchergebnisse

From today's decision by Judge Jeffrey Helmick (N.D. Ohio) in Doe 1 v. Gupta: On March 19, 2020, Manish Raj Gupta was indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a) and (b)(1), and one count of illegally dispensing a…

El tercero civilmente responsable es una figura jurídica que el legislador en la ley 600 de 2000 contemplaba como parte activa del proceso, por lo mismo, su presencia en el litigio se daba en toda la etapa procesal, situación que cambio de forma definitiva con la ley 906 de 2004, que limitó dicha participación bajo dos condiciones, la primera de ellas, posterior a un fallo condenatorio debidamente ejecutoriado, y segundo, invocado el denominado incidente de reparación, situación que para el tercero civilmente responsable resulta negativa y violatoria de garantías procesales, puesto que dentro del proceso penal se pueden debatir aspectos relevantes que de forma directa e indirecta afectan al tercero y que a causa de la disposición normativa contenida en ley 906 de 2004, no puede refutar o controvertir. En esta investigación se hará un análisis respecto a la regulación de la figura del tercero civilmente responsable que reposa tanto en el actual procedimiento penal, Ley 906 de 2004, que incorpora al sistema procesal la oralidad con tendencia acusatoria en Colombia, frente a las garantías que para el tercero rigen en el sistema de la Ley 600 de 2000; se expondrán las marcadas diferencias en cuanto a las exigencias constitucionales mínimas que deben orientar toda actuación judicial y que derivan de una escasa reglamentación del trámite del incidente de reparación integral, sumado a la oscuridad en la aplicación de normas penales o civiles en cuanto a la integración normativa se refiere, según la cual, en materias no reguladas en la legislación adjetiva, son aplicables las del Código de Procedimiento Civil, hoy nuevo Código General del Proceso. En el presente trabajo de investigación se hace un análisis de la institución procesal del tercero civilmente responsable y la manera como se encuentra regulada su participación en el sistema penal acusatorio colombiano, introducido a través del Acto Legislativo 03 de 2002, regulado legalmente en la Ley 906 de 2004 y demás modificaciones introducidas especialmente con la expedición de la Ley 1395 de 2010. ; The third civilly responsible is a legal figure that the legislator in the law 600 of 2000 contemplated as an active part of the process, therefore, its presence in the litigation was given throughout the procedural stage, a situation that changed definitively with the law 906 of 2004, which limited such participation under two conditions, the first one, after a conviction duly executed, and second, invoked the so-called reparation incident, a situation that for the third party responsible civilly is negative and violates procedural guarantees, since in the criminal process relevant aspects can be discussed that directly and indirectly affect the third party and that because of the normative provision contained in law 906 of 2004, can not refute or controvert. In this investigation an analysis will be made regarding the regulation of the figure of the third civilly responsible party that rests so much in the current criminal procedure, Law 906 of 2004, which incorporates into the procedural system the orality with an accusatory tendency in Colombia, against the guarantees that for the third they rule in the system of Law 600 of 2000; will be exposed the marked differences in terms of the minimum constitutional requirements that should guide any judicial action and that derive from a poor regulation of the process of the integral reparation incident, added to the obscurity in the application of penal or civil norms regarding the integration normative refers, according to which, in matters not regulated in the adjective legislation, those of the Code of Civil Procedure, today the new General Code of the Process, are applicable. In the present research work an analysis is made of the procedural institution of the third civilly responsible and the manner in which its participation in the Colombian accusatory criminal system is regulated, introduced through the Legislative Act 03 of 2002, legally regulated in Law 906 of 2004 and other modifications introduced especially with the issuance of Law 1395 of 2010.

PurposeCorporate social responsibility ("CSR") and its themes have taken root across the globe in the last 25 years. Corporations have generally responded by either embracing CSR as an important tool for productivity and value‐creation or by adapting to the changed and changing business environment caused by CSR. The third sector has a complex set of relationships with CSR, at times exhibiting tension about the changing role of corporations as a result of CSR. This paper seeks to show how conceptions of the value of CSR by corporations and third sector (CTS) organisations affect the nature and outcome of interactions between them.Design/methodology/approachThe paper provides a framework to assist in explicating the standpoint of an entity and its likely engagement with others in relation to CSR. The framework is used to compared CSR motivations across CTS organisations in order to show where those motivations and orientations are compatible or in conflict.FindingsThe paper finds that CTS organisations may be able to better predict the likelihood of success before engaging with a partner.Research limitations/implicationsThe frameworks identified will provide a basis for further research in relation to the pre‐engagement phase of corporate and third sector organisations partners.Practical implicationsThe paper will help practitioners and corporations engaging in CSR and those in the third sector seeking engagement to find mutually beneficial grounds for a sustainable relationship.Originality/valueThere is growing concern among those who need to manage the relationship to find better terms of engagement. However, ground is largely unexplored.

The purpose of the study was to elicit feedback from sex offenders about the components of treatment that they believed to be most helpful in preventing reoffense. A sample of civilly committed sex offenders from the Sand Ridge Civil Commitment Center in Wisconsin ( n = 44) was surveyed about their perceptions of treatment, including content, process, therapists, rules, and completion requirements. Clients were asked to rate the importance of treatment components to their recovery and to rate their satisfaction with the treatment they received for each component. Participants expressed fairly positive sentiments about their treatment experiences, though specific concerns were noted. There was an overall positive correlation between importance of and satisfaction with treatment, but ratings of importance were consistently higher than ratings of satisfaction. Implications for practice and future research are discussed.

A Critical Gambling Studies blog entry on responsible gambling. The interactive version of this blog is available at: https://criticalgamblingstudies.blogspot.com/2020/09/responsible-gambling-who-is-responsible.html

Thirty years ago, in Youngberg v. Romeo, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that those who are involuntarily committed in a state institution enjoy a constitutionally protected liberty interest, which protects the right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable restraint, and minimally adequate training sufficient to ensure these liberty interests. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that when government officials make decisions that constitute a substantial departure from professional judgment, causing injury to these liberty interests, the officials violate the substantive due process guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Despite the Supreme Court's admonition that those who are civilly committed in state institutions do not lose their core liberty interests and that they enjoy greater protection than convicted criminals, many lower courts have seriously eroded the substantive due process protection recognized in Youngberg. Two Supreme Court decisions, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services and County of Sacramento v. Lewis, have fueled this erosion. This Article seeks to revitalize Youngberg's protection of liberty for the civilly committed by explaining why neither DeShaney nor Lewis should be interpreted to limit the fundamental liberty interests recognized in Youngberg.