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Fifteen years ago, Jens Rydgren (2002) asked why no electorally successful radical right-wing party had yet emerged in Sweden. In this respect, Sweden was a negative case. Rydgren posited four main explanations: (1) social class mattered more in Sweden than elsewhere. Working class voters identified strongly with their social class and with the Social Democratic party, making them largely unavailable to radical right-wing mobilization; (2) socioeconomic issues still structured most politics in Sweden, and issues belonging to the sociocultural dimension – most importantly immigration – were of low salience for voters; (3) voters still perceived clear policy alternatives across the left-right divide; and (4) the leading radical right-wing alternative, the Sweden Democrats, was perceived as being too extreme. Since 2010, however, Sweden can no longer be considered a negative case, as the Sweden Democrats received 5.7 percent of the vote in the 2010 election and 12.9 percent in the 2014 election. In this paper we argue that in order to understand the rise and growth of the Sweden Democrats we should focus on changes in the factors enumerated above, that is: (1) the decline of class politics in Sweden; (2) the growing salience of sociocultural politics, and in particular the politicization of the immigration issue; (3) the increased convergence caused by a double move toward the center by the Social Democratic party and the Conservative party, leaving voters confused about policy alternatives; and (4) the process by which the Sweden Democrats have tried to distance the party from its neo-fascist past and erect a more respectable façade.

Fifteen years ago, Jens Rydgren (2002) asked why no electorally successful radical right-wing party had yet emerged in Sweden. In this respect, Sweden was a negative case. Rydgren posited four main explanations: (1) social class mattered more in Sweden than elsewhere. Working class voters identified strongly with their social class and with the Social Democratic party, making them largely unavailable to radical right-wing mobilization; (2) socioeconomic issues still structured most politics in Sweden, and issues belonging to the sociocultural dimension – most importantly immigration – were of low salience for voters; (3) voters still perceived clear policy alternatives across the left-right divide; and (4) the leading radical right-wing alternative, the Sweden Democrats, was perceived as being too extreme. Since 2010, however, Sweden can no longer be considered a negative case, as the Sweden Democrats received 5.7 percent of the vote in the 2010 election and 12.9 percent in the 2014 election. In this paper we argue that in order to understand the rise and growth of the Sweden Democrats we should focus on changes in the factors enumerated above, that is: (1) the decline of class politics in Sweden; (2) the growing salience of sociocultural politics, and in particular the politicization of the immigration issue; (3) the increased convergence caused by a double move toward the center by the Social Democratic party and the Conservative party, leaving voters confused about policy alternatives; and (4) the process by which the Sweden Democrats have tried to distance the party from its neo-fascist past and erect a more respectable façade.

This paper examines beliefs about the past across ethnic groups in conflict ridden Northern Iraq, and the extent to which such beliefs are associated with interethnic trust and political trust. Using individual-level survey data collected in 2010 and 2011 in the cities of Erbil and Kirkuk, we show that beliefs about the past are strongly structured by ethnicity, but that the ethnic composition of friendship networks is an important moderating factor. Our results also indicate that beliefs about the past play a significant role in interethnic trust as beliefs about the past connected to particular ethnic groups are often associated with trust in these groups. Beliefs about the past are also shown to be associated with trust in political institutions.

This paper examines beliefs about the past across ethnic groups in conflict ridden Northern Iraq, and the extent to which such beliefs are associated with interethnic trust and political trust. Using individual-level survey data collected in 2010 and 2011 in the cities of Erbil and Kirkuk, we show that beliefs about the past are strongly structured by ethnicity, but that the ethnic composition of friendship networks is an important moderating factor. Our results also indicate that beliefs about the past play a significant role in interethnic trust as beliefs about the past connected to particular ethnic groups are often associated with trust in these groups. Beliefs about the past are also shown to be associated with trust in political institutions.

Past research suggests that majority evaluations of welfare deservingness are structured along ethnic dividing lines. The fact that poverty and immigrant status are highly associated across Europe's increasingly ethnically diverse societies may thus lead majorities to withdraw support from welfare programs that transfer money to people who are different from themselves. Utilizing measures of general welfarism, most prior studies have not addressed the interplay between attitudes toward immigrants and support for specific welfare types that rely on different notions of entitlement and attract varying levels of take-up among natives and immigrants. Addressing this gap in the literature and focusing on the example of Germany, this paper asks to what extent anti-immigrant sentiment relates to native-born Germans' attitudes toward the government's responsibility to care for three recipient groups: the unemployed, the old, and the sick. Anti-immigrant attitudes expressed as ethnic prejudice are associated with lowered support for government intervention to assist the unemployed, while support for old-age and sickness assistance does not appear to be related to levels of negative out-group sentiment. The results suggest that those who harbor ethnic prejudice are more likely to oppose aid that is predominantly means-tested, rather than universal or contribution-based, and that does benefit a large number of non-natives. The negative association between prejudice and support for unemployment assistance is independent of concerns with the economic viability of the welfare system in the face of immigration. This points to the relevance of negative affect beyond subjectively rational motives.

Past research suggests that majority evaluations of welfare deservingness are structured along ethnic dividing lines. The fact that poverty and immigrant status are highly associated across Europe's increasingly ethnically diverse societies may thus lead majorities to withdraw support from welfare programs that transfer money to people who are different from themselves. Utilizing measures of general welfarism, most prior studies have not addressed the interplay between attitudes toward immigrants and support for specific welfare types that rely on different notions of entitlement and attract varying levels of take-up among natives and immigrants. Addressing this gap in the literature and focusing on the example of Germany, this paper asks to what extent anti-immigrant sentiment relates to native-born Germans' attitudes toward the government's responsibility to care for three recipient groups: the unemployed, the old, and the sick. Anti-immigrant attitudes expressed as ethnic prejudice are associated with lowered support for government intervention to assist the unemployed, while support for old-age and sickness assistance does not appear to be related to levels of negative out-group sentiment. The results suggest that those who harbor ethnic prejudice are more likely to oppose aid that is predominantly means-tested, rather than universal or contribution-based, and that does benefit a large number of non-natives. The negative association between prejudice and support for unemployment assistance is independent of concerns with the economic viability of the welfare system in the face of immigration. This points to the relevance of negative affect beyond subjectively rational motives.

Like in many other European countries, the political system has undergone rapid changes in Sweden as a radical right-wing party – The Sweden Democrats (SD) – has grown from a negligible position into one of the country's largest parties. SD has been winning voters from both the right and the left sides of the political spectrum, and particularly from Sweden's two largest parties, the Conservative Party (Moderaterna, M) and the Social Democratic Party (S). The present study investigated the extent to which SD voters that previously voted for one of these two parties differ from each other, as well as compared these SD voters with current Conservative Party and Social Democratic voters. Results showed that 1) economic deprivation offers a better explanation for the past mobility from S, than from M, to the SD; 2) no group differences were found between previous M and S voters in attitudes connected to the appeal of an anti-establishment party; and 3) views on the profile issues espoused by the radical right, most importantly opposition to immigration, did not differ between SD voters who come from M and S. However, SD voters – particularly SD voters who previously voted for the Social Democratic party – differed from the voters of their previous parties in several aspects. It is thus possible that many SD voters will not return to the parties they previously voted for, at least as long as the immigration issue continues to be of high salience in the society.

With the aim of studying the role of contextual factors for explaining within-country variation in the vote share of the radical right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats, in the 2014 Swedish election, we specify and test hypotheses pertaining to social marginality and ethnic threat. An important finding is that change (increase) is more important than the actual proportion of non-European immigrants for explaining the electoral support of the Sweden Democrats. Moreover, our results indicate that the increase in non-European born residents is positively associated with the vote share of the Sweden Democrats primarily in districts where the proportion of non-European-born residents was already high. This finding contradicts the defended neighborhood hypothesis, as well as the findings of Rink et al. (2009). This suggested tipping-point effect runs counter to the contact hypothesis, while being more in line with ethnic threat and group position theories. Also, our results suggest that a higher level of aggregation, such as at the municipal or region labor market level, is sometimes more relevant when measuring contextual explanations than the more fine-grained level of voting districts. The social marginalization hypothesis receives mixed support.

With the aim of studying the role of contextual factors for explaining within-country variation in the vote share of the radical right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats, in the 2014 Swedish election, we specify and test hypotheses pertaining to social marginality and ethnic threat. An important finding is that change (increase) is more important than the actual proportion of non-European immigrants for explaining the electoral support of the Sweden Democrats. Moreover, our results indicate that the increase in non-European born residents is positively associated with the vote share of the Sweden Democrats primarily in districts where the proportion of non-European-born residents was already high. This finding contradicts the defended neighborhood hypothesis, as well as the findings of Rink et al. (2009). This suggested tipping-point effect runs counter to the contact hypothesis, while being more in line with ethnic threat and group position theories. Also, our results suggest that a higher level of aggregation, such as at the municipal or region labor market level, is sometimes more relevant when measuring contextual explanations than the more fine-grained level of voting districts. The social marginalization hypothesis receives mixed support.

Despite acknowledgments that social capital has an unequal distribution more empiric evidence knowledge is needed on how sociability acts different for women and men. Given the established connection between sociability and wealth, differential access to social resources could enlighten the gender asset gap (Deere and Doss 2006) in access to resources. This article uses data from a formal survey undertaken in 2006 in rural Ethiopia, to study the gendered patterns of sociability covering a probability sample comprising 464 farming women and men residing in four different communities. Ethnography is further used to assist in the analysis. The empirical analysis focuses on women's and men's access to local forms of sociability, using descriptive statistics, and a specific analytical eye focuses on those women who head their own households. The results show that there are variations in associational patterns that can be attributed to gender, and that a significantly larger proportion of men than women are members in government organizations, productive organizations and NGO:s. Men are also both more organized and connected than women are, and significantly more often than women lead local organizations. Women who head their own households are least involved of all in local forms of sociability, contributing to the specific vulnerability of this group.

Despite acknowledgments that social capital has an unequal distribution more empiric evidence knowledge is needed on how sociability acts different for women and men. Given the established connection between sociability and wealth, differential access to social resources could enlighten the gender asset gap (Deere and Doss 2006) in access to resources. This article uses data from a formal survey undertaken in 2006 in rural Ethiopia, to study the gendered patterns of sociability covering a probability sample comprising 464 farming women and men residing in four different communities. Ethnography is further used to assist in the analysis. The empirical analysis focuses on women's and men's access to local forms of sociability, using descriptive statistics, and a specific analytical eye focuses on those women who head their own households. The results show that there are variations in associational patterns that can be attributed to gender, and that a significantly larger proportion of men than women are members in government organizations, productive organizations and NGO:s. Men are also both more organized and connected than women are, and significantly more often than women lead local organizations. Women who head their own households are least involved of all in local forms of sociability, contributing to the specific vulnerability of this group.

In analyzing the Swedish case, this paper aims at filling a void in earlier theorizing about the emergence of radical right-wing populist (RRP) parties by showing the impact of organizational factors. First, organizational factors may contribute to our understanding of how favorable opportunity structures arise, in particular how niches emerge in the electoral arena. Secondly, a focus on organizational factors directs our attention to why some newly founded RRP parties may have short-term advantages in maximizing voter support. This is particularly true of parties with a hierarchical or even authoritarian structure and access to external resources, which lessens the dependency on party members⎯while making them especially vulnerable in the longer run. Thirdly, this paper strongly indicates that the relative failure of Swedish RRP parties may depend as much on organizational factors as on the demand side and supply side factors that have been the main focus of earlier research.