Suchergebnisse

In this chapter I provide an overview of the political economy of taxation in democratic states by considering the three most important issues in the field: (1) the evolution of the power to tax in (what are now) the mature constitutional democracies; (2) the nature and determinants of modern tax structures; and (3) redistribution in pluralistic societies over various horizons and in the face of economic shocks. The discussion considers the ideas and models that have arisen as scholars have grappled with these related issues, and points to some of the outstanding problems that may be worth pursuing in future research.

In this chapter I provide an overview of the political economy of taxation in democratic states by considering the three most important issues in the field: (1) the evolution of the power to tax in (what are now) the mature constitutional democracies; (2) the nature and determinants of modern tax structures; and (3) redistribution in pluralistic societies over various horizons and in the face of economic shocks. The discussion considers the ideas and models that have arisen as scholars have grappled with these related issues, and points to some of the outstanding problems that may be worth pursuing in future research.

"We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behavior of a monopolist." (author's abstract)

We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behavior of a monopolist.

AbstractWe analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales tax increases in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of the tax burden to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers, as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behaviour of a monopolist. Several control treatments corroborate this finding.

This paper studies the implications of monopsony power for optimal income taxation and welfare. Firms observe workers' abilities while the government does not and monopsony power determines what share of the labor market surplus is translated into profits. Monopsony power increases the tax incidence that falls on firms. This makes labor income taxes less (more) effective in redistributing labor income (profits). The optimal tax schedule is less progressive. Monopsony power alleviates the equity-efficiency trade-off that occurs because the government does not observe ability, but at the expense of exacerbating capital income inequality. I illustrate these findings for the US economy.