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AbstractThis paper investigates the effects of a borrowing firm's CEO inside debt holdings on the structure of the firm's syndicated loans. When a borrowing firm's CEO has a higher level of inside debt holdings, syndicate loans have a larger number of lenders and are less concentrated, and lead arrangers will retain a smaller portion of loans. In addition, CEO inside debt holdings have a lesser effect on the syndicate structure when lead arrangers have a prior lending relationship with the borrowing firm or the CEOs are close to retirement, while CEO inside debt holdings have greater influence on the syndicate structure when the borrowing firm has low information transparency.

Do development banks influence syndicate structure? Using a global dataset across 48 countries of 11,949 syndicated loans from 2001 to 2016, we show that lead banks decrease their loan shares and form less concentrated structures in mixed syndicates that include both development banks and private-sector banks as participant lenders. In line with the social view on the role of development banks, we find that such an effect is stronger during periods of financial instability, particularly for the green industry and in the case of borrowers that are financially constrained. Conversely, we do not find any evidence that mixed syndicates exhibit a different syndicate structure for political distortions. Lastly, we find that mixed syndicates are not associated with higher covenant violations and an increasing of the borrowers' risk profile after the loan origination. Our results are robust when accounting for, among others, relationship lending, asymmetric information within the syndicate, lenders' lending expertise, borrowers' opacity, types of loan, and ranking hierarchy in the syndicate.

Do development banks affect the structure of loan syndicates? We argue that development banks' participation in syndicates can reduce the lead banks' monitoring efforts and generate higher risk diversification across lenders. Using a global dataset of syndicated loans from 2001 to 2016 for 105 countries and 44,899 deals, we show that the lead banks decrease their loan shares and form less concentrated syndicates when development banks are participant lenders. These syndicates are also composed of a higher number of foreign lenders that retain greater loan shares. We also find that development banks are not associated with higher covenant violations. Our results are robust when accounting for relationship lending, asymmetric information within the syndicate, lenders' lending expertise, borrower opacity, types of loan, and ranking hierarchy in the syndicate, among others.

En Belgique, 85 % des chômeurs environ sont syndiqués. Les chômeurs représentent entre 15 et 20 % des effectifs syndicaux. Ces taux élevés sont liés au rôle de premier plan que les syndicats jouent dans le versement des allocations de chômage, un système qui remonte à l'origine même des syndicats. Comme prestataires de services et groupements de défense individuelle et collective des chômeurs, ils établissent un rapport spécifique avec leurs membres sans emploi. À partir du milieu des années 1970, des comités de chômeurs se sont progressivement constitués à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur des deux principales organisations syndicales. Il a cependant fallu attendre le début de la décennie suivante pour que la CSC, puis la FGTB, octroient à leurs groupes de sans-emploi un statut au sein de leurs structures. Jean Faniel étudie l'origine de ces groupes, leur développement et leurs revendications. Mais auparavant il présente l'origine du système d'indemnisation du chômage et ses implications pour les syndicats et leurs affiliés. Ce détour par l'histoire permet en effet de comprendre les tensions entre les fonctions de gestion et de revendication dans les syndicats.